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1Abstract
Where does conscious experience stop and the rest of the world begin? Is the material 
basis of consciousness confined to the brain, or can it be extended to include other parts 
of the body and environmental elements? This study proposes an extended account: when 
all the requirements are fulfilled, an external tool may become part of the realising basis 
for certain experiential processes. Andy Clark and David Chalmers argued famously that 
the material basis of cognitive states sometimes extends out of the barriers of skin and 
skull to external objects such as notebooks and other everyday tools. However, they draw 
the line there: only cognition, but not consciousness can have an extended base. The 
central argument of this study is that their constraint is not legitimate. If one is accepted, 
the other one follows. Many externalist philosophers tend to dismiss this and assume that 
the experiential side can be ruled out, or rather, left in (the head). This study makes 
explicit the reasons why conscious experience extends as well.
The first chapter lays an overview of the theoretical background of externalism and the 
4E-theories in present-day philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. It also examines 
the central concepts, accounts and methodological questions that will be used and further 
developed in later chapters. The second chapter presents three arguments for the position 
defended in this thesis, namely the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The third 
chapter analyses the ongoing debate in the interface of philosophy of mind and philosophy 
of science about the causal–constitution distinction, and argues that rather than in 
mechanist terms, the causal–constitution distinction should be interpreted in diachronic 
terms when dealing with mental phenomena. When depicted that way, the extension 
relation in the hypothesis of extended conscious mind counts as constitutive.
The fourth chapter distinguishes between several different levels of extension, from mere 
short-term extension to more robust functional incorporation, where the external tool has 
become part of the transparent bodily point of view of the subject. Based on the notion of 
functional incorporation, a set of demarcation criteria for the hypothesis of extended 
conscious mind will be developed. The chapter closes by discussing sensory substitution 
as a concrete example of functional incorporation. Finally, the fifth chapter introduces the 
most influential counter-arguments that have been set forth against the hypothesis of 
extended conscious mind. The critiques will be examined and answered.
2Abstrakti
Missä tietoinen kokemus loppuu ja muu maailma alkaa? Rajoittuuko tietoisuuden 
materiaalinen pohja aivotoimintaan vai voiko se laajentua myös muuhun ruumiiseen ja 
vuorovaikutukseen ympäristön kanssa? Tämä tutkimus puolustaa laajentunutta kantaa: 
kun tietyt ennakkoehdot on täytetty, ruumiin ulkopuolinen apuväline voi tulla osaksi 
tietoisten kokemusten materiaalista toteutuspohjaa. Andy Clark ja David Chalmers 
esittivät kuuluisassa artikkelissaan, että ulkomaailman apuvälineet – kuten muistikirjat tai 
tietokoneet – voivat olla kognitiivisten prosessien muodostamisessa mukana siinä missä 
biologiset ruumiinosatkin. Clark ja Chalmers kuitenkin rajoittivat laajentumisen tähän: 
heidän mukaansa pelkästään kognitiivisilla prosesseilla voi olla laajentunut perusta, mutta 
tietoinen kokemus rajoittuu pään sisään. Tämän tutkimuksen ydinargumentti on, että itse 
asiassa tällaista rajanvetoa ei ole mahdollista tehdä johdonmukaisesti. Jos hyväksymme 
kognitiivisten tilojen laajentumisen, tietoinen kokemus seuraa usein mukana. Tämän 
tutkimuksen uusi avaus ja keskeisin tavoite on osoittaa, että tietoiset kokemukset voivat 
laajentua siinä missä kognitiiviset prosessitkin.
Ensimmäinen luku kartoittaa eksternalistisen mielenfilosofian taustaa sekä asettaa 
tutkimuksen niin kutsuttujen 4E-teorioiden kontekstiin (embodied, embedded, enacted,
extended). Toinen luku esittelee kolme argumenttia laajentuneen tietoisen kokemuksen 
puolesta. Kolmas luku analysoi tieteenfilosofian ja mielenfilosofian rajapinnalla olevaa 
kysymystä siitä, onko mielen toimintojen laajentumisessa kyse kausaalisesta vai 
konstitutiivisesta suhteesta. Neljäs luku erottelee laajentumisen tasoja tai asteita, aina 
lyhytkestoisesta laajentumisesta (esim. kynän ja paperin käyttö) syvempään 
”funktionaaliseen inkorporaatioon” (esim. sokeankepin tai aistikorvaavuuslaite-
teknologian käyttö). Viides luku esittelee keskeisimmät vasta-argumentit, joita 
laajentuneen tietoisuuden teoriaa vastaan on esitetty (esim. unien ja hallusinaatioiden 
olemassaolo ja skeptinen ajatuskoe aivoista altaassa) sekä vastaa niihin.
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91. A Roadmap from the Extended Mind to the Extended
Conscious Mind
1.1. Introduction
In her Aeon -essay, Karina Vold (2018) describes a dramatic scene that took place in 2017 
in Texas, where a gunman shot 26 people. In the course of fleeing, his car fell into a ditch 
and he died. The shocking story doesn’t end here. During investigations, FBI pressed the 
dead gunman’s finger on his iPhone, which had a fingerprint recognition for unlocking it. 
Regardless of the fact that the subject happened to be a mass shooter, it is an alarming 
idea that the police can enter a person’s “digital afterlife” by using their corpse.
The lesson learned from this rather distressing story is the same Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers (1998) set forth in their Analysis paper: where does the mind stop and the rest 
of the world begin? Did the police merely break into the gunman’s smartphone, or did 
they also break into his mind? Smartphones are so deeply intertwined with us that it is 
difficult to disentangle the functions of our minds and the ones we perform with 
smartphones. Our smartphones “know” us better than our friends, spouses or even 
ourselves, at least where quantity of information is concerned. Many of the functions that 
we used to do “in our heads” only a decade ago, are nowadays extended to combine not 
only our brain functions, but also our smartphones and other similar devices. Smartphones 
have become part of our minds.
In this thesis, I modify Clark and Chalmers’s question, and ask instead: where does 
conscious experience stop and the rest of the world begin? I argue that the skin and skull 
frontier is not always the answer, but sometimes the material realisers of conscious 
experience extend outside the bodily boundaries to include external elements. Extension 
happens with devices that are incorporated into the bodily functions, so that they have 
become part of the transparent perspective of the subject. Consider, for example, a blind 
person using a white cane in order to be able to move around. The cane has become part 
of her point of view: she doesn’t primarily experience the cane in her hand, but instead 
the world (what the surfaces feel like, etc.) at the tip of the cane. I argue that the material 
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realisers of these experiences are extended to involve also the cane, and not only her 
neural functions. Hence, according to my position, neural functions are necessary, but are 
not always sufficient for conscious experience.
Philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences have traditionally conceived mental processes 
as something that occur in the head. Material realisers are strictly limited to neural 
functions and the central nervous system. However, in the recent couple of decades, an 
increasing number of philosophers have questioned the brain-boundedness of the mind, 
and instead characterised mental functions as processes that include the body and the 
environment. Susan Hurley (2010, 104) asks, “what is so magical about the boundary 
around internal factors?” She calls this persistent internalist idea the magical membrane
argument. However, there are no conceptual or logical requirements for internalism: 
“there is nothing about the notion of the subpersonal that restricts it to the neural in 
particular” (Ward 2012, 733). 
Humans have always used various external tools and technologies to enhance, replace 
and create new functions. Off-loading the cognitive burden in the environment is not a 
new phenomenon – even though it has taken striking forms with recent technological 
development. Already Plato wrote [sic] that writing works as an external memory for 
humans (in his Phaedrus dialogue). According to Clark (2003), we have always exploited 
environmental elements – incorporated and integrated material tools and cultural 
practices into ourselves. Biology has been intertwined with technology for a long time, 
and it is a completely “normal” situation for us. It is possible because of brain plasticity: 
our brains are sculpted by the tools we incorporate and by the activities we engage in.
The “E-Turn”1 has become an auspicious line in philosophy of mind and the cognitive 
sciences starting from the 1990s. It includes e.g. enactivism and the embodied approach
(Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991), dynamical systems theory (Thelen & Smith 1994), 
distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995), extended cognition (Clark 1997; Clark & 
Chalmers 1998), and sensorimotor enactivism (Hurley 1998; O’Regan & Noë 2001). E-
turn is a cluster of philosophical and scientific theories that reject the brain-boundedness 
of cognition. It is often referred to as the theory of the 4E’s (embodied, embedded,
enacted, extended). The roots of the E’s lie, of course, deeper in history. Some of the most 
important earlier influences include James J. Gibson’s (1979) ecological psychology and 
                                                
1 A term coined by Dan Hutto. 
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theory of affordances, Rodney Brooks’s (1990) experiments in embodied, situated 
robotics, Jakob von Uexküll’s (1934) notion of Umwelt as describing the subjectively 
produced surroundings, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) phenomenology of the 
body. Obviously, the list could be extended, but that has to be left for historical surveys.
One single remarkably influential paper that has promoted the spreading of externalism 
is Andy Clark’s and David Chalmers’s “The Extended Mind” (1998), where they set the 
stage for a long-lasting discussion and debate.2 According to their extended mind thesis 
(EM), the material basis of cognition can be extended across brain, body and world. 
However, Clark (2009; 2012) and Chalmers (2008; 2017) deny that experiential states, 
such as perceptual experiences could be extended. Many philosophers who are 
sympathetic towards cognitive extension tend to agree with Clark (and Chalmers), and 
leave conscious experience in the head. However, recent developments in the embodied, 
enacted cognition and sensorimotor approach have created an appeal for a broader view. 
That is precisely what I will do in this thesis. I will argue for a broader position according 
to which not only cognition, but also consciousness can extend, and call it the thesis of 
extended conscious mind (ECM).
One worry that arises is that if we accept that the gunman’s smartphone was part of his 
mind, where does that take us? Is my laptop part of my mind, and what about the holiday 
pictures I have saved on it? What about Wikipedia, or the whole of the Internet? Or 
consider pen and paper, a calendar, eyeglasses, a blind person’s cane, a hearing aid or a 
navigator. Technologies and skills such as Braille writing, playing the violin, body 
hacking, augmented reality – or an old couple completing each other’s sentences and 
looking back on their past from their shared point of view. Not all of these examples 
qualify as extended mind.3 Clark and Chalmers’s EM comes with instructions when and 
where the extension can happen, and which requirements need to be fulfilled. In this 
thesis, I will provide a similar treatment regarding ECM. I will give demarcation criteria 
of what kind of conditions need to be satisfied for something to count as an instance of 
ECM.
                                                
2 Before 1998, Clark had already introduced the idea of the mind extending outside the skin and skull in his 
1997 book. However, the 1998 paper with Chalmers hit the jackpot. Chalmers has not written about these 
topics much since the original article, whereas it is a lifetime’s work for Andy Clark.
3 This is related to one of the first counter-arguments that was presented against EM, namely the cognitive 
bloat argument, which brings out the difficulty of demarcating the boundaries of extension. Especially the 
third and fourth chapters will provide responses to this critique.
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1.2. The Concepts of Cognition and Consciousness
Let us now inspect two central notions that are used throughout this thesis: cognition and 
consciousness. There is no consensus amongst philosophers or cognitive scientists about 
the definition of either of the terms, nor where their limits are, nor how they are materially 
realised. I do not think it is possible to give stringent definitions for these concepts in the 
first place, neither do I think there is a mark of the cognitive or a mark of the conscious
that would always lead to an infallible demarcation. (Adams and Aizawa’s critique based 
on the mark of the cognitive will be discussed in the third chapter.) However, in what 
follows, I will outline some ways in which the concepts have been used in the sciences of 
the mind, and explain how I will use them in this study.4
Let us start with ‘cognition’. It is a term used by many, but defined by few. It is found in 
the titles of research fields (such as cognitive science and cognitive psychology), but the 
researchers in these fields might have varying ideas of its meaning. In a call for papers 
for a journal about cognition, Charles Abramson says he made a brief survey of 
psychology textbooks, and found fifteen different definitions of cognition (Arstila 
2016b). It is often said to contain at least dispositional beliefs, memory, attention, 
decision-making, reasoning, problem-solving, using language and other features 
connected with thinking in general.
Some take cognition as a natural kind, and others think it is better captured by focusing 
on typical examples. Cognition is not understood as a natural kind in this thesis. Instead, 
I follow the latter conduct: defining cognition by appealing to typical examples of 
cognition. However, this approach is not unproblematic either, because what are 
considered “typical examples” vary significantly depending on the theoretical framework. 
(See the discussion in Newen, Gallagher & De Bruin 2018.)
The central discrepancy (for the purposes of this thesis) lies between the cognitivist and 
enactivist understandings of ‘cognition’.5 According to the cognitivist reading, cognition 
                                                
4 When it comes to even more primary terms, I use ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ as synonyms, and they contain both 
cognitive and conscious processes. In other words, cognition and consciousness are subcategories of 
mind/mental. (‘Mental’ though is not the most advantageous term, as it might suggest a contrast with 
‘material’. This, however, is not my aim.)
5 Both cognitivism and enactivism are introduced in the next sub-section, and are discussed in further details 
in later chapters.
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is manipulation of representations, while the enactivist notion refers to the autonomous 
embodied agent’s interactive relationship with her environment. The former has 
influenced how the concept is used in analytic philosophy of mind, whereas the latter has 
to a great extent shaped how it is used in the 4E-framework. However, to make things 
more complicated, not all of the 4E literature use the concept in the enactivist way. 
Especially, it is crucial to notice that the original Extended Mind account by Clark and 
Chalmers is not using an enactivist concept of cognition, but rather a functionalist, 
cognitivism-influenced one that is also familiar from analytic philosophy of mind. This 
embeds a tension within the research that encompasses both Clark and Chalmers’s 
account and enactivism – from which the present study is not safe. There is an ongoing 
debate whether accounts based on functionalism (such as Clark & Chalmers’s) can be 
fitted with enactivist accounts (for discussion, see e.g. Kiverstein & Clark 2009). The jury 
is still out. This thesis is one attempt to bridge the gap, and to bring the two standpoints 
closer.
Clark and Chalmers’s argument was established within the analytic philosophy of mind 
that understands cognition as something that is realised in the head. Without breaking out
of the analytical framework altogether, perhaps the only option was simply to move the 
physical barrier but not otherwise change the concept. Critical voices have said later (see 
e.g. Hutto & Myin 2012) that this kind of framing repeats the internalist assumptions: on 
the default case, cognition is something that occurs in the head, and extensions are just 
exceptions that bring the normally internally-realised functions into a wider realm. Even 
though I agree with the criticism that the way Clark and Chalmers (and many of their 
followers) use the concept of cognition does not reorient it as thoroughly as is needed, I 
still think the extension they made within the analytical framework was highly valuable. 
The extending needed to start from somewhere.
On the other hand, in enactivism extension is not a deviation but is inherently embedded 
in the enactivist concept of cognition. In a way, it doesn’t even make sense to talk about 
extension, because in enactivism, the non-extended cases are the ones that count as 
abnormalities. In the enactivist account, what requires explanation is cognition that is not 
based on extension and interaction. For example, in the fifth chapter, I look at some 
enactivist ways to explain the occurrence of dreams (which is an often used example of a 
phenomenon that at least prima facie seems internally realised, and hence exceptional and 
challenging for enactivists).
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Hutto and Myin have introduced the notion of extensive mind that aims to improve the 
problematic nature of Clark and Chalmers’s use of extension. According to them, “minds 
are already, in their basic nature, extensive and wide-ranging” (Hutto & Myin 2012, 7). 
Thus, they distance themselves from the analytical reading of EM that does not exclude 
internally realised cognitive states. However, my starting point is Clark and Chalmers’s 
EM, hence I am operating in a framework where ‘extension’ is needed. I will, however, 
go beyond that framing, and embrace the enactivist picture, which ultimately criticises 
the analytical framework. Even though the two frameworks proceed to the matter from 
opposing directions – Clark and Chalmers’s EM is trying to find arguments why extension 
sometimes happens, and enactivism is trying to find explanations why extension 
sometimes doesn’t happen – they still share a common goal: a criticism of intracranialism. 
Despite the tension, I think the two frameworks can be used together for a common 
purpose. This thesis pursues to extend the extended mind: lead the analytic reading of EM 
to the enactivist sphere where consciousness comes along.
Another ambiguity between the two interpretations is that according to the cognitivist 
reading, cognition is not experiential, while according to the enactivist reading, it is 
experiential. As one of my central aims in this study is to show that Clark’s EM (which 
deals with the non-experiential concept of cognition) leads to experiential extension 
(ECM), I have to use the concepts in the same way as Clark. Hence, cognition, by 
definition, is non-experiential. In addition, there are cognitive processes that are 
undoubtedly not conscious (such as blind-sight). Cognition and consciousness are not
identical.
However, in practice, they often occur together. As there are non-conscious cognitive 
processes, there are also cognitive processes that are undoubtedly conscious (such as 
occurrent episodic memories). It is often impossible to tell where one ends and the other 
one begins. I will criticise the strict separation of cognition and consciousness in the 
second chapter (2.2.). The critique concerns empirical occurrences of cognition and 
consciousness – not the bottom-line conceptual differentiation. The crux is that cognition 
and consciousness overlap, and they are often difficult to keep apart neatly in real-life 
situations. Still, the conceptual differentiation remains. (It is also worth noting that the 
relation between the concepts of cognition and consciousness is not in a central role in 
chapters 3, 4 or 5, nor in the second and third arguments in chapter 2.)
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Let us now turn to the concept of conscious experience.6 If the concept of cognition was 
already multifaceted, consciousness is undoubtedly one of the most charged concepts in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. Scientists often try to avoid it altogether, and analytic 
philosophers of mind have created the most extraordinary ways of treating it – from bats 
to zombies. However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, conscious experience is actually 
simpler to define than cognition, since it covers a narrower area than cognition. In this
thesis, conscious experience simply refers to phenomenality – that the mental state has a 
phenomenal side to it, that it feels like something to undergo it. It doesn’t refer to the 
general capability of being a conscious creature, or being awake and possessing
awareness; in other words, it doesn’t refer to creature consciousness (see Bayne 2007). 
Instead, the concept is used to refer to particular states or processes that are experienced 
in a certain way.
The discrepancy between the cognitivist and enactivist accounts described earlier also 
affects how the concept of consciousness is understood. Within analytic philosophy of 
mind, starting from Thomas Nagel’s (1974) famous paper, conscious experience has been 
understood as certain properties of “somethingness” it feels like to undergo an experience. 
This what-it-is-like-ness is often described in similar terms as the nowadays less 
fashionable notion, qualia. It conceives experiential states as static, intrinsic properties –
snap-shots of redness, painfulness, sweetness, coldness and so on. Opponents in the same 
framework (eliminativists who deny the existence of qualitative states) also use the 
concept in the same way.
This understanding of consciousness faces trouble when combined with the concept of 
cognition in the same framework and by the same writers. If cognition is understood in 
terms of computation, consciousness is difficult to fit into the picture, because 
consciousness clearly isn’t computation. This has resulted famously in the hard problem 
of consciousness (Chalmers 1996) and the explanatory gap (Levine 1983). (See the 
discussion in the second chapter and Kiverstein 2016.) On the other hand, when cognition 
is understood in terms of enactivism, consciousness is already on board. When cognition 
is not understood as computation, there is no reason to assume an unbridgeable gap 
                                                
6 I use synonymously the terms ‘consciousness’, ‘conscious experience’, ‘phenomenal experience’, 
‘experiential state’, ‘experiential process’ and other versions of these terms.
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between the two. This is the reason why many enactivists state that the “hard problem” 
doesn’t arise in the first place (see e.g. Kiverstein 2016; Silberstein & Chemero 2015).
Further, the explanandum of consciousness is not the same in autopoietic and 
sensorimotor enactivisms. (This subdivision within enactivism will be presented in the 
following section.) While autopoietic enactivism describes consciousness as an 
autonomous agent’s dynamically evolving relationship with its environment, 
sensorimotor enactivism focuses on perceptual experiences, which are based on our 
actions in the environment. According to sensorimotor enactivism, perceptual experience 
is “something we do”, as Alva Noë (2004, 1) famously wrote. Autopoietic notion is a way 
to explain creature consciousness, whereas sensorimotor enactivism deals with state 
consciousness.
To sum up, my use of ‘conscious experience’ refers to the phenomenal quality of mental 
states. It is the same feature that Nagel was referring to – even though I don’t ascribe to 
all of the theoretical assumptions that lie behind the legacy of Nagel’s conceptual work. 
The difference between my use and the analytic philosophy’s use is that I reject the static 
atom-like nature that was encouraged by the notion of qualia. Further, even though I 
follow Clark and Chalmers’s conceptual framework for the sake of argument, overall my 
view is closer to enactivism’s concept of cognition and consciousness. I criticise the 
cognitivist picture that understands cognition as computation, and this criticism gives the 
result that phenomenal experience doesn’t have to be something extraneous. The target 
of ECM is particular perceptual experiences – processes such as reaching for an object, 
hearing a melody, or spatial navigation such as moving around in a room, namely, 
perceptual interactions that have a phenomenal quality in them.
To conclude, ECM is hard to accept for analytic philosophers of mind who are 
sympathetic towards EM, because it challenges the strict separation between cognition 
and consciousness. On the other hand, ECM might be trivial for enactivists who accept 
EM, since for them, cognition by definition already comprises experiential aspects. 
Hence, this thesis is valuable for both parties; for an analytic philosopher, because it 
shows that consciousness cannot be cut out neatly from accounts of cognition, and for an 
enactivist, because it addresses an extension of phenomenality that has been taken for 
granted but never really spelled out in explicit terms.
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1.3. 4E’s: Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended
In recent years, different sorts of externalist views in philosophy of mind and the cognitive 
sciences have often been combined under the title ‘4E cognition’. Mind is embodied, that 
is, it is partly constituted by bodily processes; mind is embedded in its surroundings 
(Umwelt); mind is enacted through the agent’s actions in the environment; and finally 
mind is extended to consist of external elements as its constitutive parts. The 
embeddedness thesis is a causal claim, whereas the extended thesis is a constitutive claim. 
The causal–constitutive distinction is the demarcation criterion between those two views. 
The embodiment and enacted theses are used in a less strict way in the literature: they are 
sometimes used as causal and sometimes as constitutive claims. However, throughout this 
thesis, I will treat them as constitutive theses. Thus, only one of the E’s is causal 
(embedded), but the rest of the E’s always describe a constitutive relation. In the 
following, I will take a closer look at each of the 4E’s. 
Embodied
According to the embodied mind thesis, different aspects of the mind are intrinsically 
dependent on bodily functions. Depending on the writer, these aspects can include, for 
example, cognition (e.g. Gallagher 2005), perceptual experiences (e.g. Noë 2004), or 
affective states such as emotions and moods (e.g. Colombetti 2014). In all of these cases, 
the physical body and its functions are part of the constitutive basis for the mental function 
in question. The body shapes, enables and sets the limits for our minds. Its anatomy, 
structure, motor capabilities, etc. determine how we perceive the world and what we can 
do in it.
At least in principle, the embodiment approach can be accepted without the other E’s. 
Consider the claim that conscious experience is embodied: technically, it is fulfilled when 
the body (and no other external processes) makes up part of the material basis of the 
experience in question. Nevertheless, if one accepts the embodiment, it is quite natural to 
continue to the other E’s. The embedded and extended theses leak into the picture, because 
it is difficult to set the limits of the body. A prosthesis, glasses, a blind’s cane, sensory 
substitution devices and other non-biological devices can be incorporated into the body 
and into the bodily point of view – and as a result, the borders of the body get blurred. 
The enacted thesis, on the other hand, comes in because it is difficult, if not impossible, 
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to differentiate the body from the actions it performs. The embodiment thesis, on the other 
hand, is necessary for the other three E’s. It is not possible to embed or extend in the 
environment without a body as part of the process. Neither is it possible to enact in an 
environment without a body – actions between the subject and her environment are 
necessarily embodied. Thus, the embodiment thesis is a gateway to the other E’s. 
The embodied approach will be discussed especially in the second chapter, where I argue 
that accepting the embodiment of experiences leads to ECM. It will also be discussed in 
the fourth chapter, where I differentiate between levels of embodiment and extension, 
from shorter-term uses of external tools to profounder cases of incorporation.
Embedded 
According to the embedded thesis, the environment is necessary for the mind – the mind 
is profoundly “environmentally supported” (Sterelny 2010). Minds are never entities in a 
vacuum, but creations enabled by the interaction with their surroundings. The agent 
creates its environmental niche and adapts to it in a two-way manipulative process (see 
Odling-Smee et al. 2003); its environment is personalised as an Umwelt, perceived from 
a subjective perspective (see Uexküll 2010).
This is a broader position than the rest of the E’s. It is also “lighter”, in the sense that 
many people who are otherwise sceptical about externalist views have accepted it (e.g. 
Rupert 2009). However, the embedded thesis is not only the trivial claim that the outside 
world affects our minds. Even an internalist could accept this much, for she could say that 
the mind depends on the sensory input from the world, but that its processing – the
cognitive work – is done inside of the subject. The embedded thesis denies this, and 
claims for a stronger link. Instead, many of our cognitive processes are directly dependent 
on the environmental interaction. In metaphysical terms, the embeddedness thesis is a 
causal rather than a constitutive claim (as opposed to e.g. the extended thesis). The 
environmental interaction affects, influences, shapes and enables the mind – but it is not 
part of its constitutive basis. Environmental elements are amongst the etiological reasons 
how minds are made up. This is the reason why the embedded thesis is easier to accept 
than the extended thesis.
The terms ‘situated’ and ‘scaffolded’ are sometimes used synonymously with
‘embeddedness’. However, I follow Krueger and Colombetti (2015), who use scaffolded
differently – not as a way to differentiate between causal and constitutive, but simply as 
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a way of stressing the role of environmental interaction without taking a stance to the 
causal–constitutive debate. They explain the benefits of a neutral term as follows. “As for 
the ontological question of when, if ever, the environment comes to be part of cognition—
this is not something that a supporter of the scaffolded approach needs to provide an 
answer to” (Colombetti & Krueger 2015, 1159). However, the distinction between causal 
and constitutive is crucial for the position I am building in this thesis, and hence the 
distinction between embedded and extended remains important. If used at all, by 
‘situated’ and ‘scaffolded’ I always refer to the neutral stance that brackets out the causal–
constitution question. I will discuss the outcome of the differentiation between the 
embedded and extended theses (i.e. the causal–constitution debate) in the third chapter.7
Enacted
According to the enacted-thesis, our embodied actions in the environment are a part of 
the constitutive basis of the mind. The term originates from enactivism, which was first 
introduced as a biological theory of autopoiesis by Varela and Maturana in the 1970s and 
80s. Enactivism emerged as a criticism towards classical cognitive science, also known 
as cognitivism. Thus, it was a critical response to intellectualism, internalism, 
computationalism and representationalism. According to cognitivism, computation is the 
core feature of cognition (e.g. Fodor 1975). Where there is cognition, there is 
computation. In the manner of digital computers, human cognition is also inherently 
manipulation of mental representations: “the mind is thought to operate by manipulating 
symbols that represent features of the world or represent the world as being a certain way” 
(Varela et al. 1991, 8). The legacy of cognitivism in the cognitive sciences and philosophy 
of mind has set the focus on brain functions, and ignored the role of the body and 
environmental interactions (see e.g. Newen, Gallagher & De Bruin 2018).
The name ‘enactivism’ was first presented in Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991). This 
earliest account is sometimes referred to as autopoietic enactivism in virtue of the central 
role of the autonomous agent that produces and maintains itself. ‘Autonomous’ refers to 
self-governed, as opposed to ‘heteronomous’, which refers to other-governed such as cars 
and computers (Thompson 2007, 98). Living systems “make sense” of their environments 
                                                
7 My position specifically addresses the constitutive components of the mind, not its causal background 
conditions. The distinction is important when discussing metaphysics of mind. However, it is not so relevant 
in sciences, for example in psychiatry. Consider an Alzheimer patient, who relies on her own familiar home 
– the order of the furniture, other objects, etc. Whether the home is a causal or constitutive element for her 
mental capacities is an irrelevant question for psychiatric purposes.
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owing to their autonomous and adaptive nature. They care and worry about their world 
from their point of view – the environment is not indifferent to them, but it gets meaning
in virtue of the sense-making relationship that is created in the interaction between the 
agent and her environment.8 Without the sense-making attitude, there cannot be true 
agency or mind. (See e.g. Thompson 2007.)
Colombetti & Thompson (2008, 55–56) list five main features that describe the enactive 
approach: 1) Living beings are autonomous systems that actively generate and maintain 
their identities. They don’t just passively process pre-existing information from the world 
but they bring forth or enact their own cognitive spheres in ongoing, continuous 
reciprocal interaction with their environment. 2) The nervous system does not process 
information in the computationalist way. It should not be understood as hardware, but 
rather as an autonomous system on its own that actively generates its own meaningful 
patterns in interaction with a sensorimotor network. 3) Cognition is embodied action. 
Cognitive processes are based on repeated sensorimotor patterns of perception and 
action.9 4) Cognitive agent’s environment is not a predetermined or fixed area that is 
represented in its brain, but rather a relational domain created by the mode of coupling 
with it. 5) Experience is not considered an epiphenomenal by-product, ergo the questions 
of cognitive science and phenomenology should not be kept separate from each other.
Apart from autopoietic enactivism as a general approach to the mind, two more focused 
branches of enactivism are often classified. Sensorimotor enactivism is specialised in 
perceptual experience.10 According to it, perceptual experience is based on the agent’s 
sensorimotor actions and skills (sensorimotor contingencies) in her environment. It is 
realised in the course of sensorimotor activity itself – perception and action are mutually 
dependent processes. Finally, radical enactivism (or radical embodied cognitive science)
takes the anti-representationalist side further than the other versions of enactivisms. Thus, 
it is not only criticising the cognitivist tradition, but also showing that autopoietic and 
sensorimotor approaches contain leftovers of representationalism.11 According to the 
                                                
8 Compare the concept of ‘valence’ in psychology – attractiveness vs. averseness of situations, objects, etc.
9 The third feature on Colombetti & Thompson’s list contains a stronger and a weaker claim. First, it states 
an identity (“cognition is embodied action”), and second, a causal or constitutive relation (“cognition is 
based on sensorimotor patterns”). This is a good example that both views can be found in the literature and 
that they often get confused, as now in this one paragraph.
10 The most important works of sensorimotor approach include O’Regan & Noë (2001); Noë (2004) and 
Hurley (1998). 
11 Chemero 2009; Silberstein & Chemero 2012; 2015; Hutto & Myin 2012; 2017. 
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radical view, basic forms of mind are non-representational and content-free – mind is 
constitutively “world-involving”.
In this thesis, when I use the term ‘enactivism’ in a general sense, it refers to all of these 
branches. However, autopoietic and radical versions are not directly related to perceptual 
experience, and hence they are mostly left in the background. They are not in 
contradiction with ECM, but their focus is elsewhere. Sensorimotor enactivism, on the 
other hand, addresses exactly perceptual experience, and that is why most of the 
enactivism discussed in this thesis considers the sensorimotor branch. However, the roots 
of sensorimotor enactivism are deeply located in autopoietic enactivism. In addition, I use 
the notion of sense-making (which is more commonly used in autopoietic than in 
sensorimotor enactivism) to define conscious experience. Sensorimotor enactivism will 
be discussed especially in the second chapter. 
Extended
The last of the E’s is the extended thesis, according to which non-biological 
environmental elements – tools, devices, instruments, equipment, props and so on – can 
become part of the constitutive material basis for certain mental states. It is the strongest 
and most radical of the E’s. It seems to require all the other three E’s to hold. What makes 
it such a striking position is that it is a constitutive claim. The tools don’t just affect the 
mental processes (whether cognitive or experiential) but are part of what the mental 
processes are made of. The most important work supporting this view is Clark and 
Chalmers’s (1998) theory about extended cognition (EM) – and of course the central goal 
of this dissertation is to show that ECM belongs to this group as well. Accordingly, the 
extended thesis is the common thread running through this work. All the chapters deal 
with the question whether experience is extended.
Apart from these above described 4E’s, some other notions are sometimes added to the 
list (even though they don’t start with the letter ‘E’). I think we should add at least two: 
distributed cognition and participatory sense-making. They both touch an issue that is 
left out from the other E’s, namely social and intersubjective relations. The view about 
socially distributed cognition is based particularly on Edwin Hutchins’s (1995) work: 
cognition is not confined to an individual, but spread to other members of the social group 
as well. Intersubjectivity has been a neglected topic in the enactivist literature until 
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recently.12 Participatory sense-making is correcting this by shifting the focus to 
intersubjectively shared features of the mind: it drives the enactivist notion of sense-
making towards the social domain. According to it, intersubjective processes (e.g. a 
conversation) also self-organise: subjects coordinate their movements, actions, gestures, 
etc., and this embodied intersubjectivity allows them to participate in each other’s sense-
making.13 I wholeheartedly agree with the role of intersubjectivity for cognitive and 
experiential processes. However, I don’t discuss the social aspect in this thesis apart from 
a few occasional examples.
All the E’s (and other letters) presented here are more or less related to ECM. However, 
these E-views form a general theoretical framework that operates with a much larger 
canvas than ECM. Instead, ECM concerns only a narrower area: the constitutive material 
vehicles of certain perceptual experiences. I argue that three of the E’s lead to ECM: 
extended, enacted and embodied. In the second chapter, I will present three arguments 
based on these hypotheses respectively.
                                                
12 As Shaun Gallagher (2008, 176) condemns: “[O]ne can read through Noë’s book without bumping into 
anyone else (with the exception of referenced scholars and researchers, of course). The idea that there are 
other people in the world is almost completely absent from the analysis of perception.”
13 Participatory sense-making was developed by Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo. (See e.g. De 
Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher 2010.)
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1.4. From the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind
Let us now turn to the more specific theories of extended mind and extended conscious 
mind. They both belong to the last of the above-introduced E’s (extended). In the 
following sub-sections, I will first introduce the original formulation of EM as it was 
presented by Clark and Chalmers (1998). Then I will present three waves of research that 
illustrate how the theory of EM has developed during the last 20 years – ECM is riding 
on the crest of the third wave. In the latter parts, I will discuss how ECM has been defined 
in the literature, and formulate my own definition of it. Finally, I will attend to vehicular
externalism, that is, explain what is meant by the claim that EM and ECM concern the 
material vehicles of cognition or consciousness respectively.
1.4.1. The Extended Mind
The starting point for my position on ECM is Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) account of 
extended mind.14 Even though some other theories, especially sensorimotor enactivism, 
are actually in many ways closer to ECM than Clark and Chalmers’s EM is, the latter is 
still the central inspiration behind ECM. Therefore, let us have a closer look at Clark and 
Chalmers’s argumentation in their ground-breaking work. 
Clark and Chalmers offer a delightful number of concrete examples of cognitive 
extension, of which the most illustrative ones are rotation in Tetris, and the amnesiac Otto 
and his notebook. In the former, Clark and Chalmers (p. 7–8) ask us to consider three 
                                                
14 I use the term extended mind (EM for short) throughout this thesis to refer to Clark and Chalmers’s theory 
of extended cognition. The term is undeniably slightly misleading, and many writers have recently started 
to refer to it as the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC for short). However, I think EM works better in 
the context of this thesis, where it is constantly compared with ECM. The terms are used consistently – the 
reader just has to remember that EM does not refer to mind in general, but only to cognition.
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cases of problem solving. In the first scenario, a person is watching a game of Tetris on a 
computer screen, and has to “mentally rotate” the shapes – only by looking at them try to 
decide which way the shapes would fit the slots. In the second scenario, a person is 
watching the same geometrical shapes falling, but now she can physically rotate them 
with a rotation button (as in real Tetris). In the third scenario, a person in the cyberpunk 
future is playing the same game, but this time she has a neural implant that takes care of 
the rotation.
The gist of this example is that all three of the scenarios are on a par regarding their 
functions. According to Clark and Chalmers, the third case (neural implant) is clearly 
similar to the first case (mental rotation). The second case (rotation button), on the other 
hand, fulfils the same function as the neural implant, although it is distributed across the 
player and computer, instead of being internally realised within the player. Clark and 
Chalmers ask: if the rotation counts as cognitive in the case of the neural implant, by what 
right do we count the case of the rotation button as fundamentally different? Pointing to 
the boundaries of the body would just beg the question, since that boundary was at issue 
in the first place.
Clark and Chalmers (p. 8) discuss an experiment conducted with Tetris players (Kirsch 
& Maglio 1994). Physical rotation proved to be significantly faster than mental rotation: 
getting a shape through 90 degrees with a rotation button took 100 milliseconds plus 200 
to select the right button, whereas the same action with mental rotation took 1000 
milliseconds. Kirsch and Maglio showed that the physical rotation is not only used for 
positioning the shape to fit the slot, but also as a means to determine if the shape and slot 
are compatible. They call this an epistemic action. Clark and Chalmers (p. 8) take the idea 
further, and propose that epistemic actions deserve epistemic credit. Hence, it is fair to 
say that the cognitive action in the second case is spread to include also the physical 
rotation.
The second example is the most famous one, and it wouldn’t be unfair to call it the 
flagship of EM. Otto suffers from a curious version of Alzheimer’s15 that has made him 
                                                
15 It has nothing to do with real Alzheimer’s syndrome. The Otto example is a thought experiment, where 
it only matters that his biological memory is non-existent, whatever the diagnostic reason is. In general, I 
think we should be suspicious of the use of thought experiments in arguments in philosophy of mind. 
However, this particular thought experiment is rather innocent and quite successful in its purpose. On one 
hand, it is based on a common everyday tool (a notebook) rather than some science-fiction scenarios or 
imaginary future technologies, and on the other hand, it works perfectly as an intuition pump that directs
even the unaccustomed readers away from internalism towards externalism.
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very forgetful. He writes down everything in the notebook he always carries with him, 
and that’s how he is able to cope in society like any of us. One day, he wants to visit the 
Museum of Modern Art, and as usual, he consults his notebook. He finds the address, 
walks to the destination, and enjoys the art experience. Inga, on the other hand, has normal 
memory, and she also appreciates modern art. She decides to go to the same museum with 
Otto. She thinks for a moment to remember the address, recalls it, walks there, and enjoys 
herself as much as Otto. Clark and Chalmers (1998, 13) state that the two cases are on a 
par considering the status of their beliefs. 
[I]n relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: 
the notebook plays for Otto the same role that 
memory plays for Inga. The information in the 
notebook functions just like the information 
constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just 
happens that this information lies beyond the skin.
The gist of this example is that what makes something count as a belief is the role it plays 
– rather than whether it is located inside or outside the skin. Otto and his notebook 
together create a “coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right” 
(C&C, 8). Hence, the notebook not only influences Otto’s cognitive process of 
remembering the address, it also becomes part of that cognitive process itself. Clark and 
Chalmers list requirements that need to be fulfilled in order for something to count as an 
instance of EM: the external device has to be a constant for its user, it has to be easily and 
directly available, reliable, and automatically endorsed. (These “glue and trust” criteria 
will be analysed in the fourth chapter.) Especially the example of Otto and his notebook 
has evoked an abundance of literature in philosophy of mind and related fields – critical 
comments, answers to critiques, applications to other areas, etc. Many of those critiques 
will be discussed (and answered) in this thesis. 
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1.4.2. The Waves to the Extended Conscious Mind
Externalist accounts have developed in various directions since the original argument was 
presented 20 years ago. Broadly speaking, the research about the extended mind 
hypothesis has been classified in three different theoretical “waves” (see e.g. Menary 
2010b; Gallagher 2018c). The first wave refers to the original formulation of EM by Clark 
and Chalmers that is based on functionalism – the functional role the external element 
plays in the system. When the tool plays the same functional role as the biological process, 
it merits the same cognitive status. This is called the parity principle, which Clark and 
Chalmers describe as follows:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world
functions as a process which, were it done in the head,
we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of 
the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so
we claim) part of the cognitive process (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998, 8).
The parity principle has been criticised by both the supporters and opponents of EM.16
One shortcoming is that it might encourage one to think that mental functions can only 
be found by comparing them with biological, neural functions. Otto’s notebook is part of 
his cognitive system if it is on a par with Inga’s organic cognitive system. However, this 
was not what Clark and Chalmers had in mind. As Michael Wheeler writes (2015b, 158, 
footnote 3), Inga’s role as a point of comparison could even have been left out without 
the core of the argument suffering. In hindsight, without comparing Otto to Inga, the 
philosophical literature would have been saved from the debate whether the two ways of 
having a memory are on a functional par or not. In a sense, it was an unfortunate path,
because the truth of EM is not dependent on whether Otto’s and Inga’s beliefs are 
functionally identical (it is clear that they are not) or even similar enough. On the other 
hand, the critique led many supporters of EM to move their focus from the original parity-
based arguments to other kinds of arguments.
                                                
16 The parity principle will be under scrutiny in sections 2.2., 4.2.2. and 4.3.1. Note also that the term ‘parity 
principle’ was not used in C&C’s original article. It has been introduced later (e.g. in Clark’s contributions 
in the collection of essays edited by Menary 2010a), and I think the demand for this term evolved exactly 
from the need to differentiate the first wave from the second wave EM.
27
The second wave arguments dropped the parity principle, and replaced it with theses such 
as complementarity and integration. Sutton (2010) initiated the complementarity 
principle that allows that there are dissimilarities between external and internal functions. 
Biological and external functions can sometimes be on a par, but often the externalised 
function is in fact altogether different from a biological one – and can still count as 
cognitive. Hence, parity is no longer a defining feature of extension. Sutton also 
emphasises that extension varies based on differences in people, situations and 
environments. Subjects might have different habits of using tools – differing from person 
to person, situation to situation, and environment to environment. Menary’s (2007; 
2010c) account of cognitive integration is another example of leaving the parity 
requirement behind, instead focusing on the everyday embodied ways of integrating 
external means to the cognitive functions we perform. Menary sums up the second wave: 
“the bodily manipulations of external vehicles are different from, but complementary to, 
internal processes” (Menary 2010c, 240). 
Finally, the third wave is an attempt to bring together coherently all the different threads, 
“a motley connection of factors”, that have stayed somewhat disconnected in the earlier 
waves of arguments – from neurons to cultural practices, and from writing skills to 
smartphones. Whereas the first and second wave arguments are rather established, the 
third wave is still in formation. (Gallagher 2018c.) Sutton (2010, 213) describes the third 
wave as rejecting the idea that internal and external, natural and artificial would have 
fixed properties, but instead “this third wave would analyse these boundaries as hard-won 
and fragile developmental and cultural achievements, always open to renegotiation”. 
Instead of fixed properties, the elements are constantly transformed, negotiated and 
reformatted. 
Gallagher (2018c) mentions two attempts that have been initiated in the 4E literature in 
order to better take into account the dynamical, holistic conception of mind/cognition. On 
the one hand, predictive processing offers a unifying explanatory model, and especially 
Andy Clark’s (e.g. 2013; 2015; 2016) recent work has brought the theories of predictive 
processing and extended mind together. On the other hand, enactivism is a theoretical 
framework that has always understood cognition in a dynamical way. One defining 
feature of the third wave has been to try to bring enactivism and extended mind together. 
The two theories have a lot in common, but they also contain sharp differences, such as 
diverging attitudes towards functionalism and representations. My dissertation fits 
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precisely this latter slot – third wave externalism that understands mind in a dynamical 
enactivist way combined with lessons from the theory of extended mind.
Indeed, we can say that ECM is on the top of the third wave (which has also been 
described as a tsunami).17 And as stated, it is also an heir of EM, which has its roots in 
the first wave. How is ECM different from EM then? Of course, many cognitive states 
are conscious, and most conscious states are cognitive. Hence the difference between 
cognitive vs. conscious cannot be used as a straightforward separating factor (even though 
it seems that most of the critiques assume consciousness can be neatly cut out from 
cognition). One important difference is related to the question whether the extended state 
is occurrent or dispositional. The Otto example is about a dispositional belief, and 
dispositional beliefs are not experiential; therefore, the Otto example is not an instance of 
ECM. (It is plausible that Otto goes through some sort of experiential states while 
checking the address, but that is not what the example is about.) ECM applies to occurrent 
states only, because experiences are always occurrent. However, cognitive states can be 
both occurrent and dispositional.
Consider the two examples I presented above by Clark and Chalmers (1998). The first 
one, using the rotation button in Tetris, concerns an occurrent process, while the second 
one, Otto and his notebook, concerns a dispositional state. Thus, the Tetris example comes 
closer to ECM than the Otto example. Even though originally intended to give support 
exclusively to EM, it ends up dealing with aspects that are not only cognitive, but also 
experiential, namely sensorimotor actions.18 Playing Tetris also undoubtedly requires 
cognitive actions – it is a good example of an occurrent mental process that consists of 
both cognitive and experiential aspects. I will discuss the difference between dispositional 
and occurrent EM in more detail in the second chapter, arguing that accepting occurrent 
EM leads to ECM.
In the remainder of this section, I will frame a definition of ECM (and EM). First, let us 
have a look at how others have defined ECM. Andy Clark19 (2009) describes ECM as 
                                                
17 Gallagher (2018c, 434) writes: “The first two waves of extended mind theory, as I count them, are part 
of the tidal change of embodied cognition that, on some accounts, has led to a gradual erosion on the 
shoreline of the classic cognitivists. The third wave promises to be more tsunami like and threatens to wash 
away that shoreline altogether.”
18 Notice that Clark & Chalmers (1998) do not treat the rotating actions as conscious. As said earlier, they 
treat them as epistemic actions. However, I think their treatment misses the experiential side that is present 
due to the sensorimotor nature of the task.
19 Note that Andy Clark himself is not supporting ECM.
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follows: “the local material vehicles of some of our conscious experiences might include 
more than the whirrings and grindings of the brain/CNS” (p. 967) and “the minimal 
physical substrate for some forms of conscious experience include[s] the goings on in the 
(rest of the) body and the world” (p. 963). Dave Ward (2012, 732) understands “ECM as 
the claim that the subpersonal basis20 of some conscious experiences can include events 
and properties outside the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject”. Ken 
Pepper (2013, 99) is more specific and stresses the sensorimotor dynamics of perceptual 
experiences: “Some authors have urged that if it is indeed the case that perceptual 
experience depends on a bodily engagement with the world, then the implicated patterns 
of environmental interaction – sensorimotor dynamics – are physical constituents of 
perceptual experience.” Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin (2012, 158) take a stance from 
supervenience and write that “phenomenality has a wide supervenience basis – that it 
constitutively involves parts of the environment. […] Phenomenal experience strongly 
supervenes on, or is constituted by, temporally extended, interactive worldly 
engagement.”21
What is common in these formulations is that they all concern the constitution of the 
physical underpinnings of phenomenal experience. These definitions could be summed 
up as follows: The constitutive material vehicles (i.e. the material basis) of some 
conscious experiences can include external parts. However, my thesis is more specific 
and limited: it only includes certain kinds of perceptual experiences. Further, my position
is not modal – it is not a thought exercise what could or can be the case – but rather it is 
a claim about the actual state of affairs. Finally, my position concerns larger experiential 
systems rather than single experiential states or processes. For example, it deals with the 
use of a blind person’s cane as a stable, consistent way of perceiving the world, rather 
                                                
20 Ward (2012, 733) explains his use of ‘subpersonal’: “I focus on the claim about the subpersonal rather 
than the material basis only to avoid commitment to the idea that the best way of characterizing that 
subpersonal basis will be in physical terms (as opposed to, say, the language of ecological optics).”
21 For example, in the following texts, the writers have explicitly argued for extended conscious experience:
Kiverstein & Farina (2013); Kiverstein (2016); Kiverstein & Kirchhoff (2019); Noë (e.g. 2004); Hurley 
(e.g. 2010); Rowlands (2003; 2010); Ward (2012); Pepper (2013); Loughlin (2012); Vold (2015); Bruno 
(2013); Silberstein & Chemero (2012; 2015). Many writers are also very close to ECM, but have not fully 
accepted it, or haven’t taken a stance about it. They include e.g. Hutto and Myin (2012; 2017); Colombetti 
(e.g. 2014); Wilson (2004). Actually, probably the majority of the 4E-oriented philosophers belong to this
group, which makes the central argument of this thesis (that ECM follows from most of the E’s) noteworthy.
Yet another option is put forward by Michael Wheeler (2015a; 2015b), who remains deliberately agnostic 
about ECM. According to him, the arguments for ECM presented in the literature do not yet resolve the 
case for either externalism or internalism.
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than focusing on one successful use of a blind person’s cane.22 Of course, the experiential 
system consists of individual experiential processes. To be a competent user of the cane, 
one has to have had a large number of uses of the cane. Thus, it is impossible to 
categorically differentiate between these. This complication and the differentiation 
between single short-term extensions, and wider-ranging systemic extensions (or 
incorporations, as I will specify them) will be illuminated in the fourth chapter. Based on 
all these reflections, I will define ECM and EM as follows:
Extended Conscious Mind (ECM): The constitutive 
material components of certain perceptual 
experiences include external elements on the 
condition that those components are functionally 
incorporated into the subject.
Extended Mind (EM): The constitutive material 
components of certain cognitive states/processes 
include external elements on the condition that they 
are integrated into the subject. 
These are the definitions that are used in this thesis for EM and ECM. It is worth noting 
already at this point that they also contain the demarcation criteria for both EM and ECM 
– integration in EM, and functional incorporation in ECM. These requirements will be 
explained in the fourth chapter.
Further, ECM could be taken as an explanatory or ontological account. Philosophers 
would probably consider an ontological account a stronger view, whereas empirical 
scientists probably only deal with explanatory accounts to start with. Hurley is the most 
important example of a sensorimotor enactivist who commits to explanatory externalism.
I take issues about internalism and externalism to be 
issues about explanation. Some boundaries, like the 
skin, are intuitively salient. But they may not capture 
the explanation we seek. Intuitive boundaries can cut 
between factors that are not explanatorily separable. 
(Hurley 2010, 113–114.)
                                                
22 This last feature is similar to Clark and Chalmers’s EM, which is also about the whole memory system 
of Otto, rather than one individual memory of his.
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When our aim is rather to do cognitive science than metaphysics, I do not think it makes 
much difference whether ECM is considered explanatory or ontological claim. I do agree 
with Hurley, but still claim that ECM is the “strong” claim that some philosophers would 
only connect with an ontological claim.
1.4.3. Vehicular externalism
As became clear from the above definitions, both EM and ECM concern the material 
vehicles of mental states (the former of cognition and the latter of consciousness). I use 
the term ‘vehicle’ synonymously with ‘material basis’, ‘material underpinnings’, 
‘material realiser’, ‘sub-personal basis’, ‘substrate’, ‘material component’, ‘constitutive 
component’, ‘material part’, and other similar combinations modified from these. They 
are the underlying entities that realise mental states. In internalist accounts of mind, neural 
functions are considered to be the only constitutive vehicle, whereas EM and ECM add 
the body and environmental interactions. Needless to say, brain functions are still 
necessary vehicles – they just are not always sufficient according to the externalist views.
The fact that EM and ECM concern the material basis separates them from some other 
well-known theories in philosophy of mind and language. EM and ECM differ from 
Hilary Putnam’s (1975) semantic externalism in that the latter is about mental content. It 
is often stressed (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998; Menary 2010b) that EM is a form of active 
externalism whereas semantic externalism is passive – about the distal (albeit external) 
causes that have determined the contents of certain mental states. While this distinction 
is legitimate, I think it dismisses the central disjointing factor. Instead, the crucial 
difference is simply that EM and ECM are about the concrete material realisation of 
certain mental states, and not about how meaning, sense, or content is determined. These 
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two kinds of externalisms need not be in contradiction; they simply deal with completely 
different matters. (Putnam’s account will be discussed in section 2.2.2.)
Further, EM and ECM differ from panpsychism (see e.g. Strawson 2006) in that 
panpsychism concerns mental character. EM and ECM do not claim that a notebook or 
a blind person’s cane are cognitive or conscious, nor that they contain “proto” 
cognitive/conscious elements. These tools can only become part of the realising material 
basis for some cognitive/conscious state when properly coupled with an (already 
cognitive/conscious) agent – and this claim is far from panpsychism. Besides, 
panpsychism is not empirically testable but remains in the analytical sphere.23 To 
conclude, EM and ECM do not have almost anything in common with semantic 
externalism nor panpsychism (except the label ‘externalism’ in the former case).24
1.5. Conclusions and Methodological Remarks
In recent decades, there has been an increase in the amount of literature on naturalistic, 
empirically responsible philosophy of mind. Rather than relying on speculative a priori
thought experiments and pure rational reasoning, naturalistic philosophy of mind is in 
close interplay with empirical research and experiments in fields like cognitive sciences, 
cognitive psychology, neurosciences, psychiatry, robotics, etc. My research shares this 
empirically oriented methodology and multidisciplinarity.
                                                
23 Although some panpsychists might oppose this. For example, integrated information theory is said to 
entail panpsychism, and it is promoted as a scientifically testable theory (see e.g. Tononi 2008).
24 Yet another account to be contrasted with is naïve realism, according to which the objects of perception
constitute the experiences (Martin 2004). As Clark (2009, 968) has pointed out, naïve realism is a “more 
metaphysical” argument than ECM. ECM targets the material vehicles of experiences, not their objects or 
contents, and is a more empirically oriented position.
33
I use thought experiments as little as possible. Sometimes they can be useful in illustrating 
a phenomenon, such as the example of Otto and his notebook. That particular thought 
experiment is a good example because it doesn’t contain any leaps into science-fiction, 
but deals with relying on a mundane pair of notebook and pencil. One especially 
problematic (but common) aspect in philosophy of mind is that people tend to appeal to 
“future technology”, or “future development in neuroscience”. My position is not 
dependent on any “future” inventions, but is rooted in existing artefacts, technology and 
science.
Not only can the empirical sciences guide philosophy, but philosophy also has a lot to
offer the empirical sciences. Furthermore, these topics are related to ethical and societal 
questions. Apart from being intriguing philosophically, the question about the borders of 
the mind can also have direct implications on our lives. In democratic societies, citizens’ 
bodies and brains cannot be fiddled with without their permission. However, if the 
boundaries of our cognitive and experiential functions lie elsewhere, perhaps the legal 
questions should be adjusted accordingly. Perhaps hacking a laptop should be seen as a 
personal assault rather than an assault on one’s property.25 Further, if we accept the 
externalist view, we need to admit that when the FBI searches through somebody’s 
smartphone, they search through part of their mind.
                                                
25 Carter & Palermos (2016) have argued that if we accept the hypothesis of extended cognition, we have 
to update our notion of personal assault to include also intentional harm done towards the gadgets that are 
properly coupled to the system.
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2. Arguments for Extended Conscious Mind
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will give three arguments for ECM. The basic idea behind them is quite 
simple: if we accept the general 4E-framework, we have no other choice than to accept 
ECM. Hence, in a broad sense, the most important argument for ECM is simply the whole 
4E-framework. For this chapter, I have picked up the most important subtypes of it 
regarding ECM. The inference relations are as follows.26 1) If EM, then ECM. 2) If 
sensorimotor enactivism, then ECM. 3) If the embodiment thesis, then ECM. They are 
presented in this order in the following sections.27
This alone (showing that ECM follows from the three other theories) is an important result 
– regardless of whether we accept these three theories or not. It is important because 
several writers argue for the other three theories, but deny ECM.28 This chapter shows 
that these views are often inconsistent – however, not always, for there are at least two
exceptions. First, it is consistent to commit oneself to a narrow version of (dispositional) 
EM, but deny ECM. However, a broader reading of EM leads to ECM. Moreover, within 
the supporters of EM, this broader understanding is very common and widespread: it is 
what is usually understood by EM at least amongst philosophers of mind (it is supported 
e.g. by Clark). Second, it is possible to accept the embodiment thesis (experience is 
embodied), but stop there, and deny that experience could spread outside the bodily 
frontiers. However, accepting the embodiment thesis is a slippery slope leading towards 
ECM, as will be shown in the third argument. However, one of the premise theories, viz. 
sensorimotor enactivism, differs in this sense: I claim that there is no consistent way to 
accept it but still deny ECM. All these subtleties and refinements will be clarified and 
analysed in the following sections.
Thus, there are two ways the reader can receive the arguments in this chapter. First, they 
can be taken as a clarification of what follows from the three premise theories, without 
                                                
26 Even though I use the terms ‘inference’, and ‘implication’, in none of these arguments the inference 
relation is a logical inference or material implication. They are rather a posteriori claims that are to be 
tested on empirical rather than on logical grounds.
27 The last remaining E (the embeddedness thesis) makes an exception, because it would not lead to ECM 
since it is by definition a causal account, whereas EM and ECM are constitutive accounts.
28 For example, Hutto and Myin (2012; 2017); Colombetti (e.g. 2014); Wilson (2004). 
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the need to commit oneself to any of them. If understood this way, the results could even 
be used against the premise theories, because a critic of the externalist views could say 
that if these theories lead to ECM, it is a good enough reason to consider the premise 
theories false. Even if used in this way, the importance of the matter presented in this 
chapter remains – whether we are for or against externalism, we have to be consistent in 
our views. However, my argument for ECM is stronger than this conditional acceptance. 
Second, the arguments can be taken as reasons why we should accept both the premise 
theories and ECM. I claim that the three theories are actually valid/true, therefore so is 
ECM. Moreover, one does not need to accept all three arguments to reach ECM, even one 
of them is enough.
2.2. Argument 1: Parity argument
Most of the proponents of EM have not even considered the possibility of ECM. Clark 
(2009; 2012) makes an exception. As said before, he is probably the best-known supporter 
of EM, and at the same time the best-known denier of ECM. However, it is not an easy 
task to both hold on to EM, and deny ECM. Clark needs to use a very complex system to 
keep the counterbalance, and he ends up making controversial claims in order to uphold 
EM.29 Clark’s attempt shows that it is very difficult to argue for EM but leave ECM aside. 
The arguments from straightforward internalists are at least more consistent than Clark’s 
in this case.
                                                
29 I will discuss Clark’s objections in full detail in chapter 5. In a nutshell, Clark’s argument on high-
bandwidth (according to which conscious experience requires high bandwidth processing, and only neural 
processing is capable of the task) is problematic at least in two ways. First, it is based on dubious 
assumptions about the body as a low-pass filter that doesn’t have empirical support. Second, even if it were
true, it would also debunk occurrent EM (which is certainly an unwanted result for Clark).
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This first argument for ECM adopts a treatment opposite to Clark’s. It proceeds from EM 
to ECM. Hence, the argument consists of two questions in need of answers: First, why 
EM? And second, why the bridge from EM to ECM? I will concentrate on the second
question, since the first question has been discussed comprehensively in the literature for 
the last twenty years.
For the weaker version of this argument (if we accept EM, ECM follows – without taking 
a stance whether we should accept EM or not), we don’t need any back-up for EM, 
obviously. In the weaker case, only the bridge from EM to ECM needs arguments. 
However, the stronger version (if we accept EM, ECM follows – and we have good reason 
to accept EM, therefore we need to accept ECM as well), requires both those “good 
reasons” for EM, alongside the arguments for the inference relation.
As mentioned before, the literature is full of arguments for (and against) EM. The leading 
arguments can be found indubitably from Andy Clark’s works (e.g. 2007; 2008; 2010). 
Besides Clark, Menary (2010a) has edited a worthwhile compilation of defences and 
criticisms. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the arguments for EM have been 
classified in first-wave and second-wave arguments (the third wave consists of ECM 
already, so it is out of this discussion) depending on what aspects they stress (see Menary 
2010b; 2010c).
First-wave arguments rely on the parity principle, which draws on the functional parity, 
or uniformity of the (putative) external and internal substrates of cognitive processes. As 
long as the functional role is the same, it doesn’t matter whether the apparatus is inside 
or outside the skin and skull. The parity principle was first and foremost an intuition pump 
whose purpose was – alongside the Otto example – to question the Cartesian prejudices 
looming behind the internalist account of the mind.
The second-wave line of argumentation drops the parity requirement (or parity metaphor,
depending on the interpretation), and instead states that the external processes don’t have 
to functionally mimic any brain-based cognitive state, but that they complement them 
instead. Second-way arguments for EM include, for example, the complementarity 
argument (Sutton 2010), and the cognitive integration argument (Menary 2007). Instead 
of the parity principle “the motivation is found in the brute fact of our embodiedness and 
our bodily manipulation of environmental vehicles” (Menary 2010c, 233).
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I think the most central and straightforward reason to accept EM is captured in Susan 
Hurley’s (2010) no-magical-membrane argument. There is no reason to assume a 
“magical” membrane between the brain and its body and environment. The dynamic 
processes criss-cross between all of them, and they don’t respect membranes, magical or 
mundane. Of course, Hurley’s way of putting it is not at odds with the parity (nor 
complementarity) arguments, but it avoids the problems that can potentially arise from 
the parity principle. If the parity principle is understood literally instead of as an intuition 
pump, it can lead to a strong commitment to functionalism, and to an impression that 
extension is only to be detected with the means of comparing it with internal processes, 
as if the internal brain processes were a default case. This criticism towards the parity 
principle has been articulated by many writers (e.g. Di Paolo 2009; Menary 2006; Wilson 
2010). Others have criticised the critique for misunderstanding the aim of the parity 
principle (e.g. Clark 2007; 2008; Wheeler 2010). Kiverstein & Clark (2009, 3) sum up 
the defence: 
The parity principle was introduced only to engage 
our rough sense of what might belong to the domain 
of the cognitive. It was never a requirement that the 
external entities perform the same or similar role to 
processes taking place internal to the individual. 
Parity demands that we count external elements as 
forming a part of the machinery of cognition even if 
their causal contribution is unlike anything we find 
within the head.
This shows that Clark doesn’t commit himself to a dubious interpretation of the parity 
principle, but still, it doesn’t remove the fact that the original formulation of the parity 
principle in Clark and Chalmers (1998) had all the ingredients to encourage these 
misinterpretations.
Overall, I think the general 4E-framework that was presented in the previous chapter and 
the numerous arguments formulated in the literature provide good enough reasons to 
accept EM. It is not considered a very controversial claim in philosophy of mind anymore, 
which is also backed up by the fact that it has been used extensively in other fields, e.g. 
in philosophy of psychiatry, cognitive neurosciences and art and literature studies.
The following, and more radical step is to be taken from EM to ECM. At least the 
following writers have argued that EM cannot be accepted without accepting ECM 
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alongside it. According to Ken Pepper (2013), if we accept the wider commitments of 
EM and the lessons from sensorimotor enactivism that Clark needs to accept for his own 
EM to stay safe, we cannot but accept ECM as well. Victor Loughlin (2012) argues that 
some cases of Clark’s EM already involve conscious experience, even though Clark 
didn’t intend so (i.e. the example of an artist and her sketchpad).30 Karina Vold (2015) 
finds Clark’s reasons to reject ECM wanting. She pursues the strategy of criticising 
Clark’s criticism based on high-bandwidth, and claims that the arguments Clark is using 
for EM work for ECM as well, and Clark hasn’t been able to consistently disprove this 
result.31 As we can see, their reasons differ, but all of them explicitly state that ECM 
follows from EM.32
In principle, yet another way to proceed from EM to ECM would be to claim that all 
mental states are conscious, or at least potentially conscious. Something like this is 
proposed by John Searle (1992) and Galen Strawson (1994). Given EM, and given that 
cognitive states are mental states and therefore conscious states, ECM follows. However, 
I do not support this view. As presented in the first chapter (1.2.), cognition and 
consciousness are not identical. There are mental states that are not conscious as e.g. the 
existence of blind-sight shows. It would not be reasonable to cut the psychological sphere 
to cover only the phenomenal side.
Of course, this line of argumentation could be used not only as a back-up for ECM, but 
also as an objection to EM – if all mental states need to be conscious, and the dispositional 
state described in the Otto example is not conscious, it follows that it is actually not 
mental. Clark and Chalmers (1998, 16) note this possibility: if dispositional beliefs are 
not considered real beliefs, because “the only true beliefs are occurrent beliefs”, then Otto 
would not count as an example of EM (and neither would Inga have a real belief before 
deciding to go to the museum). Obviously, this is a criticism only against dispositional 
                                                
30 I think Loughlin’s argument is on the right tracks. It touches on the same differentiation that I will present 
in the following sections, i.e. between the occurrent and dispositional EM. However, he fails to explicitly 
state the difference between the two types, and how one leads to ECM and the other doesn’t, and that 
slightly reduces the power of his argument.
31 Vold’s criticism towards Clark’s high-bandwidth argument is very apt and I fully agree with it. However, 
in order to argue for ECM, she ends up using a thought experiment, where instead of replacing neurons 
with silicon chips (as e.g. in Searle’s version), the whole silicon apparatus is placed outside the head and 
connected to the brain with wires through one’s ear. Even though this argument is supposed to give support 
for ECM, I think it is as mistaken and harmful as the similar views in the opposing camp, viz. brain-in-a-
vat scenarios.
32 However, it should be noted that opposing views have been presented as well, of which an example is
Wheeler (2015a; 2015b), who supports EM on parity grounds but denies that ECM should follow from it.
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EM, not against occurrent EM, let alone ECM. (Clark & Chalmers 1998 themselves don’t 
talk about occurrent vs. dispositional EM, and certainly not about ECM.) Nevertheless, 
as already mentioned, I don’t think there are good reasons to accept the claim that all 
mental states have to be conscious or occurrent, and hence also the dispositional EM 
survives this criticism.
In what follows, I will present what I think is the most important reason why one cannot 
consistently support EM and deny ECM. I will approach the matter from two directions. 
First, I appeal to the close ties between cognition and consciousness, and defend a view 
that they overlap in many situations. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the strict 
separation stems from theoretical traditions that have been predominant approximately in 
the last half of the 20th century. The cognitivist paradigm in cognitive sciences (and its 
influence on analytic philosophy of mind) has strengthened the gap. The work in the 4E-
field has shown that we should drop both the cognitivist paradigm and the deep gap 
between cognition and consciousness.33 Second, I argue that there is a version of EM that 
includes experiential states, that is, ECM can already be found in one version of EM (that, 
for example, Clark himself supports). These two slightly different strategies – whose aim 
is still to reach the same destination – will be discussed in the following sections.
2.2.1. Cognition and consciousness are often inseparable
Let us start by considering the first option. The first way to proceed is to propose that 
cognition and consciousness should not be separated in the categorical manner that they 
have been separated in the (especially analytic) philosophy of mind during the last 
decades. The motivation behind this idea comes from a critical stance towards classical 
                                                
33 Instead of the vocabulary I use, some writers speak about non-conscious cognition and conscious 
cognition (see e.g. Kiverstein 2016). Possibly that vocabulary might be more neutral, but for the sake of 
clarity, I use the terms cognition and consciousness.
40
cognitive science (cognitivism), and it has been addressed in some recent enactivist 
writings (Silberstein & Chemero 2012; 2015; Kiverstein 2016).
As was pointed out in the first chapter (1.2. and 1.3), cognitivism has promoted the view 
that cognition is inherently computational. When understood as computation, it makes 
sense that cognition has been thought of as independent from consciousness, for it is 
difficult to see how conscious experience could be explained in computational terms. 
Therefore, there is a gap separating the two, and that is reflected e.g. in the famous 
arguments in analytic philosophy of mind such as the explanatory gap and philosophical 
zombie arguments.
Let us just very briefly consider the famous zombie thought experiment (see e.g. 
Chalmers 1996). According to this argument, conceiving of creatures that are functionally 
identical with us means conceiving identity in terms of the cognitive processes. The 
phenomenal side is ruled out, because allegedly it is not based on those very same 
functions – therefore, according to the argument, there is nothing it is like to be a 
philosophical zombie. When the concepts of cognition and consciousness are separated 
in such a manner, this argument becomes conceivable, a logical possibility. However, this 
conceivability is only due to assuming that cognition and consciousness can be separated 
in the first place. Without the separation, the argument is meaningless: zombies would 
not be conceivable. Creatures functionally identical to us in cognitive terms are also 
identical to us phenomenologically. (See the discussion in Kiverstein 2016, 132.)
Consider the two ways to understand the concept of cognition that was presented in the 
previous chapter (section 1.2.). If we conceive cognition in the enactivist way, that is, 
based on skilled, embodied interaction with the world that already comprises the 
experiential side, the gap dissolves and there is no longer a need for principled separation. 
Kiverstein (2016) draws a picture of cognition and consciousness as entangled and 
inseparable.34 Instead of “atomic sensations”, that is, qualia that are based on intrinsic 
properties of sensory qualities (pain is intrinsically unpleasant/painful, experience of 
redness is intrinsically red), Kiverstein builds his theory on enactivism and especially on 
                                                
34 Kiverstein also criticises Block’s (2002) differentiation between phenomenal and access consciousness. 
“Such a distinction only appears necessary because of a computational theory of cognition tailor-made for 
explaining unconscious cognitive processes” (Kiverstein 2016, 109). I am also critical towards a certain 
use of the differentiation, viz. when the motive is to set phenomenal consciousness (understood as an 
abstract property of what-it-is-like-ness) in its own sphere, dissociated from report, memory, reasoning, etc. 
However, if used more as an epistemic tool, i.e. as describing different aspects of experiential–cognitive 
processes but not aiming to dissociate them, I think the differentiation still has its place.
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Gibsonian affordances. Phenomenal experience is based on everyday human life – on the 
practical engagements we have with our surroundings. We primarily experience a world 
that offers opportunities for action, rather than properties of sensations, and the 
phenomenality of experiences is explained by our “intentional directness” to the world. 
What we experience is the “relevant affordances that move us to act in ways that improve 
our situation in the world” (Kiverstein 2016, 121).
When the notion of phenomenal consciousness is considered in this way, it becomes a lot 
easier to see how cognition and consciousness are not very different from each other. 
Both are based on the same thing – the agent’s skilled interactions in its environment. 
(Skilled is an important aspect here – it refers to the sense-making stance that is gained in 
the interactions.) Cognition is not the computation of mental representations, and 
consciousness is not something alien to the natural world and explanation. There is no 
“qualia”. In my experience of a red apple, there is no separable “raw feeling” that would 
plainly consist of the property of redness itself. Rather, I see an edible, perhaps even a 
delicious object, and my knowing or believing that it is a fruit, that I can eat it, and my 
visual, olfactory and tactile perception of it are not separate from how I experience a red 
apple.35
This kind of understanding of phenomenal consciousness is in particular based on the 
ideas presented by the radical enactivists (Silberstein & Chemero 2012; 2015; Hutto & 
Myin 2012; 2017), who bridge the gap between cognition and consciousness (or the 
mind–mind problem as they call it). Instead, experience extends jointly and inseparably 
with cognition: all mental processing is based on coupled animal–environment systems. 
They describe the phenomenological–cognitive systems in terms of affordances, niche-
construction and evolution.
[W]e can understand phenomenology and cognition 
as inseparable and complementary aspects of coupled 
brain–body–environment systems. On our view, 
experience is cognition and cognition is experiential. 
Our cognitive, conscious, and behavioural capacities 
co-explain and co-determine each other dynamically 
[…] The systems that cognitive scientists have 
identified as extended cognitive systems are in fact 
                                                
35 Kiverstein (2016) mentions another interesting view: Sytsma & Machery (2010) have conducted 
experimental philosophy, according to which consciousness is seen as valence, not something-it-is-like.
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extended phenomenal-cognitive systems. (Silberstein 
& Chemero 2012, 40–41.) 
If we accept this view, what remains of the difference between cognition and 
consciousness? Are they simply identical, and is the separation only due to a theoretical–
philosophical misunderstanding? The radical enactivists don’t have a clear stand on this. 
However, Kiverstein’s (2016) suggestion is worthwhile. According to him, we should 
understand the linkage as something that happens outside of psychological experiments 
in laboratories and thought experiments in philosophers’ writing desks. To put it 
concisely: cognition is experiential in everyday life situations. They usually occur 
together. In “normal” situations, “cognitive processes do not unfold independently from 
conscious processes” (Kiverstein 2016, 114).
However, they are not identical. Cognition and consciousness are still separate 
conceptually; and not only conceptually, but there are occasions where they occur 
separately. Especially clear are occasions of cognition without consciousness. For 
example, right now, when I am writing, I don’t consciously experience several things in 
my surroundings (such as unfluctuating noises in the background), but we could still say 
there is some cognitive processing of these things that I do not experience going on. 
Psychological experiments have shown that perception can occur without conscious 
awareness, for example in phenomena such as blind-sight, change blindness and 
binocular rivalry (see e.g. O’Regan et al. 1999; Prinz 2015; Rensik et al. 1997). Also 
dispositional beliefs, etc. might be considered as occasions of non-conscious cognition 
(even though some people deny that they count as mental states at all – but this of course 
depends on how we define mental states). Overall, cognition comprises several different 
features (e.g. attention, memory and problem solving, see the list in section 1.2.), and it 
is clear that not all of them are experiential.
Nevertheless, the fact that cognition and consciousness can occur separately, doesn’t 
entail that they are separated all the time, or in the cases we are interested in. The 
anomalous perceptual states mentioned above (blind-sight, change blindness and 
binocular rivalry) are conducted in controlled conditions that are “artificial in so far as 
they abstract away from the normal ecological contexts in which unconscious and 
conscious cognitive processes normally occur” (Kiverstein 2016, 114). The cases that I 
am referring to when discussing the similarities of EM and ECM are exactly the above 
43
described everyday-life mundane tasks, such as sketching with pen and paper, dancing to 
a choreography or deciding whether an apple is good for eating.
To put it in a nutshell: we don’t become Chalmers’s zombies when undergoing cognitive 
tasks. Several everyday cognitive processes (such as recognising an apple as food) are 
experiential, and experiential states (such as seeing the appleness of an apple) are 
cognitive. A rigid differentiation does not help to solve the empirical questions that for 
example psychology or cognitive neuroscience deal with. The most important question 
for the empirically oriented sciences of mind is not Why is there consciousness at all? but 
rather How does the cognitive-experiential system work? The question of this thesis is of 
course the latter one, with a focus on its sub-question: How is the cognitive-experiential 
system materially realised?
2.2.2. Occurrent EM
A slightly different way, which however leads almost to the same result, is to point to the 
occurrent side that is already present in EM. Namely, to start from the fact that the theory 
of EM itself not only deals with dispositional states (such as Otto and his notebook), but 
also with occurrent processes (such as calculating with pen and paper). Colombetti & 
Roberts (2014, 1244) make a significant distinction:
It is important to distinguish two targets of [EM]: (1) 
standing, enduring mental states, such as 
dispositional beliefs; and (2) temporary, fleeting 
occurrent cognitive processes, such as calculating a 
complex sum at a certain moment. [EM] is the thesis 
that, sometimes, the material vehicles that realize 
both (1) and (2) extend beyond skull and skin, into the 
world.
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This line of proceeding leads to the same conclusion as the previous strategy, but the path 
of reasoning is slightly different. Instances of occurrent EM already cover the experiential 
side: they are cognitive(-phenomenological) processes that happen during a certain 
interval of time, of which the experiential side cannot be carved off (at least in real life 
situations, conceptually they might be separable, for example in thought experiments). 
Colombetti & Roberts use an example of calculating to refer to an occurrent cognitive 
process. I suggest that perhaps an even better example of (2) from the above passage is 
calculating with ones fingers. It is more experiential than “calculating a complex sum”, 
which may be quite abstract (even if completed with pen and paper).
Indeed, the only non-experiential aspect in EM is (1) in the previous quote: standing, 
dispositional beliefs.36 Now, Clark most definitely supports occurrent EM, and has come 
up with the most illuminating examples in his publications over the last couple of decades. 
I think it is fair to say that the most important and interesting instances of EM belong to 
this group, and it is what makes EM such a striking and influential theory. The only cases 
that are left to the group of dispositional, non-occurrent EM are based on memory, 
knowledge or beliefs such as the Otto thought experiment. In the literature, dispositional 
and occurrent EM are usually not separated, or if they are, EM is taken as a wider theory 
that covers both (of which the above quote from Colombetti & Roberts is an example). 
In general, I follow their example (i.e. when I use the term EM, it covers both sides), but 
in this chapter, and especially in this first argument, the differences between the two sides 
play a crucial role.
Of course, this investigation did not only reveal that occurrent EM leads to ECM, but also 
that dispositional EM does not lead to ECM. But neither does it rule ECM out; the two 
theories just cover very different phenomena. The Otto example is not the only instance 
of dispositional EM, for we can also come up with real life manifestations. Probably, the 
most obvious one would be our everyday use of the “Otto-method”: how we have 
extended part of our memory in the everyday equipment and technologies, such as 
memories from a summer vacation to pictures in albums and computers, appointments in 
calendars, and several other commonplace pieces of information in shopping lists, diaries, 
                                                
36 Colombetti & Roberts (2014), however, do not aim to support the line of reasoning that the occurrent 
side in EM leads to consciousness coming on board. Their paper does not discuss the matter. However, I 
think it is something that everybody who accepts occurrent EM should accept.
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smartphones, etc. O’Regan already in his 1992 article suggested that the world functions 
for us as an “outside memory”.
It is not common amongst 4E-minded philosophers of mind to support only dispositional, 
but not occurrent EM.37 It is questionable whether the plain dispositional EM would even 
count as active externalism anymore, as Clark and Chalmers (1998) described it. What 
matters for Otto is his interaction with the object of perception (his notebook and the 
sentence that states the whereabouts of the museum), whereas in occurrent EM (and in 
ECM), the focus is not on the object or content, but rather on the means of perception
(e.g. using a calculator for solving a maths problem). Hence, extension is obtained in 
different ways in dispositional and occurrent EM.
Dispositional EM rather resembles content externalism, of which Putnam’s (1975) Twin 
Earth argument is an example.38 Of course, the act of checking my calendar or childhood 
photo album, or Otto checking his notebook, are active deeds, whereas the external factors 
responsible for the beliefs about XYZ or water are passively looming in the distance and 
in history. Hence, perhaps dispositional EM after all belongs to active externalism, but it 
is only due to it being contrasted with a very different account, namely Putnam’s content 
externalism. (It is good to remember that Clark and Chalmers (1998) use other examples 
of EM that belong to the group of occurrent EM, such as the example of playing Tetris.) 
The dispositional side of EM is the only part of EM that doesn’t lead to ECM. As I have 
stressed from the beginning of this thesis: the Otto example doesn’t entail ECM.
Susan Goldin-Meadow’s (2001) research gives empirical support for the non-
instrumental, constitutive role of moving and gesturing for cognitive tasks, such as 
solving a maths problem. That moving and gesturing is experiential, in addition to being 
cognitive. Hence, in occurrent cases of EM, such as calculating a maths task with one’s 
fingers, there are both cognitive and experiential sides at work. Calculating is a cognitive 
task, whereas the embodied act of using one’s fingers is an experiential act. Moving one’s 
                                                
37 On first impression, one would think that supporters of (exclusively) dispositional EM could be found 
amongst epistemologists who support EM. However, this is not the case, at least not straightforwardly. 
According to e.g. Pritchard (2010), not only dispositional, but also occurrent beliefs extend. Since the target 
of epistemologists is so different from the targets in cognitive science/philosophy of mind, and the 
‘occurrence’ in the ‘occurrent belief’ is probably understood very differently, those two disciplines cannot 
be contrasted without much further investigation (which is not among my aims here).
38 If we follow Clark and Chalmers’s conduct, dispositional EM still belongs to vehicle externalism (as 
opposed to Putnam’s content externalism), because it is supposed to be about the material basis, and not 
about the contents of those memories or beliefs. However, I am not sure whether in this case the difference 
between content and vehicle is crucial, precisely because of the blurring of active and passive externalisms.
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fingers when counting provides a clear-cut illustration how the cognitive act is also 
experiential. 
Alternatively, consider calculating with pen and paper or with an electronic calculator. 
Both are unquestionably cognitive acts. Both are also embodied, experiential acts. The 
difference from counting with one’s fingers is just that there is an extra-bodily tool, so 
the experientiality is not only based on the body parts, but also on the external parts. If 
we admit those acts of using pen and paper and/or using the calculator counts as instances 
of EM, they should also be counted as cases of ECM. For it is clear that those acts are 
both cognitive and experiential, and it is impossible to keep those two aspects apart.
Pleading to the occurrent side in EM can perhaps be seen as a more neutral strategy than 
the previous inseparability argument (in everyday situations), since it doesn’t ask us to 
change our notion of cognition or consciousness. It aims plainly to point out something 
that has been there all the time, but perhaps just unnoticed by us. However, I think the 
two strategies are equally important and that they are just two different routes for 
approaching the very same result: if cognition extends, conscious experience extends as 
well.
2.2.3. Summing up the first argument
The two strategies presented below are just two different routes for approaching the very 
same result: if cognition extends, conscious experience extends as well. The core reason 
why EM cannot be accepted without ECM became apparent from both strategies: 
cognition and experience cannot be separated in the way they have been separated by the 
leading supporters of EM. The narrow version of EM (dispositional EM) doesn’t lead to 
ECM, but the wider (occurrent) does – and the latter includes the most important and 
interesting instances of EM.
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A further reason why EM and ECM stand or fall together is that if Clark’s counter-
arguments against ECM were true, they would also refute his own EM. Especially, his 
criticism against ECM based on high-bandwidth (Chalmers 2008; Clark 2009; 2012), 
were it a valid argument, would also – unintentionally – bring down EM. I will argue in 
chapter 5 that the high-bandwidth argument doesn’t work in general, and hence ECM 
(and EM) survive. Nevertheless, despite its faults, it is a nice example of how EM cannot 
be defended independently of ECM. (Needless to say, this is quite the opposite way to 
interpret the matter from Clark’s.) Thus, chapter 5 provides yet another argument for the 
claim that ECM follows from EM.
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2.3. Argument 2: Sensorimotor enactivism
Whereas the defenders of EM usually deny ECM, the supporters of ECM are often found 
amongst sensorimotor enactivists. According to my second argument, if we accept 
sensorimotor enactivism, ECM follows. Not only do I argue for this entailment, but I also 
claim that sensorimotor enactivism is an explanatorily powerful theory of perceptual 
experience, and we should accept it.39 The benefits of the theory are independent of my 
purposes with ECM. It provides explanations of some features of perceptual experience 
that remain unresolved or mysterious in representationalist and cognitivist theories, e.g. 
experiential differences between sensory modalities, and within one sensory modality. 
That is, sensorimotor enactivism answers the comparative explanatory gap. It has been 
suggested in the literature (Hurley and Noë 2003; O’Regan 2016) that the explanatory 
gap (Levine 1983), which is a close relative to the hard problem of consciousness 
(Chalmers 1996), is not the only (putative) gap in explanation. Apart from this absolute 
explanatory gap, there is the comparative gap: the puzzle why different sensory 
experiences differ in the way they do. Providing an answer to the comparative gap can be 
considered to be the most important outcome of sensorimotor enactivism.
Even though sensorimotor enactivism as a theory in cognitive sciences is independent of 
ECM, I argue that a defender of sensorimotor enactivism cannot consistently deny ECM. 
This argument consists of two steps. First, I will discuss the reasons why we should accept 
sensorimotor enactivism, and second, the reasons why sensorimotor enactivism leads to 
ECM. As previously mentioned, I claim that the second step follows quite 
straightforwardly, even though not all sensorimotor enactivists explicitly address it, and 
furthermore, Clark (2009) explicitly rejects the implication (challenges to the implication 
will be discussed in 2.3.1.).40 First, I will outline what sensorimotor enactivism actually 
claims, and then I will sum up what kind of arguments for ECM can be drawn from it. 
                                                
39 I use sensorimotor ‘enactivism’, ‘approach’, and ‘view’ synonymously. Proponents include e.g. O’Regan 
& Noë (2001); Hurley & Noë (2003); Noë (2004; 2012); Silverman (2013); Hurley (1998); Kiverstein 
(2010). Especially vision is often used as an example of the extended perceptual mode of experience, e.g. 
in O’Regan & Noë (2001); Bruno (2013); Loughlin (2012); Pepper (2013).
40 Apart from denying the implication (which is the main focus in his 2009 paper), Clark has also criticised 
“strong sensorimotor models” (see e.g. Clark 2008, chapter 8), which includes Noë’s account for example.
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2.3.1. Landscapes of sensorimotor enactivism
Understanding perception as active exploration in the world through sensorimotor skills 
and patterns is a feature that is very typical of enactivism in general. According to 
enactivism, the material basis of perception is in the interactions between brain, body and 
environment, and consciousness is not considered an epiphenomenal by-product, but it 
already belongs to cognition (see e.g. Colombetti & Thompson 2008; Gangopadhyay & 
Kiverstein 2009).
As explained in the first chapter, enactivism is composed of three main branches: 
autopoietic (e.g. Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007), sensorimotor (e.g. Hurley 1998; 
2010;41 O’Regan & Noë 2001; Noë 2004; 2006; 2012) and radical (e.g. Chemero 2009; 
Hutto & Myin 2012; 2017).42 Even though in this argument I only discuss the second (the 
sensorimotor branch), this does not mean that the two other branches would be in conflict 
with it. The types of enactivism do overlap. However, autopoietic and radical accounts 
often bypass conscious experience, and instead discuss the minimal conditions of 
cognition, the “lower levels of mind”, i.e. the cognitive system as an autopoietic system 
(Varela et al. 1991) or “basic minds” (Hutto & Myin 2012) that is already present in 
simple life forms, e.g. in bacteria. The sensorimotor branch is the one that most directly 
addresses the issues related to perceptual experience – but it is an independent theory 
from ECM. Let us now take a closer look at what sensorimotor enactivism involves.
The central feature of the theory lies in the concept of sensorimotor contingencies (also 
referred to as sensorimotor dependencies, loops or patterns) that are “regularities 
governing how sensory stimulation depends on the activity of the perceiver” (Seth et al. 
2016, 267). They highlight the deep interdependence of the sensory input and motor 
output – the bodily interactive skilful encounters we have with our environment. Our 
experiences are tied to sensorimotor contingencies or laws that are at work when we are 
                                                
41 Susan Hurley’s view is sometimes separated from the sensorimotor branch (e.g. in Gangopadhyay & 
Kiverstein 2009), since Hurley firmly denies the need for a higher-level integration at the conceptual level 
(as opposed to e.g. O’Regan and Noë). Hurley’s view can be considered a version of strong enactivism
(which will be discussed later in this section): perception truly requires action, and not only knowledge of 
the sensorimotor effects of actions. However, the difference found between Hurley and the other 
sensorimotor enactivists is not essential for the current purposes of settling the premise theory that entails 
ECM. Thus, I treat Hurley as one of the sensorimotor enactivists.
42 When I use the term ‘enactivism’ without any specifications, I refer to the general view that covers the 
sub-branches.
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in bodily interaction with our environment. Perceivers “know how to exploit them to 
explore and negotiate their environments” (Hurley & Noë 2003, 146). They are said to 
determine the content and character43 of experience (O’Regan & Noë 2001; Noë 2004; 
2012; Ward et al. 2017). “Perceptual experience just is a mode of skillful exploration of 
the world” (Noë 2004, 194).
According to the sensorimotor approach, skilful bodily engagements with the 
environment determine perceptual experiences, and those engagements themselves are 
constitutive for the content and character of perceptual experience. Importantly, they not 
only enable or affect, but do nothing less than constitute the experience. Hutto and Myin 
(2012, 11) write that perceptual experience is “literally constituted by, and to be 
understood in terms of, concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, 
nothing more or less”. Ward (2012, 738) is no less clear: “the enactivist’s claim is that an 
evolving perceptual relationship with the world, implicating sensorimotor understanding, 
is our experience of the world”.
The connection to Gibson’s (1979) affordances is unmistakable. The subject perceives 
the affordances in its environment – what it can e.g. grasp, stroke, eat or avoid. Another 
source of influence can be traced back to Dewey’s transactionalism (Dewey & Bentley 
1949) that stresses the inseparability of the organism and its environment: the subject’s 
actions, behaviour and mental states (including higher-order epistemic states, 
“knowings”) cannot be explained without referring to the full organism-environment 
situation. Similarly, the sensorimotor approach takes into account the whole organism-
environment sensorimotor loop.
A similar kind of reasoning can be found in the work of the robotics pioneer Rodney 
Brooks (1990), who started building robots based on the ideas similar to the sensorimotor 
approach. Rather than trying to create internal representations or symbols, his robots learn 
from their sensorimotor actions in their environment by “using the world as its own best 
model”. This case from robotics is interesting because with robots, no doubt is left that 
there would be some hidden symbol manipulation at play. We know (or at least Rodney 
                                                
43 ‘Content’ here means the character of the content, i.e. what is experienced (compared with how the 
experience is produced – with which vehicles). ‘Content’ is used in a weak/mild sense, and it doesn’t have 
any technical meaning that would greatly differ from ‘character’. It certainly doesn’t refer to 
representations, but rather just simply notifies that experiences are about something. See Hurley (2010) and 
my discussion about the what- and how-explanations later in this chapter. From now on, instead of referring 
to both character and content, I sometimes simply refer to character.
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Brooks knows) for a fact how these robots function because they are built by humans.44
In theory, an internalist about the human mind could always appeal to the current 
incompleteness of neurosciences: perhaps the places for symbols in the brain will be 
found in the “future”, when the neurosciences develop.45
2.3.2. Bridging the comparative explanatory gap
Sensorimotor enactivism deals with the experiential (i.e. qualitative character) side of 
perceptual experiences. Some proponents also discuss whether the character determines 
the vehicle – whether the vehicular side is also extended.46 However, the material basis 
of experience is not the main explanandum for sensorimotor enactivism (as is it for ECM). 
It is rather a theory that aims to explain the qualitative side of conscious experiences: 
qualitative differences between modalities (e.g. visual and auditory), and within one 
modality (e.g. between different colours or shapes). The sensorimotor approach has an 
indisputable asset when compared with its internalist competitors: it promises genuinely 
to explain the differences (especially with the notion of sensorimotor contingencies),
whereas accounts that seek for neural correlates of consciousness – even if they did find 
them – would always come up with an explanatory gap (O’Regan & Noë 2001, 940–941; 
Silverman 2013, 152).
                                                
44 Robotics offer an interesting case for 4E-theories; they can learn from each other. However, my thesis is 
about the human mind – and even though I think that the investigation of the possibility (or impossibility) 
of an artificial mind could also shed light on the human mind – it is, however, not possible to handle these 
issues here. The questions are so complicated that they are worth their own research.
45 These kinds of arguments that deal with their problems by appealing to future sciences, could, in my 
opinion, be left to future science, and as we only have access to the present and past science, we would 
never need to see them again.
46 I will get back to the issue why I think it is legitimate to claim that the experiential level determines the 
material level.
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For example, in visual exploration, the colour and brightness reflected from objects 
change in regular, lawful ways when we move around, or the light source or the object 
moves (O’Regan & Noë 2001, 942). Sensorimotor enactivists stress that to be a visual 
perceiver is “to be capable of exercising mastery of vision-related rules of sensorimotor 
contingency” (O’Regan & Noë 2001, 943).
We have expectations how perceptual experience is 
likely to change due to our own movement and 
movement of objects that is independent of us. A first 
law distinguishing visual percepts from perception in 
other modalities is the fact that when the eyes rotate, 
the sensory stimulation on the retina shifts and 
distorts in a very particular way, determined by the 
size of the eye movement, the spherical shape of the 
retina, and the nature of the ocular optics. In 
particular, as the eye moves, contours shift and the 
curvature of lines changes. (O’Regan & Noë 2001, 
941.)
For example, we have an implicit sensorimotor understanding how red objects behave in
different lighting. O’Regan and Noë (2001, 951) write that ‘red’ is knowing the structure 
of the changes that ‘red’ causes”. The parts that are facing the light look brighter than 
those that are in the shadow. To know what red is, is to know how it would look different 
when “colour critical conditions” vary – the colour is “a pattern or structure in 
appearance” (Noë 2016, 73). The phenomenon of colour constancy speaks for this kind 
of implicit sensorimotor understanding that we possess: despite apparent changes in 
colour due to change in the illumination conditions or in the contrasting objects, we still 
perceive a uniform colour, and not a variable appearance (Noë 2004, 127). 
This goes for other perceptual experiences as well, such as tactile experience.47 Touching
is a good example how the sensorimotor view explains the qualitative differences within 
a sensory modality. Tactile modality is linked to our movement, action and “to our 
implicit understanding of the relevant tactile-motor dependencies governing our 
                                                
47 Noë (2016) explains sensory experiences such as sensations of pain in a similar manner. Pains are context 
dependent (e.g. compare having a tattoo vs. a tiger mauling your arm), and as such they contain an 
accessibility or potentiality that resembles the way colours are accessible to us. However, notice that a 
sensation of pain is not a perceptual experience, and hence not amongst my examples. Noë makes an 
exception, because usually sensorimotor enactivists only talk about strictly perceptual experiences, and 
exclude “experiences of thought, emotion, and feelings like hunger and pain” (Degenaar & O’Regan 2015, 
footnote 1).
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interaction with objects” (Noë 2004, 98). Touching is not possible without sensorimotor 
action; we need to sense the resistance of the object in able to have a tactile experience 
(see O’Shaughnessy 2000; and chapter 3).
For example, the quality of softness of a sponge is 
constituted by – it is nothing more or less than – all 
the things that one can do with the sponge when one 
is checking for softness, and all the ways the sponge 
reacts when one handles it in this softness-checking 
way. Anything one can potentially say about the 
quality of softness of the sponge must ultimately boil 
down to something about how one potentially can 
interact with the sponge when one is checking 
whether it is soft. (O’Regan 2016, 41.)
In fact, according to sensorimotor enactivism, not only visual and tactile, but all sensory 
modalities are constituted by patterns of sensorimotor contingencies. Sensorimotor 
contingencies also explain phenomenological differences between different sensory 
modalities. Different sensory modalities are governed by different sensorimotor 
contingencies: visual experiences are partly governed by eye movements and saccadic 
movements in a law-like way, whereas for auditory experiences these factors are 
irrelevant. The sensorimotor contingencies determine why seeing has a certain 
phenomenological character, and hearing has a different character. We as perceivers are 
familiar with these law-like contingencies, and we know how to exploit them. This is the 
core reason why sensorimotor contingencies have more explanatory power than neural 
correlates. 
With neural correlates there is always the accompanying (comparative) explanatory gap 
without an answer: why is a certain brain chemistry and physics correlated with exactly 
the experience it is correlated with and not with something else, e.g. the experience of 
seeing rather than hearing? O’Regan (2011, 115) states that “there is no natural way of 
making such a link”. However, this kind of comparative gap doesn’t arise with 
sensorimotor contingencies. Actions themselves serve as an explanation. (Hurley & Noë 
2003, 146–147.) Solving the comparative gap can be counted as a reason why we should 
embrace sensorimotor enactivism.
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2.3.3. Sensorimotor reductionism or sensorimotor integrationism?
The character of perceptual experience (such as seeing a round-shaped red object) is given 
by the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. So the crux is in our mastery, knowledge
or understanding of subject–environment dependencies (O’Regan & Noë 2001, 944; 
Ward et al. 2017, 371). The word ‘knowledge’ should not be understood as a propositional 
attitude, but rather as a basic embodied, implicit, practical understanding of the ways our 
actions affect the world and our perceptions of it. Especially Noë stresses the role of 
knowledge, whereas radical enactivism on the other hand criticises views where its role 
is too significant. In order to avoid controversial terminology, ‘sensorimotor empathy’, 
‘feeling-into’ (Chemero 2016) and ‘sensing-in’ (Colombetti & Torrance 2009) have 
among other terms been suggested.48
Besides terminological ambiguities, the above considerations are connected to a deeper 
tension within sensorimotor enactivists. On the one hand, the theory seems to depend 
upon concrete bodily action, and on the other hand, mere know-how or understanding of 
the sensorimotor dependencies seems to be enough. Aizawa (2010) has named the former 
‘strong enactivism’ and the latter ‘weak enactivism’. Are they really two different 
versions of sensorimotor enactivism, and if so, is the differentiation important considering 
ECM?
Undoubtedly, Clark (2009, 974) is right to note that “mere potentialities of experience are 
surely not what is at issue between the friends and foes of ECM”. Of course, ECM is 
talking about actual, not potential experience. However, I do not think we can cut out the 
sensorimotor tracking abilities from the actions themselves – at least when talking about 
perceptual experience in humans. The gist of sensorimotor enactivism lies in the 
inseparability of sensorimotor actions and understanding their effects. What sensorimotor 
enactivism means by those actions already presupposes and depends on familiarity, 
attunement, understanding (or “knowledge”, if you want) of sensorimotor 
                                                
48 The nature of the sensorimotor contingencies is not a settled issue amongst the enactivists, and the 
scientific implementations (e.g. in cognitive sciences and robotics) have varied from non-representationalist 
dynamical interpretations to more representationalist and cognitivist approaches (for an overview see Ward 
et al. 2012, 371).
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contingencies.49 But that “knowledge” is knowledge-how: practical, non-propositional, 
and bodily in nature.
Keeping Aizawa’s differentiation as well as my criticism of it in mind, we might still 
want to ask: are these sensorimotor actions and the following understanding of the law-
like contingencies everything that is needed for there to be conscious experience? Is it a 
necessary and sufficient constitutive basis for perceptual experience?
Of course, it depends on how we understand this “knowledge-how” or “understanding”. 
We can postulate a behaviourism-inspired view where the actions are all that matters. Noë 
(2016) calls sensorimotor reductionism a view according to which someone or something 
who manifested a “sensorimotor profile” typical for some experience would count as 
having that experience. For example, a robot that acts as if it is in pain, would be in pain. 
Noë criticises this view, but he cannot really name any supporters of it. The closest are, 
according to him, Hutto and Myin (2012) (and probably radical enactivism in general, 
even though Noë does not say so).
Noë classifies himself as a sensorimotor integrationalist (as opposed to a reductionist). 
The difference with SM-reductionism is that according to Noë’s SM-integrationism “we 
can’t give an entirely non-mentalistic account of the substrates of consciousness” (Noë 
2016, 71, footnote 3). The non-reducible features in question concern how we achieve the 
world’s presence through our skilful access. He arranges skills of access in three. First, 
there is our knowledge of what and how we can access the world, including conceptual, 
practical, social and sensorimotor skills or techniques. Second, there is access to the “real 
world”: it is not the world of sense-data but neither is it the world of physics, because 
before physics, “there are tables, chairs, doors”. (Noë is slightly obscure in describing this 
second feature, but I think he refers to our general situatedness in the world, our attitudes 
towards it that are based on the affordances we can achieve.) And third, there is our 
“concern, caring and interest” attitude towards our environment: we reach out because 
we care about what there is. (Noë 2016, 75–76.)
                                                
49 Of course, we can have a system that is capable of sensorimotor actions, but incapable of understanding 
them in any stronger meaning of “understanding”. Consider, for example, a robot vacuum cleaner. Its 
actions are based on sensorimotor information gained from its actions in the environment. Still, we would 
probably say it doesn’t have the right sort of understanding of the sensorimotor contingencies. However, 
sensorimotor enactivism is not a theory about vacuum cleaners.
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If understood as Noë describes it, SM-reductionism is not a feasible account. However, I 
think Noë’s distinction is based on the same misunderstanding as Aizawa’s distinction 
between strong and weak enactivism. I agree with Noë that “something else” is needed, 
and I think that something else is more or less the same features Noë himself called for. I 
wouldn’t place such stress on knowledge how we can access the world, but rather on our 
primordial situatedness and sense-making attitude50 (cf. Noë’s “concern, caring and 
interest”). They are needed for there to be conscious experience, such as visual experience 
of red or a sensation of pain. Now, I don’t think it is self-evident that these factors don’t 
get reduced on our sensorimotor actions and contingencies. Or perhaps emergence would
be a more apt conception here.
The fact that Noë’s description of SM-reductionism is a strawman argument makes it 
difficult to evaluate. Whether we call the (putative) non-reducible features something 
“non-physical” (or with Noë’s euphemistic term “not non-mentalistic”) depends how we 
define mental and physical in the first place. I do not think sense-making, caring about or 
having an interest in the outcomes of one’s sensorimotor actions should be classified as 
something non-physical. They have physical substrates like any other features of the 
natural world. The distinction between physical and non-physical in the case of 
sensorimotor actions is just leading us astray. And this makes the whole SM-reductionism 
quite an unfair stipulation. Opposite to Noë, I think it is possible that this kind of sense-
making attitude could be part of the SM-reductionist account, because perhaps 
sensorimotor actions and an understanding of the contingencies (the right kind of 
sensorimotor profile) already comprises the sense-making attitude. With this description 
(which is not Noë’s, but mine), sensorimotor reductionism is a feasible account. 
                                                
50 What I am after here with the notion of sense-making has also been referred to by enactivists as 
primordial affectivity (Colombetti 2014), affective scaffolding (Colombetti & Krueger 2015; Colombetti & 
Roberts 2014), and affective framing (Maiese 2015).
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2.3.4. Temporal nature, virtual presence
Another important feature is that sensorimotor enactivism is committed to temporal 
extension of experiences, which means that “experience is a mode of temporally extended 
skilful interaction with the world” (Ward 2012, 737). Perceptual experiences unfold over 
time, they are irreducible to any atom-like atemporal states (as opposed to some 20th
century philosophy of mind views that stressed representations and qualia). To explain 
consistently temporally extended phenomenology, we need a temporally extended 
material basis. This means that we need to commit ourselves to an extensional model of 
perceptual experience. It is a view that holds that experiences are dynamic temporal 
phenomena – all the way from the material basis to the experiential level.51
An extensionalist sensorimotor account, in the first 
place, explains temporal experience by positing that 
perceptual awareness of a temporally extended event 
supervenes on a temporally extended process of 
interaction between the perceiver and the 
environment, in such a way that the content 
temporally tracks the vehicle (Silverman 2013, 156).
The temporally extended nature of experiences is related to another central feature of the 
sensorimotor approach. Our relationship with the world is based on evolving (temporal) 
processes that are explained by the thesis of virtual presence or presence in absence (Noë 
2004; 2006; 2008). This is the solution of sensorimotor enactivism to some prevalent 
puzzles of perceptual experience.
We seem to perceive a lot that we don’t actually perceive, and we also perceive a lot that 
we don’t notice perceiving. We seem to have a richly detailed, colourful visual experience 
of the scenery we are facing. However, there is a vast amount of empirical evidence that 
we (or our brain) are actually not capable of perceiving all that we seem to perceive. This 
research is well-established and accepted by the research community – the possible 
ambiguities lie in how to interpret these results. Empirical research about blind spots, 
impoverished peripheral vision (including peripheral colour vision), saccadic smear, 
                                                
51 In the next chapter, I will explain in more detail why ECM and enactivism are forms of the extensional
model, and compare it with retentional and cinematic models. The temporal and dynamical nature of 
experiences in general will be discussed in more detail there.
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change blindness, inattentional blindness, etc. show that our visual perception is an 
impoverished machinery for experiencing the world around us (O’Regan & Noë 2001; 
Stafford & Webb 2005).
Yet, we don’t notice the scarcity. The perceptual experience of the scenery is not 
monochromatic and blurry in peripheral or parafoveal areas. We are sometimes unaware 
of dramatic changes in the scenery, as was shown in the famous “invisible gorilla test” 
(Simons & Chabris 1999) that shows that when we are concentrating on one aspect in our 
visual field, we easily fail to notice other objects, no matter how striking they are, such 
as a person walking in and out in a gorilla suit (inattentional blindness). We also tend to 
fail to notice large changes in our visual field, such as objects disappearing or changing 
colour – we are unable to track the difference in a picture before and after, or when the 
picture flickers on and off (change blindness) (see O’Regan et al. 1999). In addition, 
“most people are completely unaware of how poor their acuity and their color perception 
are in peripheral vision” (O’Regan & Noë 2001, 951).
This is the puzzle: why do we seem to have a rich visual experience coated with lots of 
details and colours around us? A common internalist and representationalist response is 
that the rich visual image is due to our internal representations. We have an inner 
“picture” of the scenery: the richness of details comes from inner representations being 
activated. A related response is that the apparent richness is only illusory (and hence this 
view is sometimes called the grand illusion). According to this view, we are mistaken in 
our experience: we think we enjoy rich perceptual experiences, but actually we don’t. 
(See discussion in Clark 2009, 973.) However, appealing to an illusory character does not 
help, because we still do have phenomenological experience of the richness, which was 
the explanandum. 
The sensorimotor approach denies both the grand illusion and the internal 
representations explanations. The richness of colours and details is true for us on the 
experiential, phenomenological level. It is not illusory, but phenomenological reality. 
Furthermore, the richness is not based on representations constructed in the brain, but 
rather on our skill-based access to them in the actual environment.
In other words, sensorimotor enactivists explain the tension by pleading to sensorimotor 
contingencies. The details of the scenery are present virtually, because of our dynamic 
sensorimotor access to them. “The flick of the eye, the turn of the head, the movement of 
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the body, brings us the detail we need as we need it” (Noë 2006, 420). Hence, our 
perceptual experiences are not only determined by neural states but also by actions and 
the environment. 
Sensorimotor enactivism explains all perceptual experiences in this manner (even though 
the focus is often on visual modality, especially in Kevin O’Regan’s work). Apart from 
the above-discussed neurological deficiencies, the theory also explains the more mundane 
phenomenon that needs no laboratory experiments: the fact that we only see the parts of 
the objects we are facing and that are visible to us, but never the hidden, occluded sides. 
The retinal image can only offer a view of the fronts of the objects, it is impossible to see 
all the sides at once. However, this is not how objects are experienced. Instead, we 
experience objects as wholes. We have visual experiences of complete three-dimensional 
cats, dogs and tomatoes, not only their unoccluded parts. “When you see a tomato, you 
only see, strictly speaking, the visible face of the tomato; but it is also true that you are 
visually aware of the presence of the parts of the tomato which you don’t actually see” 
(Noë 2006, 414). The same applies for apparent size and shape. We see two trees in our 
visual field as being the same size, even though the nearer tree looks bigger; and the plate 
in front of me looks both circular and elliptical. Another example is the already mentioned 
colour constancy: the wall looks uniformly white, and yet it also looks grey, yellow, 
darker, lighter, etc. (Noë 2004; 2006.)
In the same manner as earlier, the hidden sides and perceptual ambiguities are explained 
by sensorimotor contingencies. The world is present to us virtually: with the means of our 
sensorimotor contact to it, and our understanding of the ways in which our movements 
and exploratory habits bring the occluded sides to our awareness. We have access to the 
occluded, hidden sides by means of our probing, moving and acting in the environment. 
We have learned to anticipate how a shape or colour changes when observed from 
different angles. This is what Noë means by virtual presence.
Noë’s account of virtual presence has been criticised (e.g. Clark 2009) for putting too 
much weight on the potentiality of experience. If the rich, detailed perceptual (character 
of) content is present to us only potentially, what does it tell us about the actual 
experiential contents, which are surely our focus of interest? However, this criticism is 
based on a mistaken reading of Noë. Ward clarifies Noë’s intentions with his notion of 
virtual presence:
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We should not interpret his remarks on presence as 
entailing that the detail of the world, or the occluded 
parts of objects, are present to us in experience ‘only 
potentially’ or in some impoverished sense. Whole 
objects and detailed scenes are embraced in 
experience, despite facts about the limits of sensory 
uptake that might appear to make this problematic. 
(Ward 2012, 737.)
Hence, the hidden parts are not present to us potentially, but on the experiential level they 
really are present. Ward points out that Clark assumes that Noë is talking about the sub-
personal level of experience. But instead, the notion of virtual presence is supposed to 
capture how we perceive the world in a phenomenological sense. (I will discuss the 
personal vs. sub-personal question in more details in section 2.3.6.) The virtual presence 
thesis provides a conception of experience (at a phenomenological, personal level) as an 
interactive relationship between subjects and their environment – and this conception 
explains all the above-mentioned deficiencies in our perceptual capacities.
The main features of sensorimotor enactivism can be summarised as follows: 1) 
Perceptual experience depends constitutively on skilful bodily interactions with the 
environment and the perceiver’s implicit understanding of those dependencies 
(sensorimotor contingencies). 2) Phenomenal qualities are differentiated in line with the 
subject’s actions, expectations and understanding how her movements will change the 
qualities. 3) Experiences are temporally extended dynamic phenomena. 4) Perception is 
virtual in the sense that even though we never have a retinal image of a complete scenery, 
object, colour or other properties, the details are still present due to their accessibility 
through our skilful sensorimotor actions.
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2.3.5. Arguments drawn from sensorimotor enactivism in support of ECM
In this section, I sum up what I think are the most central reasons why sensorimotor 
enactivism leads to ECM, viz., how the features described in the previous section entail 
ECM. However, let us first take a look at what others have said about this. In his critical 
paper, Clark (2009) names the features of sensorimotor enactivism that according to him 
are the best candidates that support ECM. (His aim is to show that those features don’t
entail ECM.) Since Clark’s influential paper, the features he picked up have been to a 
certain extent accepted to capture the most important arguments for ECM (they are 
referred in e.g. Ward 2012; Clark 2013; Pepper 2013; Kiverstein & Kirchhoff 2019). I 
agree that they are important arguments, but I don’t think they are the only reasons to 
accept ECM: apart from them, my first and third arguments in this chapter should also be 
taken into account. In what follows, I review the standard line of arguments from 
sensorimotor enactivism in favour of ECM, and discuss whether they work or not.
Clark (2009) calls them arguments from 1) variable neural correlates, 2) virtual 
representations, and 3) dynamic entanglement + unique temporal signature (DEUTS for 
short). First, the variable neural correlates argument is based on empirical facts about 
how changing sensorimotor contingencies affect the brain by means of neural plasticity. 
Sensorimotor enactivists (e.g. Hurley & Noë 2003) give an extensive overview of 
empirical studies on neural plasticity that show that neural correlates are not fixed. There 
are cases where the neural processing varies, but the experience remains the same, and 
on the other hand, there are cases where the experience changes while the neural 
processing remains the same. 
An example of the first kind is inverting goggles (e.g. left–right reversing goggles). When 
the goggles are first used, visual experience is disrupted dramatically; there is conflict 
between proprioceptive and visual modalities. Sensorimotor contingencies no longer 
hold, since objects on the left side are not accessible by visually leftward movements. 
However, after enough practice and use, the distorting effects of the goggles will 
disappear, and the user will perceive the world normally again. (For the left–right 
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reversing goggles experiment, see Taylor 1962; and the discussion in Hurley & Noë 
2003.)52
An example of the second kind of case (phenomenological experience changes while 
neural processing remains the same) is sensory substitution, such as tactile-visual sensory 
substitution systems (TVSS) (see Bach-y-Rita 1972) and auditory-visual sensory 
substitution systems (e.g. The vOICe) (Meijer 1992). (Blind) users of sensory substitution 
systems will start having vision-like experiences after they have used the instrument long 
enough to learn how the new mode of interaction with the environment has affected the 
sensorimotor contingencies. The crucial lesson from the use of sensory substitution 
devices is that the users acquire experiential changes in accordance with the equipment.
The aim of the variable neural correlates argument is to show that the explanation of 
experience based solely on neural factors is not sufficient. Instead, experience requires an 
explanation of the modes of interaction with the environment (i.e. sensorimotor 
contingencies). The cases of inverting goggles and sensory substitution show that the 
users must learn new ways how sensorimotor contingencies work, and only after the 
attunement can they have normal experiences again. Thus, it is the characteristic 
interaction relation that fixes53 the qualitative character of experience. “[W]hat 
determines phenomenology is not neural activity set up by stimulation as such, but the 
way the neural activity is embedded in sensorimotor dynamic” (Noë 2004, 227). 
The variable neural correlates argument stresses the plasticity of the neural mechanisms, 
the plasticity of the sensorimotor contingencies, and how they affect each other. However, 
I don’t think it is the most important argument that sensorimotor enactivism has to offer 
in support of ECM. Instead, it is best taken as a reminder of prevalent plasticity 
considering neural functions, and especially perceptual plasticity. In this general sense, it 
can be read as a version of the well known multiple realizability argument – and as such, 
encompasses something very essential to externalist views in general.
                                                
52 Another example of neural plasticity that is often used is neural rewiring (visual to auditory) in newborn 
ferrets. Sur and colleagues (1999) managed to reroute visual input to auditory areas, so that the ferrets’ 
visual modality was connected with the brain parts that were usually associated with hearing. (Discussed 
in Noë 2004; Hurley & Noë 2003.) However, this example is more controversial than the use of goggles or 
sensory substitution devices due to reportability issues: we cannot ask the ferrets about their perceptual 
experiences.
53 Here, ‘fixing’ and ‘determining’ means fixing and determining constitutively. Technically, the phrase 
could also be: “The characteristic interaction relation is the qualitative character of experience.”
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Second, the argument from virtual representations draws from the same phenomenon of 
virtual presence (or presence in absence) that was already introduced in the previous 
section. It is indeed one of the most central arguments for the role of sensorimotor 
contingencies, i.e. for the role of agent–environment loops in constituting our perceptual 
experiences. This leads directly to ECM: experience is based on those interactive 
relationships that contain external parts. (I will discuss below and in the next section why 
the personal level determines the sub-personal level.)
The third and last argument formulated by Clark (playing devil’s advocate), the DEUTS 
argument, consists of two parts. The first part, the dynamical entanglement thesis, holds 
that the material basis of perceptual experience is a dynamic mess criss-crossing the brain, 
the extra-neural body and the environment (see Hurley 1998; 2010). It is impossible to 
separate the non-neural elements from the brain functions – organisms are very deeply 
and complexly intertwined systems (Cosmelli & Thompson 2010). Sometimes referred 
to as continuous reciprocal causation (e.g. Clark 2008, 24), these dynamic complex loops 
are the material basis for perceptual experiences.
Thus, the dynamical entanglement thesis bridges the other features of the sensorimotor 
approach (i.e. sensorimotor contingencies, virtual presence, etc.) from the experiential 
level to the material level. It is basically the other side of the coin of the theory of 
sensorimotor contingencies and the other features of sensorimotor enactivism that we 
have learned above – it just stresses material realization rather than experiential 
realization. As we have now seen, the sensorimotor approach tracks the content and 
character of experience. The dynamical entanglement thesis is an exception to this, since 
it directly addresses the intertwined material underpinnings that criss-cross the brain–
body–environment axis.
The second part of DEUTS, the unique temporal signature thesis,54 adds the temporal 
extension thesis (which was already discussed in the previous section) to the dynamic 
criss-cross of brain–body–world (the first part of this argument). The interactions
mentioned above must evolve over time in order to support experiential states. Without 
the right kind of temporal evolution – which requires extra-neural elements – the
experience cannot be the same. If skilful probing and actions are the basis of perceptual
                                                
54 “Signature” here refers to the unique temporal evolution (how it has evolved in time) that each experience 
has.
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experiences, the basis must be temporal. Probing, acting, touching and moving are 
temporal phenomena. Noë captures this idea neatly:
If this is right, then a neural duplicate of me now, at a 
moment in time, won’t, by dint of being my duplicate 
now, have any experience at all. If the duplicate does 
have experience, it will be thanks to its dynamic, 
temporally extended interaction with the 
environment. But then again we must note that there 
is little reason to think that its experience would or 
could be like mine unless its environment were also 
like mine. (Noë 2006, quoted in Clark 2009, 978.)
Thus, taking snap-shots at given moments of neural activity won’t capture perceptual 
experience. The whole dynamic, temporally evolving process is needed. And when we 
add this to the earlier part of this argument (the dynamic entanglement, which implies 
that we cannot carve off the non-neural from the neural), we get ECM.55 Perceptual 
experiences are based on such feedback loops, and cannot be reduced to neural factors
considered apart from such feedback loops.
Clark himself (2009, 975–80) thinks that DEUTS is the most promising of the arguments 
for ECM. This is not surprising, since the dynamical entanglement thesis directly assesses 
the material underpinnings of perceptual experiences, and that is what ECM is about. In 
a sense, I agree with him: it is indeed crucial that we reach the subpersonal level. On the 
other hand, as Ward (2012, 741) notes, the direct link to the subpersonal level implied in 
the DEUTS argument follows from sensorimotor enactivism’s personal level conception 
of experience. It is not the primary target for the sensorimotor enactivists themselves 
when they explain perceptual experience – but it is a further step. It is the core of ECM, 
and at the same time something that follows from sensorimotor enactivism.
Sensorimotor enactivism consists of various theses that I have described above. These 
aspects are mutually informative, and probably cannot be separated. However, if the aim 
is to name the features that specifically lead to ECM, I think the most important are the 
following. 1) The theory of sensorimotor contingencies: this ties our phenomenal 
experiences to our bodily interactions with the environment. Perceptual experiences are 
constituted by law-like interactions, and this makes it impossible to have a sufficient 
                                                
55 The phenomenon of temporal extension and the criticism of the snap-shot/cinematic view will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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neural explanation. 2) Bridging the comparative gap: the differences and similarities in 
the qualities of experiences (within one and across different sensory modalities) are 
explained by sensorimotor laws – what we do with our body, in our environment –
therefore, the constitutive basis for the quality of experience comprises external elements. 
3) Temporality and situatedness: the dynamic nature of experiences already includes 
external substrates. 4) Vehicle is determined by content: the external explanation at the 
personal level requires an external explanation at the subpersonal level (this feature will 
be discussed in the next section). As we can see, these features show quite unquestionably 
that if we accept sensorimotor enactivism, ECM follows. 
2.3.6. Does entailment hold? From the personal to the subpersonal level 
Let us turn our attention to the bridge again. Does it hold up? Does ECM follow from 
sensorimotor enactivism? Perhaps a possible critique of the bridge could be to claim that 
sensorimotor contingencies cannot be (part of) the constituents, since they are only 
relations, and as such cannot form the material basis for anything.56 This would, however, 
be a problematic and mistaken way to understand the conceptions of ‘relation’ and 
‘sensorimotor contingency’. A sensorimotor contingency is a mutual interactive relation 
between the subject and the world by means of sensorimotor action and feedback-loops. 
Those components are intrinsically part of it. The contingency consists of the subject, the 
extra-neural environmental parts, and the loops between them. Hence, this criticism 
doesn’t work. (Understanding ‘relation’ without the factors it relates to would be a 
problematic stance to anybody, including internalists.) 
Another possible critique would be to argue that sensorimotor skills and actions only 
causally affect the perceptual experience but do not constitute it. However, the 
                                                
56 I haven’t seen this kind of critique in the literature though.
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sensorimotorists explicitly state that the relation is a constitutive one. I will not discuss 
this critique here, since it is the topic of the next chapter.
Moreover, can we move from the personal level to the subpersonal level? Even though 
sensorimotor enactivism mainly approaches perceptual experience on the experiential 
(character) level, the phenomenal character gained through the mastery of sensorimotor 
contingencies has consequences on the material level as well. According to Noë (2004, 
221), sensorimotor enactivism entails that “the physical substrate of the experience may 
cross boundaries, implicating neural, bodily and environmental features”. Pepper (2013, 
99) proposes this claim in an even more precise manner: “sensorimotor dynamics – are 
physical constituents of perceptual experience”. If they are right, it is quite clear that the 
bridge upholds – if sensorimotor enactivism is true, ECM is also true.
However, Clark (2009) claims that sensorimotor enactivism is unable to create a firm 
ground for ECM. He doesn’t criticise all aspects of sensorimotor enactivism as such, but 
instead he denies the implication (or the “second step”) of my argument. Is Clark right, 
and my argument alongside the enactivist argument mistaken? Ward (2012) has made an 
important observation: Clark is using a different notion of experience than the enactivists, 
or rather, they are tracking the phenomenon on different levels. Clark is talking about the 
material basis of experience, and assumes that enactivism is doing the same. However, 
sensorimotor enactivism approaches experience as a personal level phenomenon. It is 
primarily a theory about the qualities of experience (even though the material side is also 
present, as we will soon see). For example, as mentioned above, Noë’s (2004; 2006) 
account of virtual presence operates with a personal level phenomenon – how objects 
appear to us – it is not even supposed to explain the sub-personal side. Even when 
sensorimotor enactivists explicitly argue for extension on the sub-personal level (e.g. the 
argument from dynamic entanglement), it is only due to an inference from their personal 
level conception. The sub-personal extension is not sensorimotor enactivism’s 
quintessential argument, but “it is rather a statement of ECM, motivated by their personal 
level conception of experience” (Ward 2012, 741). 
To put it in other words, Clark (mistakenly) attributes a sub-personal approach to 
sensorimotor enactivism, and yet Clark (correctly) attributes a sub-personal approach to 
ECM. Hence, ECM and enactivism are targeting the same phenomenon (perceptual 
experience), but they are targeting it from different levels of explanation. Clark fails to 
67
see this difference, and instead assumes both of them are operating from the sub-personal 
level. Nevertheless, he is right about the sub-personal level approach of ECM (as I have 
stressed from the beginning: ECM is a theory about the material basis of experience).
Sensorimotor enactivism answers what is experienced, and ECM answers how it is 
experienced. This use of whats and hows is borrowed from Hurley’s (2010) terminology 
(and is also used by Kiverstein & Kirchhoff 2019). What-explanations tell what the 
mental state is about, and how-explanations tell how they are materially produced. ECM 
(and EM) are answers to the how-question; sensorimotor enactivism is an answer to the 
what-question. 
These considerations lead to very profound questions about the nature of the mind itself, 
and how we can investigate it. Even if we corrected the misunderstanding between Clark 
and the enactivists, the fundamental difference remains: enactivism targets experience as 
a personal level phenomenon, whereas ECM is a theory at the sub-personal level, i.e. a 
theory about its material basis. Can the different approaches be combined, or are they just 
independent theories without a connecting interface?57
Sensorimotor enactivists themselves take it for granted that the personal level has 
implications for the sub-personal level. The what determines the how. Any other view 
would be counterintuitive, and in conflict with the broader conception of experience that 
sensorimotor enactivism is committed to. However, as mentioned earlier, in the enactivist 
literature, this line of reasoning is rather taken for granted than argued for. Ward (2012) 
makes an exception. He opens up the relation between the personal and sub-personal 
levels, and explains why sensorimotor enactivism’s commitment to the implication from 
the personal to the sub-personal level is warranted. In a word, internalism at the sub-
personal level cannot be combined with externalism at the personal level.
                                                
57 An obvious question would be to ask how the two levels are related: how the sub-personal creates the 
personal level phenomenon, or how the personal level phenomenon emerges from the subpersonal? But 
that question is, of course, the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. how phenomenological events arise from 
the material basis. This puzzle is not a challenge for externalism only, but one of the greatest puzzles of 
philosophy of mind in general, at least if we judge by the number of publications. Actually, I think it is 
justified to challenge the setting of the hard problem, because it is based on a mistaken view of cognition 
and consciousness, which stems from cognitivism and has been prevalent in analytic philosophy of mind 
(see the first argument in this chapter). However, the question I am discussing in this dissertation is not 
about the jump between the levels, nor the question whether this question is flawed (those questions are 
exactly the same that the internalists are facing too), but instead what belongs to the set of the material 
components.
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But understanding enactivism instead as involving a 
relational conception of experience at the personal 
level, with apparent implications for the location of 
the subpersonal mechanisms of experience, allows us 
to make better sense of the enactivist arguments, and 
make the case for conscious externalism (Ward 2012, 
731, italics added).
Two main reasons for accepting these “apparent implications” between the levels are the 
following (Ward 2012, 744). On the one hand, there is no intelligible reason why the 
personal level explanation that consists of the dynamic interaction between the subject 
and her environment should shrink to consist only of neural events on the sub-personal 
level. Experience, straightforwardly, is that dynamic relationship, and “the temptation to 
go internalist when describing experience at the subpersonal level simply will not arise” 
(Ward 2012, 744). On the other hand, the same applies when we proceed from the other 
direction: if we were internalists on the sub-personal level, how could experience at the 
personal level be the dynamic relationship that partly consists of external elements? If the 
internalist explanation at the sub-personal level were true, the externalist personal level 
explanation would be mistaken. Hence, it is easy to see why the enactivists accept ECM 
as a natural outcome of their view.
If we adopt the enactivist’s conception of experience 
as a relationship between perceiver and environment 
then the subpersonal underpinnings of experience 
must include more than the internal properties of the 
subject, since those properties leave it 
underdetermined whether the requisite relationship
obtains (Ward 2012, 746).
To what extent does Clark’s criticism of the implication from sensorimotor enactivism to 
ECM (i.e. the second step of my argument) stand up after these clarificatory remarks on 
levels? I agree with Ward (2012) that Clark (2009) is right to refute the implication when 
both theories are interpreted concerning the sub-personal level. However, when they are 
understood as concerning the personal level as the sensorimotor enactivists intended 
(whether or not they clearly expressed it), Clark’s critique loses its edge. Hence, 
sensorimotor enactivism doesn’t straightforwardly give us an account of an extended 
material basis. Rather, it entails it; sensorimotor enactivism entails ECM.
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2.3.7. Summing up the second argument
Of the three arguments presented in this chapter, this one contains the most indisputable 
bridge from the premise theory to ECM. In the first argument, there was still a way to 
accept one version of EM (i.e. dispositional EM) without accepting ECM. (Another 
question is whether anyone really supports dispositional EM alone, but at least that is a 
way to avoid ECM, if that is the wish.) Also, the implication relation in the third argument 
has restrictions: all embodiment doesn’t always lead to ECM. I claim that the argument 
at hand differs from the other two: we cannot accept sensorimotor enactivism without 
accepting ECM, because its very core theses inevitably entail ECM.
Besides overlapping, ECM and sensorimotor enactivism are still separate theories, 
because they emphasise slightly different aspects. One central disparity is that 
sensorimotor enactivism concerns at least all perceptual experiences, or also all 
sensational experiences (also e.g. the sensation of pain), or even all experience simpliciter 
(also non-veridical experiences), depending on the writer. However, my position 
concerning ECM is a much narrower account that comprises only certain perceptual 
experiences.
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2.4. Argument 3: The leaky body
The third and last argument is based on the embodiment thesis. By embodied experience, 
I simply mean that the brain is not a minimal sufficient base to create experiences,58 but 
the body is part of the constitutive base as well. This much is accepted relatively widely 
amongst 4E-minded philosophers, enactivists as well as many phenomenologists. The 
embodied mind approach (see e.g. Varela et al. 1991; Hurley 1998; Hurley & Noë 2003; 
Gallagher 2005; 2018; Colombetti & Thompson 2008; Cosmelli & Thompson 2010; 
2011) has been developed in philosophy of mind as well as e.g. in psychology, 
neuroscience and developmental robotics. The general claim about the role of the body 
in explaining cognitive functions is more or less accepted across these fields.59
The more debatable part of the argument is the latter part, which is about where does the 
body end (and the rest of the world begin). According to this second step, our bodies are 
not always sealed inside our skin, and this opens up a possibility (the third step of the 
argument) that those external, incorporated parts are partly responsible for the material 
realisation of some experiences. Thus, the argument is the following. 1) Experience is 
embodied. 2) The body is sometimes extended to the environment. 3) The incorporated 
parts sometimes function as substrates for certain experiences.
This argument gives theoretical support for the functional incorporation thesis presented 
in the fourth chapter. The fourth chapter provides concrete examples of embodiment, 
incorporation and crossing the borders of the body, whereas here I will stay at the 
theoretical level. This argument will concentrate on explaining the argumentative path: 
why we are allowed to say that experience is embodied, why borders of the body are 
extended to the environment, and how all this backs up ECM.
                                                
58 Here, as throughout almost all of this thesis, by experiences I refer to experiential states rather than the 
general capability of being (phenomenally) conscious. The distinction has been called e.g. state 
consciousness vs. creature consciousness (see Bayne 2007; Cosmelli & Thompson 2011). 
59 Of course, the view that the mind is realised solely in the brain still has its supporters in the philosophical
community (especially amongst analytical philosophers). According to the brain-centred view, the body is 
not amongst the material realisers for conscious experiences, and it affects our experiences only secondarily 
by affecting our brain, and in principle an envatted brain could have similar experiences to those of an 
embodied subject (see criticism of the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment in chapter 5).
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2.4.1. Experience is embodied
As a “premise theory” for my argument, the embodiment thesis doesn’t require very 
extensive treatment, since there is already a vast empirical literature about the embodied 
nature of experiences. The claim that experience is embodied means that (also) the non-
neural body is a constitutive basis for perceptual experience. The neural and non-neural 
parts of the body cannot be separated because they are so intertwined and entangled, and 
we cannot explain brain functions without acknowledging bodily functions. We can 
proceed from a negative or positive angle: on the one hand, by criticising the brain-
centred, body-deprived view of experience, and on the other hand, by stressing how the 
body plays a vital role in having experiences. Of course, both ways aim for the same 
result. In the following, I will use both approaches.
A significant amount of neuroscientific research supports the embodiment thesis (see e.g. 
Ferri et al. 2012; Hari & Kujala 2009; Gibbs 2006; Chiel & Beer 1997; Gallese et al. 
1996). For example, neuroscientist Riitta Hari considers the brain–body–environment 
triangle a necessary basis for cognition. According to her, the features brought out in the 
4E-framework are a fruitful way to explain the human mind (e.g. Hari 2017). It is widely 
agreed among neuroscientists that the brain itself is explanatorily inseparable from the 
nervous system and peripheral sensorimotor systems: we cannot understand neural 
activity without looking at the rest of the body (see Cosmelli & Thompson 2010; 2011). 
As Gallagher (2008, 164) writes, “the structural and functional design of the body shapes 
the way that we experience the world”.
The nervous system constantly receives and responds to the feedback from the body, its 
movement and its environment, and action–perception loops are essential for a simple 
movement as well as for more complex cognitive functions (Hari 2017; Chiel & Beer 
1997). Cosmelli & Thompson (2010, 12) give a list of functional systems that are 
dependent on brain–body coupling. They include the interoceptive system, vestibular 
autonomic regulation, balance and somatic graviception, and interaction between the 
senses occurring at central and peripheral levels.
An example that is directly connected to perceptual experience is empirical research on 
vision. Studies in active or animate vision (Ballard 1991; Ballard et al. 1992) has revealed 
that eyes don’t passively record what is in the scene, but eye saccades and head motions 
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(which are, obviously, bodily actions) are shown to take part in creating the visual 
experience. Maintaining visual perception is dependent on microsaccades (short, 
involuntary eye movements): if they are prevented, object perception will fail (Martinez-
Conde et al. 2000). Overall, neuroscientific research on vision suggests that visual
experience is a strongly embodied phenomenon, dependent on the subject’s voluntary and 
involuntary bodily actions and on connected environmental loops.60
Recently, there has been a lot of discussion about the embodied nature of affective states, 
such as emotions and moods (see e.g. Colombetti and Thompson 2008). The 
philosophical arguments for embodied affectivity is backed up by a vast amount of 
empirical research (see overviews in Gibbs 2006; Colombetti & Torrance 2009). For 
example, facial expressions, gestures and autonomic nervous system activity are partly 
responsible for affective states. Dimberg et al. (2000) discovered that the non-conscious 
perception of facial expressions (carried out with the backward masking technique) affect 
the perceiver’s facial expressions. For example, pictures of sad expressions increased 
activation in the muscle that is usually connected with negative emotions (the corrugator 
supercilii muscle), even though input sad expressions were hidden with backward 
masking, and hence not consciously experienced.
The embodiment of emotions is starting to be quite widely accepted among both 
philosophers of emotion and empirical scientists. Although more controversial, the claim 
that affective states extend outside the skin (cf. the second and third steps of my 
argument), is also being supported by a growing number of researchers (e.g. Colombetti 
2014; Colombetti & Roberts 2014; Krueger 2018). Although this line of research does 
not target exactly the same phenomenon as I am here (i.e. perceptual experience), it is 
clear that the step from (phenomenal) affective experiences to (phenomenal) perceptual 
experiences is a short one.61
                                                
60 Another example of the importance of the body for cognitive and affective states, and information 
processing located outside the brain is the enteric nervous system, “brain in the gut”. However, it is not 
straightforwardly connected to perception, as opposed to e.g. information processing in the retina.
61 One more way to argue for ECM would be to start from extended affectivity, and then infer that because 
affective states are phenomenal experiences, if they are extended, phenomenal consciousness is already 
extended. As things stand, the hardest part to accept in ECM is undoubtedly the conscious, phenomenal 
side, and not the fact that it is about perceptual experiences. I haven’t seen this kind of argument for 
extended experience in the literature, though. The proponents of extended affectivity (most importantly 
Colombetti, Roberts and Krueger) are not trying to argue for ECM as such. It is not their target, but I think 
ECM follows from their account nevertheless. Their examples (e.g. a violinist and her violin) are similar to
incorporating non-biological tools into the biological body.
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One example of embodiment is the role of bodily gestures and expressions. Bodily 
gestures are not neural activity, but they are still part of cognitive processing. Goldin-
Meadow (2003), based on her thorough experiments about human gestures, shows that 
gestures do not only express internal states, but have a functional role in thinking; they 
are part of thinking itself. In an experiment, two groups of children were given a list to 
memorise, and then they needed to solve a mathematical problem before trying to 
remember the list again. One group could gesture as they wished during the maths task, 
but the other group was prevented from gesturing. The results were clear: the freely-
gesturing group managed significantly better in the task of remembering the list. (Goldin-
Meadow 2001; discussed e.g. in Clark 2008.) Based on this and other experiments, 
Goldin-Meadow (2001; 2003) ends up concluding that gesturing is not only a motor act 
separate from cognitive functions, but part of the cognitive process itself.
These examples only scratch the surface of the empirical and philosophical work that has 
been conducted in recent years that shows that our cognitive and experiential faculties are 
deeply embodied. Consequently, we could say that the embodiment of experiences is no 
longer a highly controversial claim, but rather something that a significant part of the 
research community is starting to accept.
2.4.2. The frontiers of the body are not rigid
The second step of this argument is that the body is “leaky” – it is not always enclosed 
inside the skin, but it can contain environmental elements. I will distinguish the fine-
grained details of different versions of bodily extensions and incorporation in the fourth 
chapter (from mere extension to functional incorporation), whereas here I discuss in a 
more general way the claim that the body takes external objects into it.
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When we use a stick to reach an apple from a tree, that stick has become an extension of 
our hand – we stop feeling the stick in our hand and instead we feel the apple through our 
stick. There is neuroscientific evidence that a stick can become part of the functional body 
in situations where we reach for something (see e.g. Maravita & Iriki 2004; Berti & 
Frassinetti 2000). Depending on how we see it, we can either say that the body leaks into 
the environment, or we can say that it incorporates environmental objects – but the 
outcome is quite the same.
The notion of ‘body’ is somewhat ambiguous. Its frontiers may prove to be different 
depending on what we are looking for. For example, we can refer to body schema (body 
as an object) or to body image (body as a subject). (This distinction is explored further in 
chapter 4.) A central question for this argument is of course: is biology the crucial factor? 
What about an artificial knee, a dental filling or a pacemaker? What about biological non-
human elements located in the body, such as bacteria? What about prostheses, clothes, 
piercings, hair, wigs, nails, artificial nails, eyeglasses, contact lenses, ocular prostheses, 
etc.? Or microplastic that humans (and animals) swallow a considerable amount of every 
day?
It would seem that biology cannot be the defining criterion, since our bodies contain 
several crucial non-biological components that replace or enhance biological functions. 
Our bodies are hybrid systems. We are “natural-born cyborgs” or “human-technology 
symbionts” as Clark (2003) describes. The human body is not a fixed system, but flexible, 
constantly changing, and incorporating external resources. It is made of both biology and 
technology, and the borders of the body are negotiable.
If one were reliant on, for example, eyeglasses, a walking stick, a blind person’s white 
cane, a hearing aid or sensory substitution devices, their loss would be somewhat 
comparable to losing one’s body part. Of course, the artificial devices would be easier to 
substitute with new ones, but in principle biological and non-biological parts play the 
same role: they are contingent, replaceable. Not even our biological body stays the same: 
it is different from what it was ten years ago. All the cells (brain cells and other kinds of 
cells) have been replaced with newly regenerated cells. Instead of a fixed substrate, it is 
the functions and interactions between the brain, the body and the world that create 
experience.
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2.4.3. External body parts as substrates of experience
If we agree with the first and second step of this argument, we still need to ask: are those 
external elements part of the constitutive base for experiences? After all, it seems possible 
to accept that experience is embodied, and that the body is not always defined by the skin, 
and yet deny that the external parts could be part of the constitutive base for experiences. 
Indeed, the second step doesn’t automatically lead to the third step, because it is possible 
to hold that bodies may have external parts, but that those parts are only externalisations 
of the body, but not material realisers of experiential states. However, this line of thought 
would undermine the first and second steps of the argument. For, if we commit to 
embodied realisation of certain experiences, and to our capability of incorporating non-
biological props into our bodily sensorimotor functions (i.e. into the embodied substrate 
of those experiences), the third step becomes difficult to deny. 
As several empirical experiments have shown (e.g. Maravita & Iriki 2004 about training 
macaque monkeys to use rakes; Bach-y-Rita & Kercel 2003 about sensory substitution 
devices), when used in the right way, the external parts will gain a new functional and
phenomenological status. For example, when a blind person uses a cane, it is no longer 
an external object for her, but gradually becomes part of her point of view (see chapter 4 
for more elaborated examples). They are no longer merely external objects but become 
part of the sensing body – part of the (quasi-transparent) subjective point of view rather 
than an external object. This new status is the reason why they cannot simply be 
overlooked when searching for the realisers of experience. As we have learned in the first 
two arguments for ECM, experience is that embodied, sensorimotor action in the 
environment, and that action is partly realised by those incorporated objects. Incorporated 
tools have their seat in the interface of the body and environment, and if we accept that 
both the body and the environmental action are parts of the substrate of experiences, there 
are no good reasons why we should stop short and forbid the mediating element (namely 
the incorporated object) this role.
Of course, not all kinds of bodily extension will suffice. The object needs to be a certain 
kind of tool with a sensorimotor function, and it needs to gain a new phenomenological 
status in use (e.g. a blind’s cane), differentiated from a mere tool (e.g. a washing machine) 
or a mere extension of a material body (e.g. an artificial knee). (For a more detailed 
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description of the criteria, and a taxonomy of different levels of externalisation and 
incorporation, see chapter 4.)
The third argument was yet another way to reach the conclusion that external parts can 
be part of the material realisers for experiences. When we allow that our bodily functions 
can be partly responsible for some experiential states, it is a small step to the environment. 
If an action carried out with a hand is included, it is a slippery slope to the tool that the 
hand is holding. With our bodies extending to the external parts, our experiential states 
are also sometimes materially realised by those externalisations. A leaky body means a 
leaky mind.
2.5. Conclusions to the three arguments
These arguments have shown that in order to stay consistent, a supporter of the 4E-
framework should accept ECM as well. As the reader might have noticed, the three 
arguments are not independent of each other, but they are different aspects in a common 
ground. They can be taken as a cumulative argument for ECM, where the three arguments 
build on each other: the argument from sensorimotor enactivism and the argument from 
occurrent EM lead to the argument from embodiment. Each of them, however, also offers 
a distinct entry to ECM.
The first argument, based on inference from EM to ECM, gives the groundwork for the 
concept of experience that will be used (and still developed) especially in the second 
argument. The second argument, based on sensorimotor enactivism, is in a sense the most 
important argument of them all, because the premise theory itself targets extended 
experience in a straightforward manner. The third argument about the embodied 
experience and the leaky body (and hence leaky experience) ends up with a conclusion 
that is not new, but has nevertheless been stressed in a wide range of philosophical and 
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empirical research about sensing with tools (see e.g. De Preester & Tsakiris 2009; 
Maravita & Iriki 2004). In this argument, my way of framing the matter is, however, 
different from how it is usually presented, and is also different from how I present the 
same matter in other chapters (especially in chapter 4). I haven’t seen this kind of 
approach in arguing for ECM in the 4E literature.
No doubt these arguments for ECM might be hard to accept for analytic philosophers of 
mind, because mental phenomena have traditionally been described in such a different 
way. There is resistance among philosophers of mind as a consequence of the strict 
separation between cognition (understood as computation) and consciousness 
(understood as something that doesn’t fit the computationalist picture). Empirical 
scientists don’t have the conceptual burden of bats, zombies, Chinese rooms, explanatory
gaps, and hard problems of consciousness, and thus these arguments might be easier to 
accept for them.
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3. The Constitution-Turn and ECM
3.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses how to differentiate causal from constitutive relations in general, 
and specifically in EM and ECM. The focus is on the concept of constitution, whereas the 
fourth chapter describes the constitutive relation in ECM and how to detect it. The 
demand for these discussions stems from what I call the constitution-turn in the extended 
mind literature. Starting from Adams and Aizawa’s causal–constitution objection 
presented shortly after the original paper of Clark and Chalmers (1998), there has been 
an increased interest in the concept and ontology of constitution as a culminating question 
whether externalist views in philosophy of mind are true. Especially in recent years it has 
gained a great deal of attention in the literature. As Baumgartner and Wilutzky (2017, 
1105) put it, in order to escape the stalemate situation about the adequate mark of the 
cognitive, the EM literature has turned into a debate about an adequate mark of 
constitution.
However, an account of constitution in ECM has not yet been written, and because ECM 
differs from EM, it needs its own treatment – which this chapter aims to provide. By 
clarifying the concepts of constitution and causality, this chapter will not only respond to 
the causal-constitution fallacy, but also to a closely related critique, i.e. the cognitive bloat 
argument against EM and ECM. I argue that these criticisms arise from a mistaken 
concept of constitution that should be used with ECM (and occurrent experiences in 
general), and they can be resolved by analysing and clarifying the notion of constitution.
79
3.1.1. The causal-constitution fallacy 
The causal–constitution distinction is at the centre of the debate concerning externalism 
in philosophy of mind. The extension (what is meant by extended in the 4E’s) in both EM 
and ECM is a constitutive relation according to the advocates of EM and ECM.62 The 
interaction loops with external objects and devices partly constitute cognition in EM, and 
experience in ECM. The external parts are constitutive components63 of 
cognition/experiences. This is what extended refers to in EM and ECM. The external and 
internal components together constitute the material basis for some mental states, and 
together they are necessary and sufficient for those states.64
However, it has been argued (e.g. Adams and Aizawa 2001; 2010; Aizawa 2010b) that 
EM has confused causal and constitutive relations, i.e. committed a causal–constitution 
fallacy, also known as a coupling–constitution fallacy (C–C fallacy, from now on).65
According to this objection, the role of external elements is at best causal, but certainly 
not constitutive: “the fact that object or process X is coupled to object or process Y does 
not entail that X is part of Y” (Adams & Aizawa 2010, 68). From the fact that 
environmental phenomena causally affect our cognition, the proponents of EM have 
mistakenly (according to the C–C fallacy objection) inferred that the causally affecting 
relation is (or leads to) a constitutive relation. Thus, the C–C fallacy objection aims to be 
a reminder that one should not draw constitutive conclusions from causal premises. My 
aim is to show that neither EM nor ECM have committed this error, and the C–C fallacy 
objection can be rejected.
Adams and Aizawa’s original formulation of the critique (which concerns how Clark and 
Chalmers use the Otto example) is relatively easily solved, because they in the first place 
have misunderstood Clark and Chalmers’s intentions about EM. Adams & Aizawa 
                                                
62 As was stated in the first chapter, this is what differentiates extended from embedded – the latter stresses 
the causal dependency on the environment, but denies the constitutive extension outside the boundaries of 
the organism. 
63 By ‘components’, I refer to ‘constitutive components’, and I use the terms ‘component’ and ‘constituent’ 
interchangeably throughout this text. 
64 The brain is necessary (at least for present-day human minds), but not always sufficient condition for 
cognition (according to EM), and for experiences (according to ECM).
65 I use the term ‘coupled’ as neutral regarding the causal–constitution question. So if p is coupled with q,
we still need to ask whether that relation is a causal or a constitutive one. The use of the term is not 
consistent in the literature; sometimes it is used synonymously with causal relations, sometimes with 
constitutive relations.
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interpret EM’s question to be: under what conditions does a physical object become 
cognitive? However, EM is not claiming that coupling would make any object itself
cognitive. Rather, EM is asking – in Clark’s (2010b, 84) own words – “when is some 
physical object or process part of a larger cognitive system”?
In their criticism of EM, Adams and Aizawa appeal to the mark of the cognitive, by which 
they refer to manipulation of representations that bear intrinsic, non-derived content. 
Allegedly, external parts do not bear non-derived content, and therefore they don’t satisfy 
the requirement for the mark of the cognitive. “Where the symbols written in Otto’s 
notebook have merely derived content, the recollection in Inga’s brain has non-derived 
content” (Adams & Aizawa 2001, 55). It is, however, very unclear what non-derived 
content actually is, why cognitive states should have it, or why external parts should a
priori lack it.66 Menary (2010d) has noted that the distinction between derived and non-
derived content is not relevant in cognitive sciences, and that it has no value in scientific 
research on cognition. (For a thorough discussion about Adams & Aizawa’s original 
critique, see Menary 2010a).
Nevertheless, there is a serious and unsettled matter underlying the original critique that 
deserves a proper examination, namely the question whether the relation in EM actually 
is a causal or constitutive one, and how do we distinguish causal from constitutive. The 
critique was originally directed towards EM, but if it is a sound critique, it also applies to 
ECM. If correct, the C–C fallacy is as serious a worry for ECM as it is for EM.67
Furthermore, Clark (2009) has introduced a more empirically based version of the C–C
fallacy objection specifically against ECM (for a more detailed discussion about Clark’s 
critique, see chapter 5). Adams and Aizawa’s critique is drawn from metaphysical 
considerations (viz. the metaphysical assumption of the mark of the cognitive, and the 
failure of external parts to satisfy it as a reason why EM is not possible), whereas Clark 
is appealing to the superior processing power of the biological brain as a reason why ECM 
                                                
66 Even though I think pleading for non-derived content as the mark of the cognitive is not convincing to 
start with, if for the sake of argument we accepted it, ECM would actually survive the attack better than 
EM. It is after all evident that perceptual experiences involve less derivation than some standard examples 
of dispositional EM. (Of course, Adams & Aizawa never intended their critique to be directed towards 
ECM.) 
67 There are, however, some differences in how the two can respond to the criticism. I will get back to this 
later.
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is not possible.68 Accordingly, the former is a metaphysical argument for the C–C fallacy 
objection, and the latter an empirical argument for the C–C fallacy objection. The C–C
fallacy objection I am dealing with in this chapter is the metaphysical version. It does 
originate from Adams and Aizawa’s writings, but I treat it as a general opposition for the 
constitutive claim. Even though the whole setting is rather metaphysical, it doesn’t rule 
out empirical investigation. Kirchhoff (2015) writes: 
[B]y scrutinizing the metaphysics of what it means 
for certain Xs to compose a certain Y now, it is 
possible, I think, to turn what might look like a 
metaphysical dispute into a productive recipe for 
empirical research and to set certain constraints for 
how such research must be carried out.
The constitution turn has raised the causal–constitutive distinction into the centre of the 
debate whether the arguments for different versions of extended mind are sound: the 
proponents claim that the relation is constitutive, and the opponents that it is merely 
causal. However, problems arise because neither side has clarified what they actually 
mean by this distinction, and that has created confusion.69 But the confusion itself is not 
a reason to attack externalist views, but rather it is an ambiguity that all parties need to
address and find a solution to. In order to be able to respond to the C–C fallacy objection 
(or to keep on using it as a critique towards externalist views), we need to get a clearer 
picture of the distinction between causal and constitutive relations. The clarification 
might not only help the discussions about EM and ECM,70 but also philosophy of mind 
in general and perhaps the general philosophical question of the concepts of causality and 
constitution as well, for example by broadening the view of what counts as a constitutive 
relation.
Answering the objection leads us to a very profound question of what belongs to cognition 
and experience, and how to set their limits. Kaiser (2018, 5-6) cuts up the question and 
reveals that these kinds of demarcations actually consist of slightly different sides, for 
example the individuation of the whole question (what is the whole and how it should be 
                                                
68 Both Clark and Adams & Aizawa admit that their internalism is a contingent rather than a necessary fact: 
it is internalism about us “contemporary humans”. 
69 There are a couple of recent papers about constitution in EM (e.g. Gallagher 2018; Kirchhoff 2013; 2015), 
and Kiverstein & Kirchhoff (2019) deal with the metaphysics of constitution in the context of ECM.
70 Of course, we also need to ask whether we can use the same notion of constitution with both EM and 
ECM. This chapter will also deal with that question.
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identified) is different from the demarcation question (where are the boundaries of the 
whole, and how it can be differentiated from its environment).71 This can be compared 
with a distinction between operational limits (cf. individuation of the whole) and spatial 
boundaries (cf. demarcation) (Virgo et al. 2011). These two demarcation criteria don’t 
need to coincide: the material boundaries can be different from those of the organismic 
boundaries. EM literature has focused mainly on the question of material boundaries, 
even though the question about operational/organisational limits could (and should) be 
raised as well. In order to set the limits, we need answers to both of these kinds. (This 
question of course motivates this whole thesis, not only this chapter.)
We need to find a way of setting the boundaries that is “neither too wide nor too narrow, 
but rather ‘just right’”, as Weiskopf (2010) has framed the problem (and accordingly 
called it the “Goldilocks problem”). Of course, what counts as “just right”, is a highly 
complicated question. As Kaplan (2012, 551) has put it, we need to “contend with the 
problem of partitioning from among the set of causally relevant factors those that are 
legitimate components of a given mechanism or system from those that play roles as part 
of the causal background”. This is a question worth asking and trying to answer, and the 
task is not an easy one. Much depends on how we understand the notion of constitution 
in the first place, how we distinguish it from causation, and how these concepts are 
applied to EM/ECM frameworks.
                                                
71 Kaiser (2018) is discussing parthood, demarcation, individuation and decomposition in biology. 
Nevertheless, the same differentiation can (and should) be kept in mind when we are dealing with cognition 
and experience.
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3.1.2. The constituted phenomenon: The dynamic nature of experiences 
Before delving into the concept of constitution, let us have a look at the phenomenon in 
which the constitution relation allegedly occurs (viz. perceptual experience). As was 
already presented in the second argument for ECM in chapter 2, the nature of experiences 
is dynamic – they are not static states, but rather unfolding over time by means of constant 
dynamic change.72 This view of experience is influenced by enactivism, according to 
which perceptual experience is temporally extended interaction between the agent and its 
environment governed by sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan & Noë 2001; Noë 2004; 
2006; Buhrmann, Di Paolo & Barandrian 2013; Silverman 2013; Pepper 2013). 
Experience is not made up of a succession of separate atom-like instances, but instead 
evolves dynamically between the agent and its surroundings. Silverman (2013, 154) 
encapsulates sensorimotor enactivism’s idea about temporal experience as follows:
[T]he physical substrate of the experience is a 
smoothly continuous activity rather than one which 
breaks down into temporally discrete chunks: hence 
to explain the physical substrate of perception, one 
must look at dynamically unfolding interactions, 
rather than ‘object’-like structures in the brain. 
This kind of thinking, i.e. the idea of temporality of experiences is embedded in 
enactivism; accepting enactivism means accepting the temporal, dynamic nature of 
experiences. Sensorimotor action is not conceivable without temporality. The same 
applies to ECM. If experience is extended at all, the extension cannot be restricted only 
to the material sphere, for the temporal dimension follows necessarily. As Noë (2006b, 
32) writes: “When you perceive an event unfolding, it is not as if you occupy a 
dimensionless point of observation”. Temporality is a necessary element for interchange 
between the bodily and environmental elements, and cannot be overlooked when 
explaining their constitutive basis.
This dynamic unfolding in time is close to how we seem to acquire experiences. And in 
the case of experiences, which are inherently subjective first-person phenomena, to 
                                                
72 A further and unbiased theory regarding the matter at hand is dynamical systems theory, which is a 
mathematical theory of properties of abstract dynamical systems. In cognitive sciences, it has been used as 
an alternative to computationalism. According to this theory, cognitive systems resemble dynamical 
systems rather than computational systems (see e.g. Van Gelder 1998). 
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dismiss the what-it-is-like side, is to dismiss the referent of the concept. However, not 
everybody agrees with the ubiquitous temporality of experiences. For example, Crick and 
Koch (2003) claim that we do not experience motion, but only static snapshots, and the 
alleged experience of motion is only imaginary, “painted” on snapshots. Consequently, 
there is an ongoing debate about how we experience temporal phenomena (see e.g. 
Dainton 2008; Arstila 2016; Kiverstein & Arstila 2013). Without diving too deeply into 
the questions of philosophy of time consciousness, let us briefly compare different ways 
of explaining the alleged temporality of experiences. This will help us see why we wish
to embrace an extensionalist view of time experience.
Theories of time consciousness can be divided based on whether they are committed to 
dynamical or static (or diachronic vs. synchronic) explanations of experiencing time. 
Further, the explanandum is at two levels – material and experiential – and they might 
have a different explanans.73 According to extensional models, not only the contents of 
experiences, but also the vehicles (sub-personal realisers) of those experiences are 
dynamical. The commitment to dynamic, temporally extended vehicles is what 
differentiates extensional models from retentional models, which accept the dynamic 
nature of the contents of experiences, but do not require that their material vehicles are 
dynamical (whether the retentionalists hold that they are necessarily instantaneous, 
remains unclear). Finally, cinematic models hold that both the contents and vehicles are 
instantaneous – the apparent temporality is only an illusion, as in displayed films, which 
consist of rapid sequences of instantaneous, still images or snap-shots. (The terminology 
is from Dainton 2018.)
4E-views are clearly at odds with the cinematic view, which is committed to a view that 
we never experience movement, change and succession, for those are considered illusory. 
All we perceive is detached static time-slices; direct non-inferential experience of those 
temporal phenomena is not possible. For example, Crick and Koch (2003) claim that the 
alleged experience of motion is only imaginary, “painted” on snapshots. This view fits 
well with the “grand illusion” view described in the previous chapter (section 2.3.4.). We 
think we enjoy perceptual experiences of the detailed scenery around us with moving 
objects in it, but we are mistaken – it is only an illusion.
                                                
73 Although some theories of philosophy of time consciousness deny this difference in levels, e.g. a view 
where time is treated as “its own representation” (see the discussion in Kiverstein & Arstila 2013, 447).
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An obvious argument against the cinematic model is that it cannot explain observable 
dynamicity, and it is hard to see why an experience should be explained in a way that 
contradicts that experience. It seems obvious that we are capable of experiencing 
movement, change and succession – otherwise we could have never had an experience of 
an approaching car or a ball, and it would seem very odd to claim that we haven’t. As 
embodied creatures, we survive by avoiding certain moving objects. A series of 
instantaneous slices cannot be sufficient in order to experience movement. While 
cognition and perception can occur unconsciously (e.g. blindsight), experience, by 
definition, cannot. (Another question is the reportability of conscious experiences: it is 
not straightforward how to interpret reports of experiences in empirical settings.)
However, this argument is not enough to refute the retentional model (e.g. Husserl 
1991),74 since retentional models admit that at the personal level, experiences are
temporally extended. This makes the retentional model a far better candidate, but it is still 
wanting at the vehicular level. To settle for the retentional model would be the same as 
to accept sensorimotor enactivism but refute ECM, i.e. to accept situatedness at the 
personal level, but not at the subpersonal level. For reasons that were presented in chapter 
two (see section 2.3.6.), this position is not tenable – the personal level determines the 
subpersonal level.75
Furthermore, brain events themselves take time – nobody would deny this. Neural 
processes are processes, never instantaneous brain “states”, for example action potential 
takes time. Clark (2009, 978) acknowledges this in his otherwise critical paper: “for 
information to become conscious, some amount of time needs to pass, so that normally 
there is no way the brain can ‘in an instant’ reach the kind of state that supports conscious 
experience”. As a consequence, some kind of temporality at the neural level is already 
agreed by all parties. However, the retentionalists think that the temporality at the 
personal level is not in accordance with the temporality on the neural level, and therefore 
the temporality at the material (neural) level is not important for settling this issue. The 
problem of the retentionalist model is exactly this: according to this model, the 
                                                
74 Autopoietic enactivists Thompson (2007) and Varela (1999) say that they are committed to a Husserlian 
view of time consciousness.
75 A coinciding line of thought can be found from the other side of the discussion. Ian Philipps (2014), a
philosopher of time consciousness, argues that the experiential time level determines the material (neuro) 
level.
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phenomenal and material events do not match. Hence, neither the retentional model nor 
the cinematic model is up to the task – what we want is an extensionalist model.
Even though “hearing a melody” is an often-used metaphor for describing a temporal 
phenomenon, in this case it is slightly misleading, since my claim goes to an even more 
elemental level. Not only a melody (whose temporality nobody in their right mind would 
deny), but also a single note has a temporal character. According to Noë (2006b), hearing 
a note necessarily involves a temporally extended coupling-relationship between the 
hearer and her environment. According to Foster (1991, 247), we couldn’t even conceive 
of an auditory experience without the temporal dimension. In the same way as there 
couldn’t be an experience of colour without the region of what the colour pervades, there 
couldn’t be sound experience without the period of time that the experience of sound fills.
The same applies for tactile modality. It is quite evident that tactile experience is very 
closely connected with movement, and movement is necessarily a temporal phenomenon. 
If we want to know what some surface feels like, we need to move our hands (or the tool 
we are touching it with). Without movement, which necessarily includes the temporal 
element, there is no way we can have tactile information about it. Noë (2004, 96–100) 
refers to Berkeley, who held that touch is the only intrinsically active and spatial sense; it 
is in fact “a kind of movement”. (Noë himself thinks, of course, that even though Berkeley 
is right about the tactile sense, he is mistaken in that he says it is the only active modality.) 
Noë also refers to O’Shaughnessy (2000, 658), who writes that “touch is in a certain 
respect the most important and certainly the most primordial of the senses […] it is 
scarcely to be distinguished from the having of a body that can act in physical space”. 
This underlines how touching an object depends on its resistance when we contact it by 
pushing, poking, nudging, stroking, etc. The tactile experience is dependent on the very 
act of movement.
Thus, it seems clear that auditory and tactile experiences are temporally extended 
phenomena. However, perhaps the temporality of visual modality is not as clear-cut a 
case, because of the intuitive feeling that when we see say, a red object, we are passive 
observers rather than active skilful probers. As presented in the previous chapter, the 
sensorimotor theory of perception (O’Regan & Noë 2001; Noë 2004) is an example of an 
all-encompassing dynamic view that argues that all perceptual experiences (including 
sensations, e.g. the sensation of pain) are dynamic and based on our (temporal) actions –
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what we do, probe and inquire, and not on static states that we passively receive.76
Hurley’s (1998) criticism of the “input–output model” is another example that challenges 
the view that we are just passive receivers of phenomenal states.
The experiences ECM deals with, and which are in need of constitutive explanation for 
ECM to be a solid theory, are perceptual experiences related to sensorimotor action and 
movement, especially of tactile, auditory and visual modalities. Examples include hearing 
with a hearing aid, moving around in a room with the help of a stick or having a quasi-
visual experience with tactile–visual sensory substitution technology. The what-it-is-like
side is present in them too (as in all experiences, by definition), but they are also action-
oriented in the minimal sense that an active subject is in interaction with her environment. 
Hence, those experiences are very much dependent on real-time interchanges between the 
(embodied) subject and its environment.
Even if we were internalists about the material realisers of experience, the notion of 
experience would still require temporality – for the same reasons I gave in this passage. 
An experience of, say, sound or touch is inconceivable without the event in time it 
pervades, no matter whether it is realised in the brain alone or whether environmental 
interactions are taken on board. Hence, the dynamical–temporal view is not tied to ECM 
alone.
Moreover, the static vs. dynamic question is not only related to the internalism–
externalism debate. The dynamic view has gained support from other areas of philosophy, 
too. One of the best-known “dynamicists”, Tim Van Gelder (1998, 621) has given a 
characterisation of the dynamical stance on cognition and contrasted it with the 
computationalist view as follows. Dynamicists are interested in how things change; 
computationalists are interested in states – state by state. Dynamicists understand a 
system’s states in terms of its position with other states; computationalists focus on 
internal structure, what the state is made of. Dynamicists think that cognition is laid out 
temporally, like “speech as opposed to the written word”; computationalists think that 
everything is laid out at one moment of time.77
                                                
76 Technically, my position is not even reliant on whether we accept the dynamical–temporal nature of 
visual modality or not; it is already enough if the above-mentioned tactile and auditory modalities are 
dynamical–temporal. But as we saw in the previous chapter, the dynamical nature of seeing is also well-
founded by the sensorimotor enactivists.
77 Another strand that stresses dynamicity, and comes outside the externalist views in philosophy of mind 
is process philosophy. The label refers to a variety of views held in e.g. phenomenology and pragmatism 
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To recapitulate, the need for dynamic explanation stems from the fact that the experiences 
ECM deals with are based on reciprocal interaction between the subject and her 
environment – and interaction is always inherently a temporal and dynamical 
phenomenon. The extension that we are dealing with in ECM is not only spatial, but 
spatiotemporal. Accordingly, the notion of constitution needs to be such that it takes into 
account the dynamic nature of experiences. In the next section, I will move from the 
explanandum to the notion of constitution.
3.2. Defining Constitution
Constitution is a building relation: the whole is made of its parts (Bennett 2011). It is 
usually explained as a synchronic relation between higher- (constituted) and lower-
(constituent/s) level phenomena, although the synchronicity is not a necessary feature. 
Causation, on the other hand, aims to give etiological explanations that explain events: 
their origin, changes in their properties, etc. (Ylikoski 2013). Causal explanation explains 
what caused a phenomenon or event, and constitutive explanation what the phenomenon 
is, what it is made of. There is no reason to assume a priori that constitution should be 
something internal, and causation external (to the organismic boundaries).78 In what 
follows, I will present three different ways to outline the causal–constitution distinction: 
material, mechanist and diachronic–dynamical. I will compare how they fit with EM and 
ECM. The three models might all serve for some purposes, and my aim is not to judge 
                                                
that appeals to the role of dynamic processes and temporal activities, rather than to timeless, static 
substances, when forming accounts of being and reality (Rescher 2000).
78 Even though this assumption is rather common. Hurley (2010, 106) calls it the “causal–constitutive error 
error”. This kind of assumption is also related to a “primitive notion of spatial inclusion”. Kaiser (2018) 
shows with examples from biology how spatial inclusion is neither sufficient nor necessary for something 
to be a constitutive part of a biological entity. She goes on to argue that the spatial inclusion criterion is 
also circular/trivial, because demarcating the spatial boundary of a whole by positing all the parts in it 
already presupposes what its parts are.
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them for being unable to explain any constitutive relation – I only examine the cases as 
they bear on EM and ECM.
3.2.1. Material constitution
The “standard” understanding of constitution derives from analytical metaphysics: it is a 
static view of material constitution. It is also the (often unconscious) presupposition of 
the writers who accuse EM of having committed the C–C fallacy.
Material constitution can be summarized as a 
synchronic one-one relation between spatially and 
materially coincident objects of different kinds, or as 
a many-one relation, where one object or entity is 
constituted by an aggregate of objects or entities 
(Kirchhoff 2013, 320).
In the standard material understanding, constitution is considered a material realization 
of an object. The basic example is that Michelangelo’s David is materially constituted by 
the marble it is made of – it is nothing over and above that piece of marble (Wasserman 
2004; Wiggins 1968; for critical a view, see Kirchhoff 2013). A material reading of 
constitution might explain the constitution in material objects like statues or tables and 
chairs. I am not taking any stand on whether it is a useful theory for explaining the 
metaphysics of spatial objects. However, what matters is that it is not a profitable way to 
explain constitution when discussing EM, ECM or philosophy of mind in general.79
As Kirchhoff (2013, 321) analyses, David does not unfold in time – it is constituted at a 
certain moment of time t. Temporality is not essential for its constitution relation. 
Kirchhoff continues that David’s case reveals another feature of material constitution: the 
                                                
79 It might be the case that many defenders of EM and ECM also assume a concept of constitution along 
these lines, because many of them have not delved into analysing the notion of constitution.
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constitutive relation that holds between the marble and David coincides materially and 
spatially. However, demarcating the constitutive relation based on sharing the same 
material parts is problematic. As Kaiser (2018, 8; see also footnote 73 in the previous 
section) shows, the “spatial inclusion” criterion faces trouble. It assumes a priori
“natural” boundaries based on what the spatial inclusion criterion already presupposes. 
However, this criticism is targeting the life sciences, and may not apply to simple cases 
of material constitution, such as the statue of David.
Even though material constitution might explain some phenomena, the crucial point (and 
the only statement I am making about it) is that it cannot explain the phenomenon under 
scrutiny in my research, because material constitution is unable to explain non-static
phenomena. It serves as the basis for an atemporal type of explanation in the sense that 
constituted entities are assumed to be such that they do not unfold in time but are 
explained only from given moments – in specific instants of time t, snapshot by snapshot. 
Temporal extendedness plays no role in constituting the entities under examination. 
Because of its static and atemporal nature, the material conception of constitution is 
unable to explain cognitive processes and (especially) dynamic conscious experiences, 
because of their innermost dynamical and processual nature. 
Occurrent cognitive and experiential states need a different kind of concept of constitution 
than that which applies to material objects, because what is essential to the former is not 
the static one-to-one relation, but a temporally extended dynamic unfolding. So, if the 
material view of constitution cannot be used to explain cognition, let alone occurrent 
phenomenal experiences, what are the alternatives? As better candidates for explaining 
constitution in mental processes, I will consider the mechanist and the diachronic–
dynamical conceptions of constitution. They are both better suited to accounting for the 
processual and dynamical nature of mental events. Moreover, they make better sense of 
not only extended mental processes, but of all kinds of temporally extended dynamical 
phenomena.
One might oppose this line of proceeding because it looks like the result depends on which 
reading of constitution we choose. If we apply a static view of constitution, the relation 
of external elements and mental phenomenon is not constitutive. If we apply a non-static 
view, the relation is constitutive. A critique might ask what allows us to disregard the 
static view, and instead apply a non-static view. However, I think we are entitled to 
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discard the material view because it cannot explain dynamical processes like perceptual 
experiences – whether they are extended or not. The problem is that the explanans and 
explanandum do not correspond. The choice of the theory of constitution is thus 
independent of my argument for ECM.
To recap, it is not ECM as such that needs a different kind of understanding of 
constitution, but the whole dynamical view about the mind that is defended by all the E-
views. As I have stressed, the problem with the material view is that it is built on a static 
understanding of constitution. Externalist views alongside all dynamic views (which I 
think all the accounts about conscious experience should be for them to be credible 
theories) need a different approach that appreciates the dynamic nature of the 
phenomenon to be explained. The solution I start with derives from the new mechanist 
approach in philosophy of science. 
3.2.2. Mechanist constitution
In the New Mechanist Approach (e.g. Craver 2007; Craver & Bechtel 2007; Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen 2005), a phenomenon is explained by referring to its underlying mechanism. 
The explanandum is the phenomenon, and the explanans is the mechanism (Craver 2007, 
139). Constitution is an inter-level relation between higher and lower systemic levels. The 
methodology behind this approach is naturalistic, and is committed to descriptive 
adequacy, where a theory needs to describe an actual scientific practice in order to be an 
adequate theory (Craver 2007, 19; Kaiser & Krickel 2017, 750). The mechanist view is 
very different from the static view of constitution in analytical metaphysics – it aims to 
explain phenomena within empirical research. It is a kind of scientific explanation rather 
than a metaphysical enquiry into the ontological nature of material objects. Hence, the 
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notion of constitution cannot be used in the same way as it is used in metaphysics, or in 
the static material view discussed above.
It is understandable that many EM supporters have been tempted to use the mechanist 
approach as a backup theory for EM, since it promises to get access to scientific 
explanations. It is likely that the “constitution-turn” in the EM-literature exists mainly 
because of the mechanist view; without the considerations in philosophy of science, 
probably philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences would not have paid so much 
attention to the causal–constitution question in the first place. However, as far as I am 
concerned, the mechanist view has only been used to support EM, but it has not yet been 
reconciled with ECM. The closest attempts are those of Kirchhoff’s and Gallagher’s, but 
they talk about EM, not ECM.80
The mechanist view (at least its orthodox reading) makes a strong divide between 
etiological (i.e. causal) and constitutive explanation: constitutive relation is a non-causal 
relation and vice versa.81 Causal mechanisms cause phenomena, whereas constitutive 
mechanisms non-causally ground, build or constitute phenomena – and the theory 
promises to say where the causal relation ends and the constitutive begins. In the 
mechanist view, constitutive (and also causal, but causal mechanisms are not under 
scrutiny in here) relation holds between the mechanism and the phenomenon. Importantly 
for my purposes, the mechanism may consist of different elements: not only material 
objects, but also actions, behaviour, or interactive loops between the agent and the 
environment.82 With this rather famous picture, Craver (2007) illustrates how a 
phenomenon is realised by its mechanism.
                                                
80 Their views, however, are compatible with ECM, whether or not they so intended. Kirchhoff argues for 
ECM elsewhere (e.g. Kiverstein & Kirchhoff 2019), but Gallagher has not written about the matter.
81 The notion of constitution, and the distinction to etiological and constitutive mechanisms, is influenced 
by Salmon’s (1984) work.
82 But this issue is not straightforward within the proponents of the mechanist view. The mechanist view 
quite explicitly (e.g. Craver 2007; Ylikoski 2013) requires that the constituents and constituted 
spatiotemporally overlap – hence it is difficult to see how “actions, behaviour, or interactive loops” could 
fit the picture. This touches on the ambivalence at the very heart of the mechanist view (I will return to the 
topic later in this section).
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Lower-level components of the mechanism constitute the higher-level phenomenon. The 
components are causally related to each other, and they constitute the system (S), and the 
higher-order process (ψ-ing). The intra-level relations are causal (the arrows in the lower 
part of the picture), and the inter-level relations constitutive. Something is a 
compositional constituent of a system if it is a working part “that non-causally results in 
the ‘work’ done by the relevant whole” (Gillett 2013, 319). Constitutive elements are part 
of the phenomenon itself; in the constitutive relation, the parts and how they are organised 
constitute the phenomenon (the whole). It is a compositional view – the phenomena under 
examination consist of parts that together constitute the whole.
If we consider Craver’s model in terms of EM, S ψ-ing (the whole) could be e.g. solving
a mathematical problem, and x1φ1-ing–x4φ4-ing (the parts) sub-personal processes in 
the following way: “say, x3ϕ3-ing would be the brain processing information […] x1φ1-
ing might be the eye performing a saccade, where x4φ4-ing might be writing with a 
pencil” (Aizawa 2014, 24; see also Gallagher 2018). There is causal interaction between 
the lower-level parts (the brain processes, saccade and writing with a pencil), and they 
together constitute the higher-level process (solving a maths problem).
The following three features describe constitutive relations as they are usually understood 
in the mechanist framework. Firstly, the constitutive relation is asymmetric: the 
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components constitute the whole, but not the other way around, and the parts are 
independent of the whole, but not the other way around. Secondly, it is irreflexive: nothing 
constitutes itself. Thirdly, it is synchronous: constitution takes no time. It is common (but 
there is no consensus) amongst the proponents of the mechanist view to claim that causal 
processes take time, but constitution does not – and hence processes are out of reach of 
constitutive explanation (Ylikoski 2013, 282.) This last feature is problematic, as we will 
soon see.
According to the mechanist view, what differentiates constitution from causation is that 
causal relations are not synchronous but are diachronic by nature. Thus, they differ in the 
third feature. All parties agree about the diachronicity of causal relations, but the necessity 
of the synchronicity of constitutive relations will be under critical scrutiny soon (even 
though it is widely accepted by the advocates of the mechanist and the material views). 
The third feature (synchronicity) makes the mechanist model problematic for explaining 
the constitutive relations in mental processes. Since constitution does not take time 
according to the mechanist picture, whereas mental processes do take time, they are 
clearly incompatible.
The incompatibility between the view I am supporting and the mechanist view can be 
found in a passage from Ylikoski (2013, 280). While he agrees that the ultimate goal of 
constitutive explaining is to understand a system’s behaviour, he nevertheless claims that
this can be achieved while leaving out some behavioural aspects and “orchestrated 
activities of the parts”. He admits that constitutive explaining makes “heavy 
abstractions”, but that they are needed for picking out the constitutive questions.
When building an understanding of a system’s 
behavior, scientists pose more focused questions that 
abstract away some dimensions of the system’s 
behavior. […] One could say that the question only 
addresses a synchronous time-slice of the system. 
(Ylikoski 2013, 280, italics added.)
This might be a useful way to deal with the examples philosophers of science use (e.g. 
questions in philosophy of biology). However, it simply does not work with the 
phenomenon I am working with. It is impossible to abstract away the intrinsic dynamical-
temporal aspects from experiences – if we did, what is left over would be something else 
than experiences.
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In spite of these inadequacies, the mechanist view is a much better way to understand 
constitution if we compare it with the material view, because it relies less on metaphysical 
assumptions, and instead aims to grasp how natural scientists explain phenomena. This 
promise of scientific adequacy, or arguably empirical adequacy, is undoubtedly one of 
the main reasons why some advocates of EM have used the mechanist view as a 
supporting theory.
So, how does all this relate to EM and ECM? It looks like the mechanist view can explain 
constitution in non-occurrent dispositional beliefs (like Otto’s case), because they are not 
temporally extended in nature. However, the mechanist view cannot explain constitutive 
relations in ECM or in occurrent cases of EM. This only applies if we interpret the 
mechanist view in its orthodox reading. Nevertheless, it would also explain occurrent EM 
and ECM if understood in a less orthodox way that takes diachronic relations on board –
but then it could no longer be called the mechanist view. The problem with the mechanist 
view (for my purposes) is that it is synchronic/contemporaneous. Instead, we need a 
model of constitution that takes into account the intrinsic dynamic and diachronic nature 
that experiential states bear.
Thus, the mechanist view of constitution only fits with a narrow understanding of EM 
(that considers non-occurrent cognitive states). However, the mechanist model lacks the 
ability to explain experiences – and also occurrent cognitive processes – because of their 
highly dynamical, temporal and process-like nature. That is why we need to combine the 
aforementioned features with our concept of constitution.
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3.2.2.1. The ambiguity in the mechanistic model
Apart from its very explicitly stated requirement for synchronicity,83 the mechanist view 
would be a good way to explain the constitutive relation in ECM and EM. The reason for 
this is that whether or not the proponents of the mechanist view so intended, it would 
seem that diachronicity is already in their notion of constitution, even though they state 
in various places that the relation is synchronic. An example of this kind of ambiguity can 
be found in Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability criterion (which is probably the best-
known application of the mechanist theory). It relies on causal powers, defined in terms 
of Woodward’s (2003) interventionist theory.84
Some mechanists explicitly stress the importance of processes (e.g. Kaiser 2018; Krickel 
2018; Kaiser & Krickel 2017; Harbecke 2010). Some other mechanists are committed to
views that take diachronicity on board, whether they intended to or not. For example, it 
has been said of Craver’s (2007) analysis of action potential (a change in electrical 
potential in neurons, also known as nerve impulse) that it requires a commitment to 
temporally evolving phenomena. Kaiser & Krickel (2017, 755–756) show that the action 
potential cannot be explained only by referring to spatial parthood, but that temporal 
parthood is also needed. It is what the action potential mechanism does, and when it does 
it. An ion-channel opening must occur during an occurrence of the action potential for it 
to be constitutively relevant for it. Kaiser & Krickel go on to argue that (also in other 
cases besides the action potential) mechanisms are composed of objects and occurrents,85
or rather, they are object-involving occurrents (p. 768). 
[M]echanisms themselves not only have locations, 
more or less clear spatial boundaries, and spatial 
parts, they also have durations, involve changes, and 
have temporal parts. Hence, mechanisms are also 
things that occur. There is something going on when 
a mechanism occurs. Mechanisms do not merely 
consist of spatially extended component-objects that 
                                                
83 E.g. Craver (2007, 153) leaves no doubt about the matter: “the constitution relationship is synchronic”. 
Ylikoski (2013, 282) agrees: “the relation of constitution is synchronous”.
84 All of these topics are covered in more detail in the following section.
85 Their view has similarities with entity–activity dualism as a characterisation of a mechanism, according 
to which mechanisms consist of both entities (as in material objects) and activities (what objects do) (e.g. 
Machamer et al. 2000). It is also similar to Craver’s (2007, 189) notion of acting entity, which also stresses 
what objects do.
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are only disposed to act but do not actually perform 
any action [.] (Kaiser & Krickel 2017, 765.) 
Thus, the mechanist view comprises slightly different readings, and it seems like e.g. 
Kaiser & Krickel’s view that mechanisms can contain external and temporal parts fits 
rather well with my purposes. However, even if we agreed that diachronicity was already 
(more or less implicitly) embedded in the mechanist model, I couldn’t call the view I am 
supporting “the mechanist view with a diachronic twist”, since the orthodox mechanist 
view so clearly commits itself to synchronicity, and I myself so clearly reject it.86
Furthermore, Craver is not an internalist – he acknowledges that the mechanism often 
extends outside the organismic boundaries. In the case of the action potential, for 
example, ions that are outside the neuron are still part of the mechanism. “The mechanism 
of the action potential relies crucially on the fact that some components of the mechanism 
are inside the membrane and some are outside” (Craver 2007, 141). Interestingly, Craver 
then proceeds to cognitive extension, stating that “many cognitive mechanisms draw upon 
resources outside of the brain and outside of the body to such an extent that it may not be 
fruitful to see the skin, or the surface of the CNS, as a useful boundary” (Craver 2007, 
141).
Hence, it seems that Craver himself is happy to extend cognitive phenomena within his 
mechanist model, or at least he does not oppose the idea. However, the problems I raised 
earlier remain. The request for synchronicity found in the heart of the mechanist model 
stands in the way of extending (most) cognitive phenomena, and all experiential 
phenomena.
Why is the restriction of the diachronic side (and temporality) to etiological relations so 
crucial for mechanists? It is important to notice that synchronicity is not a necessary 
property of constitution. Even some mechanists admit that “we should not require that 
building relations be synchronic” (Bennett 2011, 94). It is embedded in the orthodox 
reading of the mechanist view, but we can have a consistent view that drops this 
requirement while keeping the distinction between etiological and constitutive relations.
                                                
86 Whether the mechanist view is already diachronic (and whether the two views should be separated at all) 
is an interesting question, and would no doubt deserve to be examined in depth. However, since my thesis 
about ECM is not dependent on this question, I will not go into more details about the topic.
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3.2.3. Diachronic–dynamical constitution
Kirchhoff (2013, 341) has aptly phrased the problem that arises from the mechanist view: 
[H]ow does something that is inherently temporal (the 
complex causal relations between processes and their 
component parts at a lower level) atemporally 
constitute something that is inherently temporal at a 
higher level (e.g., the distributed process of 
remembering)?
As hinted in the previous section, I go along with Kirchhoff’s worry and do not think this 
is a possible or the most plausible way to explain the constitutive relation. It is difficult 
to see why the diachronic lower-level and the diachronic higher-level should be connected 
with a non-diachronic relation.
The third view of constitution to be presented (and the one I argue for) responds to this 
problem, and casts aside the requirement for synchronicity. I shall call it the diachronic–
dynamical view of constitution. This move allows there to be causal (or causal-like) 
features within the notion of constitution. It stresses the dynamic nature whose roots were 
already set down in the mechanist view (at least implicitly, and even explicitly in some 
texts, e.g. Krickel 2018; Kaiser & Krickel 2017). Thus, the central features of this view 
are that it is both dynamic and diachronic. The notions of causal and constitutive remain 
separate, but this view also allows there to be non-synchronic, non-contemporaneous 
elements in the constitutive relations.
The static notion of constitution (and its use with regard to EM) have recently been 
criticised from an enactivist viewpoint. Kirchhoff (2013; 2015) has developed an 
alternative (to the mechanist) view of constitution that he calls “diachronic process 
constitution”. Gallagher (2018) has been working with a quite similar dynamical view of 
constitution using Varela’s (1999) neurophenomenological analysis of cognitive 
processes occurring on different timescales. My formulation of diachronic–dynamical 
constitution draws from both of these accounts.
If the paradigm example of material constitution was the statue of David, with 
diachronic–dynamical constitution it could be a Watt (centrifugal) governor. This 
example has been used in cognitive sciences to describe a dynamical system in general 
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(e.g. van Gelder 1995). Kirchhoff (2013, 328–329; 346), however, uses the Watt governor 
as an example precisely for diachronic constitution. A Watt governor is a mechanism that 
controls the speed in a steam engine so that it maintains constant speed for the flywheel. 
It contains two “arms” that are free to rise and fall in accordance with the speed of the 
governor on account of centrifugal force. As a result, the governor controls the amount 
of steam that drives the flywheel.
The key feature of the governor’s behaviour is the 
angle at which the arms are hanging, for this angle 
determines how much the throttle valve is opened or 
closed. Therefore, in order to understand the 
behaviour of the governor, we need to understand the 
basic principles governing how arm angle changes 
over time. (van Gelder 1995, 356).
In the governor, maintaining the constant speed of the flywheel does not happen at a 
certain time t, but is rather expanded in the unfolding process. Hence, it is a temporally 
extended system. Moreover, the Watt governor is not tied to a particular location: “It has 
parts, to be sure, and its overall behaviour is the direct result of the organised interaction 
of those parts” (van Gelder 1995, 355). Hence, the processes it is performing “must be 
individuated in terms of their roles in a dynamic context” (Kirchhoff 2013, 346). Those 
processes are what constitute it.
Regarding ECM and the notion of constitution, the case of the Watt governor shows that 
processes are not tied to a single location necessarily, and not to a single moment of time. 
The C–C fallacy objection treats its target with the concept of constitution drawn from 
the statue of David rather than the Watt governor, and that is why it seems to succeed. 
However, experience cannot be treated in these terms, and hence the C–C fallacy 
objection’s outcome is misleading. 
Accepting causal features for our concept of constitution doesn’t mean we should rule out 
compositional relations, i.e. the diachronic–dynamical view does not require non-
synchronicity, but rather that constitutive relations can include both synchronic and non-
synchronic properties. The big picture remains similar with the mechanist view: 
constitution is an interlevel relation, and causation an intralevel relation. As Kirchhoff 
(2013, 324) writes, constitutive relations occur “between the putative higher-level 
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distributed cognitive processes and its lower level sub-processes and their components”.87
What is different from the mechanist view is that in the diachronic–dynamical view, the 
constituents also include “sub-processes”. Accepting processes as part of the constitutive 
relation brings temporality on board, because processes are necessarily temporal.
It is quite natural to say that processes occur or unfold in time. But what does it mean to 
“unfold in time”? One should notice that processes are continuous in time on both levels: 
both constituted (at the higher-level) and its constituents (at the lower-level) are temporal 
(in their own way). Kirchhoff (2013, 234) describes the constitution relation as 
“dynamically embedded at multiple timescales”. There are multiple timescales included, 
and they intertwine in a complex way; for example, neural processes, sensorimotor 
actions and social practices lie on different timescales. Temporality is not restricted only 
to intra-level relations. Higher-level phenomena (e.g. solving a maths problem or hearing 
a melody) usually stretch over a longer period of time than lower-level components (e.g. 
neural and extra-neural processes, such as manipulation of pen and paper). Thus, it is 
impossible to fix the constitution relation synchronically – since the phenomenon to be 
explained is temporal on all levels.
So far, we have mostly discussed the diachronic side of the diachronic–dynamical view. 
To get to grips with the second part or the term, we need to look closer at how the concept 
of diachronicity is used in a dynamical sense. Getting rid of the snapshot picture is very 
important, since snapshots cannot constitute dynamic processes. However, we need more 
than this. Diachronicity should not be understood as a sequential, linear process. As was 
stated, the diachronic–dynamical view stresses the process-like nature of evolving 
experiential events as opposed to synchronic contemporaneous states. However, the 
processual nature of experiences doesn’t need to mean that the relation between 
constituent sub-processes is sequential, i.e. linear in time. Experiential processes are 
temporal not only in the sense of succession in time, they are also non-linearly dynamic
across timescales. This is what I mean by the ‘diachronic-dynamical’ view. Perceptual 
                                                
87 Kirchhoff’s use of the term ‘component’ is slightly misleading, since the term can (and should, in my 
opinion) refer to any kind of constituents – including processes, even though in his use these two are 
separated, and it sounds like he refers to material parts when talking about components (at least in the
sentence quoted). My use of ‘component’ is wider than Kirchhoff’s: it includes not only material parts, but 
also (sub-)processes. I don’t see as very useful the task of trying to carve and separate the material parts 
(components, in Kirchhoff’s use) out of sub-processes.
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experiences are not contemporaneous, but extending in time; not linear, but non-linear; 
not static, but dynamic.
Let us look back on the levels familiar from the mechanist view (see Craver’s picture in 
section 3.2.2.). The lower-level consists of components that are tied together with causal 
relations (an advocate of the mechanist view would agree so far). According to the 
diachronic–dynamical view, it is this mutually influencing causality, i.e. processuality,
between the components that makes them the constitutive components of the occurrent 
cognitive/conscious process. Hence, it is causal/diachronic relations that ground 
constitution. This kind of thinking can be found in Clark (2008) as well, even though he 
is not using the notion to explain the concept of constitution. His notion of continuous 
reciprocal causality fits very well with the diachronic–dynamical view: it is this 
continuous reciprocal causality that grounds constitution. (I will return to this notion 
later.)
The higher-level phenomena are temporal processes (e.g. counting with pen and paper), 
and their underpinnings unfold diachronically (e.g. brain processes, sensorimotor 
interactions with the hand and pen, etc.). The processual elements, i.e. the “elements 
engaged in processes that constitute across different timescales the occurrent cognitive 
process” constitute the cognitive/conscious system (Gallagher 2018). Or to put it in other 
words, the processual relations among the elements (both external and internal) is the
cognitive/conscious processing itself (part of it).
This way of thinking is familiar from enactivism. (However, enactivists have not written 
much about the causal–constitution distinction as such, and the question is not discussed 
in these terms.) In enactivism, it is the (causal) reciprocal relationships between the 
subject and the environment that constitutes cognition – and according to enactivism, 
cognition includes experience. Cognition (and experience) is that interactive relationship. 
(For more details, see chapter 2.) Hence, the diachronic–dynamical view fits best not only 
with ECM but also with enactivism.
To sum up, the diachronic–dynamical view of constitution is the best model for ECM 
because it takes into account the diachronicity (understood as wider than in a merely 
sequential sense) required in explaining the dynamical nature of experiences. 
Furthermore, of the three models of constitution I presented, it is the only one that can 
explain constitution in an enactivist framework – which is important, since ECM relies 
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on enactivism. The active cognitive system enactivism deals with must include not only 
synchronic relations but also diachronic processes, since the cognitive system and its 
processes are constituted on that precise reciprocal dynamic change that happens in time. 
The other two models of constitution are incommensurate with the phenomenon to be 
explained, whereas the diachronic–dynamical model is not.
Fair enough, a critical reader might say. Perhaps this understanding of constitution really 
is the most suitable for a phenomenon like conscious experience. But does that imply that 
it is true? I think this question is slightly misleading. It is enough to say that it is the best 
way to explain the phenomenon under scrutiny. For example, biological phenomena 
cannot be explained with the material view of constitution, but require a view that is 
attuned to their intrinsic features (e.g. the mechanistic model of constitution). In the same 
manner experience – whether extended or not – requires an explanation that takes into 
account its special features. If they were left out, we would no longer be dealing with 
experience.
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3.3. Demarcating the system boundaries
We have now proceeded from the static view, through a mechanist view to the 
diachronic–dynamical view. In this section, the approach is more pragmatic: the aim is to 
test the view developed in the previous section, and survey how it can be applied to 
demarcate what is constitutive and what is not. Constitutive relation is supposed to tell us 
which elements are genuinely components of the system and which are not. Giving an 
answer to “how does one demarcate the constitutive components from the causal 
background conditions of an experience?”, will not only tell us what is a constitutive 
component of an experience, but also the method how to find that fact out. Therefore, by 
answering the causal–constitutive question, we will also get the other side of the coin: an 
answer to the problem how to demarcate the system boundaries. If we know the 
conditions for something to play a constitutive role, we also know that things that fulfil 
them are “inside the boundaries” of cognition/consciousness (where “inside” does not
refer to the skin and skull barriers but to system barriers, which vary depending on the 
action we are examining). Therefore, those conditions function as general demarcation 
criteria for cognition/consciousness.
An eligible criterion for constitutive relevance will also respond to a criticism closely 
related to the C–C fallacy, i.e. the “cognitive bloat” problem (Adams and Aizawa 2001, 
57), or the problem of “rampant expansion” (Sprevak 2009). It is a worry that “cognition 
bleeds into everything”. It is clearly an unwanted effect of the externalist theory if it 
allows the mind to extend e.g. to the whole of the Internet (Clark & Chalmers 1998, 17), 
or to all the books on my bookshelf. Since the cognitive bloat problem is the outcome of 
committing the C–C fallacy, solving the C–C fallacy by giving apt criteria for constitution 
also solves the cognitive bloat problem. In other words, we need to solve the question of 
how to distinguish genuine components from causal background, and by doing so, we 
will also prevent the over-extension problem.
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3.3.1. Mutual Manipulability as a Demarcation Criterion
Advocates of the externalist views have offered a wide variety of demarcation criteria. 
These conditions need to be fulfilled for there to be extension, i.e. when we can count 
something to be a genuine constitutive component/part. The suggestions for requirements 
include, for example, Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) original “glue & trust” conditions, 
“the responsibility condition” (e.g. Roberts 2012; Cash 2013) and Gallagher’s (2013) 
appealing to enactive engagements that grounds the “ownership of a process”. These 
criteria stem from the externalist views themselves and they do not take into account the 
concept of constitution itself. (All these criteria are scrutinised in more detail in the 
following chapter.)
However, in what follows I will discuss a criterion that is neutral regarding EM and ECM, 
and instead starts from the notion of constitution itself. It provides a general criterion for 
demarcating what counts as a constitutive component, and I will discuss whether it can 
be used to demarcate the boundaries of cognition and consciousness in EM and ECM. 
This criterion is mutual manipulability (MM), and it derives from the new mechanist 
literature (e.g. Craver 2007a; 2007b). Even though MM originates from the mechanist 
view, it can be used with the diachronic–dynamical view, too. (Of course, the diachronic–
dynamical view itself rose from the mechanist view.) Whether MM works is not 
dependent on the differences between the mechanist and the diachronic–dynamical view, 
but on other issues (which will be discussed later in this chapter).
Similar ideas have also been presented in the externalist side, e.g. “continuous-reciprocal-
coupling criteria” (Menary 2007; Palermos 2014; Kirchhoff 2016). Clark (2008, 24) 
himself calls continuous reciprocal causation the interaction that “occurs when some 
system S is both continuously affecting and simultaneously being affected by activity in 
some other system O”. Clark uses it in the same way as MM is used – a criterion to test 
whether something is a real component – or rather a real coupled system in his 
terminology. For Clark, continuous reciprocal causation is, however, only a sufficient but 
not a necessary condition for extension. For him, only the glue & trust criteria are 
necessary (though they are not sufficient) conditions. Palermos (2014, 34) disagrees, and 
takes the criterion of “continuous mutual interaction on the basis of feedback loops” to 
be a necessary and sufficient condition for constitution. MM, as I present it, is necessary 
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and sufficient for constitutive relations (on condition that it is a valid criterion in the first 
place). This is how the mechanists usually interpret it (e.g. Craver 2007, 159). Otherwise, 
it would be too easy to satisfy.
In MM, for something to count as a component (i.e. it being in a constitutive role for the 
phenomenon), an intervention on part(s) of the system (bottom-up) must affect the whole 
system, and an intervention on the whole (top-down) must affect its parts.
[A] component is relevant to the behavior of a 
mechanism as a whole when one can wiggle the 
behavior of the whole by wiggling the behavior of the 
component and one can wiggle the behavior of the 
component by wiggling the behavior as a whole. The 
two are related as part and whole and they are 
mutually manipulable. (Craver 2007a, 153.)
MM is supposed to be able to capture how (e.g. neuro-) scientists experimentally 
determine the system boundaries. It is an interventionist method of distinguishing 
components from the causal background. Inter-level impact is a way to settle the 
boundaries by testing whether intervening on the putative system components (parts) 
have an effect on the higher-level phenomenon (whole), and on the other hand, by testing 
whether intervening on the phenomenon affects the putative parts. Constitutive 
dependency relations are bidirectional and the constitutive relevance can be tested based 
on this bidirectionality – whether the target is mutually manipulable. Causal relations are 
manipulative too, but only in one direction (from cause to effect). (Craver 2007a.) 
There are at least three reasons supporting the use of MM as a demarcation criterion. First, 
it has no bias regarding the externalism–internalism debate, but it is a neutral way to set 
up the debate. Second, it is compatible with the interventionist view of causation 
(Woodward 2003), which is widely supported in philosophy of science these days. And 
third, I claim that it supports the diachronic–dynamical view (over the mechanist view –
although it was originally part of the mechanist view).
Even though MM is part of the mechanist theory, it seems that it actually fits better with 
the diachronic–dynamical view. The reason is that in the mechanist view, causality and 
constitution are supposed to stay separated, but MM picks out constitutive relations that 
are causal – that is, inter-level wigglings are causal, so the innermost basis of constitution 
is actually causal. Craver uses Woodward’s (2003) interventionist concept of causality to 
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explain the inter-level wigglings. This Woodwardian interventionist method brings 
causality into constitution – which is problematic for Craver’s original mechanist model 
(but not for the diachronic–dynamical view). Depending on the standpoint, this can be 
seen either as a problem for the mechanist view in general, or for Craver’s original 
formulation of the mechanist view, or for the MM requirement, or for the causal–
constitutive distinction in general. However, it is not a problem for the diachronic–
dynamical view. MM, the Woodwardian interventionist model and the diachronic–
dynamical view fit all together – and can be used as a demarcation criterion when our 
scope is to set the boundaries of constitutive elements of experience in ECM.
3.3.1.1. Mutual Manipulability in Practice
Examples of how MM can be used to separate background conditions from constitutive 
parts stem from empirical experiments.88 Kaplan (2012, 561) refers to Fisk et al. (1993), 
where they investigated the impact of gravitational forces on human sensorimotor 
capacities, such as reaching. They found out (quite unsurprisingly) that changing the 
gravitational force (from the normal background 1G) affects the performance of the 
sensorimotor task: the reaching performance does not remain the same in different force 
conditions. This is an instance of a bottom-up intervention – wiggling the putative 
component, which in this case is the gravitational force. So one side of MM is satisfied. 
                                                
88 Baumgartner & Wilutzky (2017) have criticised this central methodological claim of MM though. 
According to them, it is impossible to set the boundaries between causes and constituents empirically –
instead the matter is purely pragmatic, e.g. constitution outperforms causation in explanatory power. Their 
view is rather inconvenient for the devotees of the constitution turn, and e.g. Kirchhoff’s (2015) defence 
for opportunities of empirical research stemming from the causal–constitution debate (mentioned earlier in 
this chapter) is against this view. I think both sides are partly right: as the question itself is metaphysically 
loaded (as already stated at the beginning of this chapter), it already sets the frame for possible outcomes. 
However, even if the framework turned out to give us only pragmatic results, the hypotheses can be used 
in further empirical investigations.
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According to Kaplan, if only the first part is obtained, we can take it as a preliminary but 
incomplete reason to consider the putative part as constitutive for the system.
To accomplish MM, top-down intervention must also have an effect on the putative part. 
An intervention on the subject in a reaching task, changing the set-up somehow –
wiggling the whole – should have an effect on the gravitational force. This outcome is 
implausible enough, so we can rule out MM in this case. Hence, we can conclude that the 
1G gravitational environment is not a constitutive component for the sensorimotor task, 
but a background condition. In this same manner, we can also say that oxygen supply and 
blood circulation are not components of cognition, because the two sides of MM are not 
fulfilled. Interfering with them bottom-up has a crucial effect on cognitive capacities, but 
interfering with cognitive capacities top-down doesn’t affect the general abilities of 
respiration or circulation. So, with the help of MM, we can categorise them as background 
conditions for cognitive (or sensorimotor) capacities, not constitutive parts.
As our aim is to examine occurrent experiences, a relevant MM relation occurs between 
the putative components and the experiential state. Gallagher (2018) puts it in more fine-
grained words: the MM relation lies between the processual elements of the (putative) 
components and what he dubs occurrent cognitive processes. The latter captures the 
ongoing engagements of a system’s cognitive process – created by the processual 
elements of the components. Of course, instead of occurrent cognitive processes, my 
focus is on occurrent experiential processes, or experiential processes, for short. 
(Gallagher does not discuss the possibility that there would be any experiential properties 
involved.)
Intervening on the experiential processes (top-down intervention) affects the whole 
process. It can be done e.g. by setting a task and interfering somehow with its whole set-
up. The aforementioned experiment of changing the gravitational forces during a reaching 
task could have been interpreted like this; however, it was not used as an outer 
intervention/wiggling in Kaplan’s example, but as a putative component. (And as a 
putative component it satisfied the bottom-up wiggling side, but not the top-down side –
hence, Kaplan concluded that it is a background condition.) It is an interesting feature in 
MM how the two levels and interventions on them easily get mixed up. This could be due 
to the fact that actually they cannot be separated in the first place, or at least we cannot 
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put our fingers on them, but all we get is holistic wigglings. (Baumgartner’s fat-handed 
intervention tackles a closely related issue, but I will come to that in the next section.)
Anyway, for MM to be an eligible demarcation criterion for constitution, we must be able 
to differentiate not only between the two levels, but also the higher-level phenomenon 
(i.e. the experiential process) from the intervention on the higher-level phenomenon, and 
the lower-level components from the intervention on the lower-level components. 
Nevertheless, mixing up does happen in the literature relatively frequently. All this said, 
I think (at least to some extent) that the levels can be separated. Moreover, the 
interventions can also be separated from the phenomena and the components. For 
example, I would say that changing gravitational forces could be taken as an instance of 
a top-down intervention (against Kaplan’s intuitions). This should not be conflated with 
the higher-level phenomenon, but as a means to test the phenomenon, e.g. a reaching task.
Bottom-up intervention, on the other hand, is easier to track. It is targeted to the (putative) 
components and their processual elements, i.e. how they are causally related to each other. 
This is easier to picture: it can contain wiggling the brain (e.g. with transcranial magnetic 
stimulation), wiggling some part of the body (e.g. tying hands together during a reaching 
task), or wiggling an external object (e.g. changing the way a calculator functions or 
change the material of a blind’s cane). 
Let us consider the hallmark example of EM, poor old forgetful Otto. It should be noted 
that the part–whole relation in Otto’s case is not between the notebook and the brain –
these two are both (putative) lower-level components. The inter-level relation is instead 
between the notebook, or rather between the use of the notebook (the part), and the act of 
remembering (the whole). (Clark and Chalmers present it as a dispositional memory, 
though that is not necessary and not very useful for my purposes). It is clear that wiggling 
the notebook (bottom-up) has an effect on remembering, e.g. tearing a page out makes a 
significant difference on the memory or the act of remembering.
But what about the other way around? Gallagher (2018) has suggested that wiggling 
Otto’s remembering process (top-down) could be achieved by giving him the information 
in a different way. For example, Inga could tell him the address of the museum, and that 
would make the role (i.e. the use) of the notebook redundant – and making the role of the 
notebook redundant counts as affecting it, at least according to Gallagher. Kaplan (2012, 
567), on the other hand, suggests that in a top-down intervention, engaging Otto in a 
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memory-demanding task would make him modify (by rewriting, etc.) the contents of his 
notebook when needed.
I think an even more simple top-down wiggling would be to intoxicate Otto and by so 
doing alter his remembering processes. Perhaps he would forget to consult his notebook, 
or have problems in reading the words correctly – which would cause him to go to a 
wrong address. Hence, it seems that we can say that the Otto case fulfils both sides of the 
MM criteria. However, this outcome is rather limited. The general problem with the Otto 
case is that it is a highly speculative thought experiment, and as such, does not reveal 
much about any real cognitive capacities.
Still, for the sake of argument, let us look at how this example would work with ECM. In 
ECM, the whole is the occurrent conscious experience and the part some processual 
element of a putative component. Let us consider a case where a blind person is using a 
cane to move around in a room. The lower-level putative component is the cane and the 
process how it is used, and the higher-level phenomenon is the occurrent experiential 
process of moving around. It is clear that removing the cane affects the experiential 
process, but how could wiggling the occurrent moving experience affect the cane? But in 
fact, to satisfy MM, it doesn’t have to affect the cane itself – but rather the use of the cane. 
Perhaps we could wiggle the moving experience by changing the way the blind person 
gets a sense of the room in such a way that the role of the cane will change – maybe it 
becomes redundant or it gives wrong or different results. If we add another external 
resource, e.g. Inga or a guide dog, the cane becomes redundant. Alternatively, if we 
intoxicate the blind person, she might become unable to use her cane in the correct way 
anymore. It is important to remember that the intervention as such is not what we are 
examining; it is just a means to examine the phenomenon. In this case, it also looks like 
both sides of MM are fulfilled.
We might still want more empirical framing of the problem. Let us now consider an 
example that has actually been tested empirically: solving a maths problem. So far this
experiment has been used exclusively regarding EM (e.g. Gallagher 2018; Kaplan 2012; 
Clark 2008), but I see no reason why it should not work with ECM as well (for reasons I 
will soon give). 
When solving a simple maths problem, we use several faculties, which may include e.g. 
visual perception, language, memory, bodily positions and movements, pen and paper, 
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calculator and other devices. Intervening on the lower-level could be done by intervening 
on neural processing (e.g. by transcranial magnetic stimulation, or by some drug), or by 
preventing eye movements (e.g. saccadic eye movements as was done in Ballard et al. 
1995), or by preventing bodily movements and gestures (e.g. if the hand gestures are 
prevented by forcing individuals to sit on their hands, solving a maths problem will take 
more time and be less accurate, as was shown in Goldin-Meadow et al. 2001.) (About the 
role of the gestures, see also the second chapter, section 2.4.1.) These bottom-up
interventions clearly have an effect on the experiential process – therefore the first half 
of the MM requirement is satisfied.
But what about the other way around, i.e. wiggling top-down to detect the results in the 
lower-level components? Solving a maths problem is a complex set of cognitive and 
experiential factors, a complex experiential process. How can we get a grip on that as a 
whole? Wiggling the whole, as already hinted, can be achieved through somehow 
changing the whole set-up, e.g. engaging the subject in a task, and monitoring the lower-
level effects. This is a method commonly used in neuroscience: engaging subjects in tasks 
and detecting changes in their neural activity. Gallagher (2018) contemplates ways of 
doing this in the case of maths problems.89 He suggest we could wiggle the whole by 
setting up a time limit, or a competition to see who solves the task quickest, or having a 
distractive audience who witnesses the counting act.90
Gallagher himself does not consider it in the following sense, but I myself think it is clear 
that these kind of top-down interventions can have an effect on the components. They 
would probably change the bodily postures and gestures, eye saccades, use of external 
tools (e.g. pen and paper or calculator), brain processing, etc. Therefore, the second part 
of MM is also satisfied, and we can conclude that the elements that were wiggled both 
ways are components of this cognitive (and potentially also experiential) process. 
                                                
89 Gallagher’s own train of thought goes in a wrong direction there, though. He seems to have mixed up the 
intervention and the target of the intervention, and infers from the lack of change in the intervention itself 
that it is not a component – which it was not supposed to be, but only a way to trigger the putative 
components.
90 Perhaps an even more illuminating example of MM is the role of saccadic eye movements (Ballard et al.
1995; discussed in Kaplan 2012, 563–564; and in Clark 2008). It was shown experimentally that during a 
memory-demanding copying task, the subjects were three times slower when their saccadic movements 
were prevented (therefore the bottom-up side was satisfied). The task itself is the top-down intervention: 
the subjects needed to cope with the cognitively demanding task, and for that reason begun the pattern with 
eye saccades. This example shows in a precise way how bodily skills are part of the cognitive functions. 
However, it speaks only for the embodiment thesis, not the extension thesis, and as such it is not 
straightforward evidence for my case.
111
Even though others have used this example only in order to support EM, I think it is a 
hasty way to see the issue. People don’t suddenly become Chalmers’s zombies when 
solving maths problems – many cognitive tasks (but not all) are also experiential. As I 
have argued in the first and second chapter, there is often something it is like when 
undergoing a cognitive task. Of course, someone might say that this “something-it-is-
like” is irrelevant for the cognitive task, that it is just some kind of added extra or 
epiphenomenal factor for the completion of the task. But is this view coherent? Clearly 
cognitive tasks (such as solving a maths problem) can involve experiential features (e.g. 
gesturing with your hands, counting using your fingers, playing with one’s pen, smiling, 
frowning, etc.). These features play a real role in how the task is completed (easier, 
quicker, more accurate), and they do feel like something. Several empirical experiments 
have shown that these features matter (e.g. sitting on your hands, preventing gesturing, 
preventing saccades, Clark & Chalmers’s Tetris example), so they cannot be dubbed 
epiphenomenal features of the cognitive task. Hence, we can say that this example speaks 
about both EM and ECM alike.
3.3.1.2. Limitations of Mutual Manipulability
The MM criterion for constitutive relevance has also been criticised, for various reasons. 
The most apparent problem that arose from the discussion above seems to be that it is still 
unclear whether we really reached the “whole” in the top-down “wiggling the whole”. It 
appears that bottom-up intervention can be done, but top-down is hard to achieve. It might 
be difficult to put one’s finger on the system as a whole. What exactly is the “whole” in 
the case of cognitive or conscious process? It is difficult to talk about the whole process 
without actually referring to some part of it. As Gallagher (2018, 219) has noted, the 
intervention “has to occur ‘some where’ or in some aspect” of the system – the whole 
might be a “part” too after all. It is difficult to find the right level of “wholeness” that we 
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should be wiggling. This depends on how we frame the question in the first place. The 
differentiation between bottom-up and top-down interventions might be clear 
conceptually, but this might only be due to our theoretical framing of the question.
As we learned from the previous chapter, the connection between the sub-personal and 
personal level is one of the most discussed topics in the history of philosophy of mind 
(although with different terminology). These two levels are connected with bottom-up 
and top-down methods, even though they do not have identical meanings. 
On the one hand, using a bottom-up method (i.e. a sub-personal approach), we cannot 
obtain any whole, since there is no distinct whole in that level. The “whole” is just the
combination of the material parts, and nothing more. It is not “the conscious experience 
being experienced” or “the subject of the experience”, because that would be a personal 
level phenomenon. All we get is a list of material parts, e.g. brains, bodies and blind 
persons’ canes. On the other hand, using a top-down method (i.e. a personal level 
approach), we cannot obtain any parts, because approaching from the phenomenological 
whole, the experience is not dividable into parts as it was at the sub-personal level. 
However, to have a constitutive relation, we need the relation between the constituent and 
the constituted. As I presented in chapter 2 (see section 2.3.6.), enactivism offers a 
solution, and binds the two levels together.
Besides, the usefulness of MM for demarcating constitution would be doubtful if Kaplan 
(2012, 560) was right and it only revealed a sufficient condition for something to be a 
component. If that was the case, one could not conclude from a failure to fulfil MM that 
something is not a component – it would be too favourable a criterion. However, as 
Baumgartner and Wilutzky (2017, 1122) remark, Kaplan’s interpretation is wrong. They 
point out that Craver (2007, 159) presents MM as a sufficient condition for constitutive 
relevance, and a lack of MM as a sufficient condition for constitutive irrelevance. 
Therefore, MM is both sufficient and necessary. 
In the literature, however, the main focus of the criticism towards MM has been the 
inconsistency between the requirement for non-causality on the one hand, and the use of 
Woodwardian (causal) interventionism on the other (as mentioned in the previous 
sections). There have been various attempts to solve the problem (uphold the causal–
constitution distinction while also upholding interventionism). One of these attempts is 
the so-called “fat-handed intervention”, where the intervention is said to wiggle both 
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levels simultaneously by means of one common cause (Baumgartner & Gebhartner 2016; 
Baumgartner & Wilutzky 2017).
The reason for employing the notion of fat-handedness is the same worry that we are 
familiar with now. According to fat-handedness critiques, it is impossible to put our 
fingers (whether fat or not) on one level only – to surgically intervene on one level and 
thereby affect the other level. “Mechanist systems can only be manipulated on all their 
levels at the same time” (Baumgartner & Wilutzky 2017, 1113). However, Baumgartner 
and Wilutzky’s aim is to criticise MM as a criterion for constitutive relevance in the case 
of EM – not to save it by using the fat-handedness argument.
Krickel (2018) criticises the fat-handedness approach for several reasons, e.g. that it loses 
the ability to distinguish between top-down and bottom-up interventions, since 
interventions always happen at both levels simultaneously. This is a problem, because the 
motivation behind Craver’s MM was precisely this – to show how scientists intervene 
(“wiggle”) in their experiments using either bottom-up or top-down interventions. Her 
own solution (how to uphold both interventionism and the causal–constitution distinction) 
is based on a move that acknowledges the problems that arise from the requirement of 
synchronicity I pointed out earlier in this chapter. She interprets MM in diachronic, rather 
than synchronic terms: the two sides that manipulate each other mutually are macro-level 
temporal parts of the phenomenon and micro-level component parts of the mechanism. 
Since the “whole” is a temporal process, an intervention on a lower-level 
component/process needs only to affect a temporal part of the whole.91
Even though my primary goal is not to solve the debates within mechanist literature about 
constitution, it seems fair to say that their understanding of the inter-level relations needs 
an update. Instead of synchronic, atemporal relations, they are better conceived as 
temporal, diachronic and hence including causal features. This way of thinking saves 
interventionism from the fat-handedness arguments if we accept Krickel’s (2018) 
account. It also enables us to keep the fundamental difference between causal and 
constitutive relevance.
                                                
91 There has also been a couple of attempts to formulate alternative demarcation criteria for constitutive 
relevance that do not rely on MM and interventionism. Harbecke (2010; 2015) and Couch (2011), for 
example, have argued for a regularity theory of constitution that rejects the idea that constitutive relevance 
can be explained by means of interventions.
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Furthermore, MM leads to another problem: on what criteria should we decide whether 
MM is fulfilled or not? From what level of explanation should we go and look for the 
putative components? The level of explanation depends on what we want to explain, of 
course. The mechanist view is inherently a compositional view – and so is the diachronic–
dynamical view as I have framed it here – the phenomena under examination consist of 
parts and wholes. If our aim is to explain cognitive systems, this kind of thinking makes 
sense: it is intelligible to talk about the parts and whole of a cognitive system. A cognitive 
system can be conceived as a whole that consists of its parts. 
However, if the aim is to explain cognitive processes, the part–whole relation is not as 
straightforward. Gallagher (2018, 209) asks whether we should also think of cognitive 
processes as composed of parts, where one part of a process is distinct from another part 
of the process, and each part itself is a process, and together they form the larger process 
as a whole – without giving an explicit answer. Kirchhoff, on the other hand, explicitly 
states that in diachronic process constitution, processes have distinguishable individual 
parts. “A process might involve any number of component parts, but it always involves 
some parts” (Kirchhoff 2013, 343). The reason for this is that the explanation must stop 
somewhere. According to Kirchhoff, even though physics might tell us that strictly 
speaking individuals do not exist (because, e.g. only quantum fields exist), this level of 
explanation does not make much sense in cognitive sciences, where instead we must be 
able to identify not only entities but also their activities.
To appropriately characterize “part” in processual 
terms, we must replace what Seibt has recently called 
the “particularist conception of individuals” – i.e., 
entities that are intrinsically individuated and which 
have a determinate unique location – with a view of 
individual parts that focuses not so much on “location 
but on ‘specificity‐in‐functioning’ in the widest sense 
of ‘functioning’, i.e., focuses on the dynamic role of 
an entity (e.g., an activity) within a certain dynamic 
context” (Seibt 2009, p. 484; italics added, quoted in 
Kirchhoff 2013, 344–345). 
With this in mind, it is possible to say that even experiential processes have parts – only 
without a determinate spacetime location. Moreover, I think there is even a simpler way 
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out, and we can uphold a compositional view in the case of experiences. It makes sense 
to divide the material basis of experiences into parts on the sub-personal level, or into 
lower-level components in MM terms. The explanandum of ECM is the material basis of 
perceptual experiences – answering the question which components take part in forming 
the material basis of certain perceptual experiences. Therefore, it is possible to interpret 
ECM in compositional terms, but it must be done along the lines of the diachronic–
dynamical and not the synchronic approach. What is at stake here, however, is not the 
validity of ECM, but the validity of MM, and whether it can be used to demonstrate the 
constitutive relation in ECM.
3.5. Conclusions
EM and ECM concern components and how they are organised, and are not concerned 
with the etiological history of the components. The causal question would be: What are 
the factors that cause cognitive/conscious processes and what is their etiological history? 
Instead, EM and ECM are answers to the constitutive question: What are the factors that 
make up the cognitive/conscious processes?
The C–C fallacy objection does not work against either EM or ECM because its premise 
(the material view of constitution) is a wrong way to treat mental phenomena, and 
especially dynamic experiences. The synchronic notion of constitution that is embedded 
in the C–C fallacy objection makes it unable to pick out the temporal dynamics that are 
inherent for the phenomena ECM is dealing with. Even though the C–C critique is the 
same for both EM and ECM, there is a difference in how they might answer the critique. 
This mistaken notion of constitution is in fact not inaccurate in the case of EM, or at least 
with the original Otto example. The reason is that the Otto case deals with dispositional 
beliefs, and dispositional beliefs are in fact static in nature (at least if we compare them 
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with experiential states). My belief about the dates of my parents’ birthdays or about the 
address of a museum are not occurrent in nature as long as I don’t consider them. But my 
experience of seeing a red tomato or feeling pain in my right foot are never dispositional 
but occur in a temporal mode, in a certain here and now. Phenomenal experiences are 
always occurrent in nature. Because of this difference, it is even easier to see why the C–
C fallacy objection does not work against ECM than against EM. 
However, in Clark’s defence, we need to remember that Otto is not the only case of EM 
– the story of Otto serves rather as an intuition pump for a very much wider phenomenon. 
Clark’s entire theory of EM avoids the problem that might arise if one focused only on 
dispositional beliefs (which could, at least on some reading, fit easier with the static view 
of constitution). Whereas Otto and his notebook represent an example of dispositional 
EM, for example counting with pen and paper works as an example of occurrent EM. The 
latter example drifts away from a static understanding of constitution in the same way as 
cases of ECM.
The C–C fallacy criticism presented by Adams and Aizawa assumes that constitution is 
a synchronic, atemporal relation. As I showed in this chapter, occurrent cognitive and 
experiential states are temporal. Hence, the presumed synchronic notion of constitution
is unable to pick out the phenomena it is trying to explain. The C–C fallacy objection 
relies on a false premise and it is a question-begging argument.
Not only can we conclude that the C–C fallacy is mistaken, but also that the diachronic–
dynamical concept of constitution creates a positive way to understand the extended-
relation as a constitutive one. We can conclude that some experiences are synchronically 
and diachronically constituted by external elements. I have argued in this chapter that 
both synchronic and diachronic relations can fall under the label of constitution – when 
all requirements are fulfilled, of course.92 Furthermore, it has been argued that even if 
diachronic relations fell under causality, it would not justify the C–C fallacy criticism.93
The reason for this is that the importance of external resources for our experiential events 
remains evident in any case – regardless of what our stance to the rather metaphysical 
causal–constitution quarrel is. For a cognitive scientist, their explanatory power is quite 
                                                
92 The following chapter deals with these requirements in more detail.
93 E.g. Levy (2011, 294) does not think our conceptualisation makes much difference: “If neuroethicists 
and philosophers wish to call only some part of human cognitive machinery our minds, and call the rest its 
[causal] scaffolding, so be it. […] All that is lost […] is the rhetorical power which comes from the 
identification of extended mechanisms with the mind.”
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similar, and the ontological status doesn’t make much difference (for similar views, see 
Sprevak 2010; Colombetti & Krueger 2015; Krueger 2018).94
However, it was important to show that ECM goes under the label ‘extended’ rather than 
‘embedded’. Another question is how fruitful that distinction is for an empirically attuned 
philosopher of mind or cognitive scientist. How could we ever test empirically whether 
something is causal or constitutive without just relying on our conceptualisations of them, 
which are more or less based on “one intuition over another” as Colombetti & Krueger 
(2015, 1159) have phrased it? The notion of constitution needed clarification, and 
especially constitution in the case of dynamical experiences. However, metaphysical 
inquiry will not provide us with answers about how experiences are actually extended, 
and what their limits and criteria are. This is the more pragmatic and empirical task of the 
next chapter.
                                                
94 Ross & Ladyman (2010) go as far as to argue that the causal–constitution distinction plays no role in the 
natural sciences: therefore it should not be a problem in cognitive sciences either. However, I think they 
are wrong in drawing conclusions from the natural sciences to philosophy of mind. Although in physics, 
for example, the causal–constitution differentiation is quite meaningless, we cannot infer from this that this
is necessarily so in all fields.
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4. From Mere Extension to Functional Incorporation
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will outline the preconditions for my position concerning ECM. I will 
state what is needed for there to be a case of ECM, namely which requirements need to 
be fulfilled. This chapter is more about setting the limits of what is constitutive
specifically in ECM, and is more pragmatically and empirically oriented than the previous 
chapter. However, the underlying question remains the same: how to distinguish 
constitutive components from etiological/causal background conditions. In this chapter, 
the question concerns my own theory, that is how I am drawing the lines in my thesis on 
ECM. The borderlines I draw are much narrower than in many other general 4E-accounts. 
Whereas the second chapter provided arguments why we should accept ECM and the
third chapter surveyed how the relation can be constitutive, the present chapter is more 
descriptive. It doesn’t aim to argue for ECM or for its constitutive character, but rather 
show what is meant by (constitutive) extension in ECM. The criteria I will set for ECM 
should be taken as epistemic tools rather than ontological statements – the criteria itself 
are not answers to the question of what constitutes the phenomena they are about, but 
rather tools that help us to see what belongs to those constituents.
The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will demarcate different degrees of 
extensions, from mere non-functional short-term extension to functional, 
sensorimotorically controlled incorporation. I will then review the literature on what glue 
& trust criteria have been proposed for different sorts of externalisms so far, and finally 
give my own glue & trust conditions for ECM. Finally, I will discuss one concrete 
example that I suggest fulfils my glue & trust conditions, namely sensory substitution
technology.
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4.2. The spectrum of extensions
I will differentiate between four “types” of extension – from weaker to stronger, from 
fleeting to more robust. This taxonomy should not be read as a categorisation of different 
kinds or classes of extensions, but rather as a scale or spectrum where the borders between 
different groups are not steadfast. In the literature, the differences in extension have 
usually been presented in pairs of two – e.g. extension vs. incorporation (De Preester & 
Tsakiris 2009; Thompson & Stapleton 2009; De Preester 2011) and use vs. incorporation
(Clark 2008). The distinctions have been justified with the help of neurophysiological 
research on how tool use affects body schema (Maravita & Iriki 2004; Berti & Frassinetti 
2000). According to Thompson & Stapleton (2009), the difference between extension and 
incorporation is that with the former, we extend our abilities, and with the latter, we not 
only extend our abilities, but also a phenomenologically different status is gained.95 This 
differentiation is closest to the distinction I draw between the first two types (short-term 
extension and integration) together contrasted with the last one (functional incorporation).
Another distinction made in the literature is between dispositional and occurrent 
extension (see the discussion in the second chapter, and Colombetti & Roberts 2014). The 
former refers to standing non-occurrent mental states (such as a standing belief of a 
museum’s address written down in one’s notebook), and the latter to cases of temporary 
states that occur at a certain moment (such as the act of counting realised with pen and 
paper). As my aim is to examine experience, and because experience is always occurrent, 
all my examples here fall under occurrent extension. Thus, dispositional extension is not 
discussed in this chapter.
Distinctions have also been made within the notion of incorporation. Colombetti (2016) 
notes that Merleau-Ponty deals with two kinds of incorporation. She calls them habit 
incorporation and object incorporation. Merleau-Ponty’s (1945, 166) example of habit 
incorporation is an experienced typist who doesn’t have to pay attention to the keyboard. 
Her fingers “know” what to do. The bodily awareness (gained through habit) of where 
each letter is on the keyboard is similar to our habitual awareness of where our limbs are. 
                                                
95 They mention that their distinction is indebted to De Preester’s work. Perhaps due to limited space, 
Thompson and Stapleton make the distinction sound simpler than it is. De Preester & Tsakiris (2009) and
De Preester (2011) have probed deeper into the topic, and revealed the complexity of the matter.
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Object incorporation, on the other hand, refers to cases where material objects are 
incorporated into the body schema, e.g. a blind person’s cane. However, my 
differentiation within the notion of incorporation is different from Merleau-Ponty’s (and 
Colombetti’s). Nonetheless, it is good to recognise the existence of habit incorporation as 
well, and the different ways the term incorporation can be used.
I think it is useful to have an even more fine-grained taxonomy than any of these, which 
is why I will present four degrees or dimensions of extensions. I have labelled them as 
follows: short-term extension, integration, prosthetic incorporation and functional 
incorporation. The taxonomy will reveal the differences in the degree of attachment: how 
firmly the external part is part of the system (this doesn’t mean the level of physical 
attachment). It is important to notice that all four groupings fall under (constitutive) 
extension.96 They are different ways for an external element to be a constitutive 
component of a mental state, process or system. Hence, the distinction between extended 
and embedded is outside of this setting – all four dimensions belong to the class of 
extended (as differentiated in the first chapter, section 1.3.)
The grading of extensions also helps us to see the difference between EM and ECM. 
Revealing the difference is not straightforward, because all types of extensions describe 
occurrent states that are both cognitive and experiential, and as such all of them (except 
prosthetic incorporation) could be considered to belong to both EM and ECM. However, 
I classify EM as something that belongs to the group of integration. Even though the type 
of integration includes experiential qualities, I claim that it is not enough to qualify as 
ECM. On the other hand, even though functional incorporation surely contains cognitive 
processing as well, it only qualifies as a group of ECM and not of EM, because the 
experiential aspects are what differentiates it.
The main demarcating question is rather what is extended: an experiential state or process 
contrasted with an experiencing subject. The latter is needed for there to be a genuine 
case of ECM. This differentiation is similar to Clark and Chalmers’s (1998), when they 
separate cognitive processing from the mind (by mind they mainly refer to beliefs). The 
former involves individual acts such as using a rotation button while playing Tetris, and 
the latter involves the whole of Otto’s memory/belief system. In a similar vein, in my 
                                                
96 Even in prosthetic incorporation, we can say that the external component is constitutive for the certain 
bodily function it serves – that function just doesn’t fall into EM or ECM because the function in question 
is neither cognitive nor experiential.
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differentiation, the first two degrees describe extension of experiential (and cognitive) 
states or processes (such as the act of counting using pen and paper), and the fourth degree 
describes extension of a larger system (such as a person using a blind person’s cane). The 
third group, prosthetic incorporation, is included only for clarificatory purposes, it is 
neither an instance of EM nor ECM. Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish this type 
of extension from the fourth one. These levels of extension should be taken as epistemic 
tools rather than ontological statements. Their purpose is to explain the differences in how 
an external object may become part of a coupled system that realises an experiential state.
An important aspect in the demarcation of these levels of extension is the notion of 
functionality. It does not refer to functionalism as it is understood in analytic philosophy 
of mind. Obviously, I do not oppose functionalism’s core thesis, according to which 
mental states depend on the functions they have or the roles they play, rather than on their 
material realization.97 This, however, is not what I am aiming at with the notion. Instead, 
I refer to something that is taken as part of the functional system – not only that it has a 
function that it fulfils. Being a physical part is not enough; the tool has to be under the 
sensorimotor control of the subject, and it has to become part of the transparent subjective 
point of view. It goes without saying that my notion of functional incorporation is very 
much influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) views on incorporation.
Another aspect that needs some further clarification is the concept of tool. It is perhaps 
the most central concept in this chapter – extension occurs in and by means of tools. For 
the position I am arguing for, the tool needs to be a material object. Thus, habits, cultural 
practices, etc. are ruled out from my use of the concept.98 Frédérique De Vignemont 
(2018) refers to Beck’s (1980) landmark book on animal tool use, and spells out that tools 
extend our motor, sensory or spatial capacities. Helena De Preester’s (2011, 121) list is 
slightly different – according to her, tools extend motor, sensory or cognitive capacities.99
A tool does not refer to any object, but only to “unattached external objects that one 
                                                
97 This much is obviously true for anyone who supports any kind of externalist view about the mind. Still,
functionalism as a doctrine in analytic philosophy of mind is somewhat problematic, and should not be 
confused with the views presented in here.
98 However, I by no means oppose the idea that habits and cultural practices can also be ways of extension 
(e.g. Merleau-Ponty’s habit incorporation). They are just not what I am after with my notion of ECM, which 
is a narrower concept that includes only object extension. 
99 I think it is problematic to distinguish ‘cognitive’ from the other capacities. All the instances of tool use 
that I use as examples here are not purely cognitive but are also sensory or motor as well.
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actively manipulates – and not simply holds – for functional purpose” (de Vignemont 
2018, 2). 
De Vignemont’s and De Preester’s definitions leave some unanswered questions. For 
example, how unattached do the objects need to be? Even though hearing aids and 
sensory substitution devices are rather firmly attached to the body, I think they should be 
treated as tools. I suggest that the level of attachment is not a crucial question when we
need to decide whether something is or is not a tool. Neither is the fact whether the tool 
is replacing (e.g. an artificial limb), substituting (e.g. a sensory substitution device), 
enhancing (e.g. a hearing aid) or creating (e.g. a hammer or a robotic sixth finger)100 a
body part or function. However, the location of the putative tool – whether it is located 
inside or outside the skin – might affect the criteria because the location is related to the 
possibility of the subject’s motor control.101 Moreover, if taken literally, de Vignemont’s 
definition would also lead to a situation where if somebody was just holding e.g. a fork 
or a hammer, they wouldn’t count as tools.
However, I agree that active manipulation, adaptation and a functional goal-drivenness 
are necessary for what we are looking for. Merely holding an object (even if it was a 
hammer) doesn’t count as tool use in the sense we are after here. To understand what is 
meant by ‘tool’, we need to look at its different roles for the user. These issues show that 
we cannot actually define the meaning of tool without its use. Whether something counts 
as a tool depends on how it is used and on its relation to the tool user. The level of 
attachment and entrenchment varies, and simply talking of ‘tool use’ still leaves open 
what kind of relation is in question. The following sections aim to shed light on the 
different dimensions of tool use as instances of extension, integration and incorporation.
                                                
100 For the robotic sixth finger, see Meraz et al. (2018). 
101 I am not saying that a device located under the skin (endoprosthesis) could not count as a tool in 
principle, or that the skin would be an absolute demarcating barrier. I just want to draw attention to practical 
limitations. What matters is the possibility of taking the tool under one’s control, and it is more difficult 
with an endoprosthesis. I will discuss this in the section on prosthetic incorporation.
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4.2.1. Short-term extension
Consider an everyday task carried out with a tool. For example, imagine me cutting 
someone’s hair with scissors. I am not an expert, and the result would not look pretty, but 
I am still capable of shortening hair because I can use scissors. The relation between the 
scissors and me is only temporary, but it is goal-driven and we can say that a sensorimotor 
state is extended. We are surrounded by tools that are potential for short-term extension 
– pens, spoons, hammers, axes, rakes, spades, tennis rackets and so on. They are the very 
common “artifacts that we use and control in order to extend our abilities” (Thompson & 
Stapleton 2009).102 As Clark (e.g. 2008) has clearly shown, we off-load cognitive burden 
to the environment (to tools and by means of tools), and create new ways of cognising 
with tools. However, this off-loading does not only happen in the cognitive sphere, it is 
also very much a sensorimotor and perceptual phenomenon. It extends the sensorimotor 
body.
This type covers incompetent tool users, i.e., people who are beginners in using some 
tool. For example, think about somebody starting to practice to play the violin. The 
instrument fulfils its role, but the violin doesn’t become part of the (transparent) system: 
it is not rooted to the system and made one’s “own”. Of course, sometimes also the tools 
we have used for a long time can stay merely short-term extended, e.g. consider somebody 
who has played the violin for 10 years, but still feels quite uncoordinated and detached 
from her violin, unable to express what she would like to express with it. A fluent tool 
user is a different story and belongs to the type of integration or incorporation – depending 
on which aspects we are looking at. As I have stressed, the borders of these degrees of 
extension are not set in stone, and each case might require individual conditions.
Technically speaking, perhaps we should demarcate a group of extension even below this 
one: mere tool use without extension. Consider somebody just holding a tool without 
intentionally manipulating anything with it. The task might still get accomplished, but 
there is no sense of agency or control over the tool included. For example, consider a 
small child holding a knife – she might accidentally cut something without realising and 
without aiming to cut anything. Or somebody might move a pen on paper while doing 
                                                
102 I would not disagree that some techniques in general – such as writing – also count as instances of 
extension, but I limit the discussion to concrete material objects.
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something else that captures her awareness completely. However, as the reason for 
presenting these four types is that they are different kinds of instances of extension, mere 
tool use without extension wouldn’t belong to that setting.
Short-term extension is a predecessor and a more fleeting version of integration. In short-
term extension, the tool extends only certain states (e.g. cognitive, sensorimotor or 
perceptual), but the whole system (of which the aspect can be e.g. cognitive, sensorimotor 
or perceptual) is left untouched. Integration, on the other hand, extends the whole system. 
So the difference between these two types is about what aspect or entity we are asking 
about. Moreover, the type of short-term extension is not functional in that specific way in 
which I use the notion (which will be discussed further later). Short-term extended tools 
surely have a function in a general sense of the term (e.g. the scissors succeed in their 
function of cutting hair). But this is not enough to count as ‘functional’ in the way I am 
using the concept.
Even though I think that even with a short-term tool use externalisation may occur, I 
admit that the fleeting nature of tools that are used only rarely or sometimes might be 
problematic for the theory. Already in their seminal paper, Clark and Chalmers (1998) 
restricted their theory: they argued that the notebook must play a constant and stable role 
in Otto’s life. I am going to restrict my position in a similar way. Thus, the type of short-
term extension is not enough for something to count as ECM.
4.2.2. Integrated extension
This time, think about Sweeney Todd, who cuts his customers’ hair and throats with an 
expertise he had gained during his years as a barber in Fleet Street. The razor-sharp 
scissors move effortlessly, without a need to pay attention where his hand ends and the 
tool begins. Whereas an unexperienced scissor user won’t notice the difference between 
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one pair of scissors and another, Sweeney Todd has created a special relationship with 
his scissors that can even be two-sided. His way of using scissors has partly created their 
sharpness, and on the other hand, the special features of the scissors have shaped how the 
barber cuts with them.
This kind of coupling is more transparent, stable and individualised than short-term
extension. Sweeney Todd doesn’t have to concentrate on the technical details of the 
cutting act or the scissors, but he has a direct, transparent access to his target in the world 
(hair) and how he wants it to be cut and shaped. In a similar way as a skilful artist paints 
a portrait without needing to look at her model before every brush stroke (see Noë 2015), 
a skilful barber works with hair. Following Noë’s idea, this action is an interactive, 
dynamic process that more closely resembles dancing than it does the representing of 
ideas. I suggest that the scissors are integrated into Sweeney Todd’s sensorimotor, 
perceptual and cognitive systems.103 In his case, not only a temporary occurrent 
sensorimotor state extends, but he and his scissors together form a new whole – a coupled 
system whose function is to cut hair (and throats).
This type of extension is about the same phenomenon that was described in the previous 
section, but it is more permanent and affects a larger area than short-term extension. Otto 
could be seen as an example of this kind: an external element (the notebook) is integrated
into the system (Otto’s memory capacity). It is not only about a specific museum visit, 
but about his whole memory system. Also the way most of us use smartphones these days 
counts as an example of integration. The phone has been taken into our system: it is 
trusted, it has gained an almost transparent status, and if it is taken away, many of our 
cognitive functions suffer. As a guide in differentiation, we can use similar criteria with 
Clark and Chalmers (1998). Especially their first glue & trust criterion – constancy, 
durability and reliability – is what differentiates integration from short-term extension. 
The difference between short-term extension and integration is a question of degree, and 
as said, should be considered separately in each case. 
The term ‘integration’ or ‘integrated’ has been used in the literature, e.g. by Menary 
(2007; 2010c), who defines EM in terms of integration. He uses the term for 
                                                
103 With integration, it is not evident into what the external tool is actually integrated – it could be the mind, 
the cognitive system, an organism, the self, etc. Instead, in the case of incorporation, the target is quite self-
evidently the corpus (the body) and the bodily stance or point of view.
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differentiating his view from arguments based on cognitive parity. According to him, 
since EM does not rely on the parity principle, the external elements do not have to be 
similar or have similar functions with the biological ones – they do not have to be 
“functionally equivalent”. Instead of parity, the external elements are integrated into the 
system in a complementary way. Menary (2010c, 235) writes that “it is because the 
external vehicles provide a different kind of functionality and because they can coordinate 
with internal processes that they are integral parts of our cognitive systems”.
However, I use the term in a slightly different way. I accept Menary’s view, and agree 
that his account of integration is a better way to understand externalist views than the 
first-wave views based on parity principle. However, this is not what I am after with the 
notion of integration. My aim is to differentiate integration, on the one hand, from short-
term extension, where the external element doesn’t get integrated into the system, and on 
the other, from incorporation, where bodily ownership is required. Integration, according 
to my reading, is hence a stronger relation than short-term extension, and a weaker 
relation than incorporation. This reading is lacking from Menary’s view.
Integration is a type of extension that happens in EM. Even though an experiential side is 
included, some aspects are not present that are needed for ECM. For example, the body 
schema doesn’t get extended in this type of extension. This might give empirical methods 
to track the difference between integration and incorporation (for neurophysiological 
studies on the extension of body schema, see Maravita & Iriki 2004; Berti & Frassinetti 
2000). I will list the other differentiating aspects in the section on functional 
incorporation. However, before that, let us look at another type of incorporation.
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4.2.3. Prosthetic incorporation
Consider a patient using a cardiac pacemaker to maintain a healthy heart rate. It is 
implanted in her body, and will become a non-biological part of the body. Or consider an 
endoprosthesis, i.e. a prosthesis that is located inside the body, e.g. in the hip where a 
dysfunctional joint is replaced with an artificial one. The pacemaker and the prosthetic 
hip enable bodily functions that keep the patient alive, or at least improve the quality of 
her life significantly. We can also think of a transplant (e.g. heart or kidney) – a biological 
version of prosthetic incorporation. (Or if we want to continue with hair-related examples, 
we can think of somebody using a wig.)
This kind of incorporation is mechanical rather than functional. An endoprosthesis is 
functional only in the narrow sense that it becomes part of the physical, bodily functions. 
It is not functionality as I define it in this taxonomy of extensions. The crucial difference 
between a prosthesis that is located inside the body and a tool that the subject is using is 
that the former is not under the control of the experiencing subject, whereas the latter is. 
Moreover, we cannot feel the world through an endoprosthesis, the transitive nature of a 
tool is lacking. Thus, an endoprosthesis or other prosthetically incorporated object is not 
a tool.
A terminological clarification is needed here. I use the term ‘prosthesis’ to refer only to 
cases that fall under prosthetic incorporation. I don’t call them ‘tools’, since they don’t 
satisfy the requirements of how I define ‘tool’: they are not unattached objects taken under 
the ownership, control and point of view of the user. These concepts are not used 
consistently in the literature, for example ‘prosthesis’ sometimes refers to any device that 
the subject can use or incorporate, and hence also includes what I refer to as tools (e.g. 
De Preester 2011).104
There are two different ways for an object to belong to the group of prosthetic 
incorporation. First, when they are replacing body parts or functions, as was the case with 
the pacemaker and artificial hip (especially internal body parts, i.e. endoprostheses, but 
the distinction between external and internal replacements is not rigid, but may vary 
                                                
104 I will discuss artificial limbs briefly in the section about functional incorporation. It is not a simple 
question whether they should be treated as prostheses or tools.
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depending on the case and what aspect of it we are interested in).105 Second, the object 
can create an extra part or function that does not replace any pre-existing function. This 
is possible at least in principle, and in the case of Australian performance artist Stelarc 
and his many prosthetic objects, such as a statue in his stomach.106
Even though the type of prosthetic incorporation is non-functional, it still deserves to be 
called incorporation, instead of short-term extension or integration, because an external, 
non-biological element is taken as a part of the (physical) body. Furthermore, this kind of 
extension should still technically go under the label of constitutive, because artificial body 
parts clearly work as constitutive components for the bodily functions in question. 
However, prosthetic incorporation is not very interesting for my purposes – it is not the 
kind of extension that is needed for ECM. Still, this type’s existence is important to 
acknowledge, because it shows that incorporation can be divided into two: prosthetic and 
functional incorporation, where the former is mechanical and passive, and the latter active 
and goal-driven. Apart from showing what kind of incorporation is needed for ECM (i.e. 
functional rather than prosthetic), pinpointing the group of prosthetic incorporation also 
sorts out one potential misunderstanding that could be used as a critical note against ECM, 
namely the claim that ECM’s proponents allegedly argue for ECM on the grounds of 
prosthetic incorporation.107 One unfortunate passage by Andy Clark (2009b) initiated the 
problem, and others by Katalin Farkas (2012), and Karina Vold (2015) made it even 
worse. 
[I]magine a case in which a person (call her Diva) 
suffers minor brain damage and loses the ability to 
perform a simple task of arithmetic division using 
only her neural resources. An external silicon circuit 
is added that restores the previous functionality. Diva 
can now divide just as before, only some small part of 
the work is distributed across the brain and the silicon 
circuit: a genuinely mental process (division) is 
supported by a hybrid bio-technological system. That 
                                                
105 This group also contains thought experiments where neurons are replaced by silicon circuits. Apart from 
philosophers’ armchairs and science fiction, this kind of experiment has in fact been conducted with 
California spiny lobster (even though with only one of its neurons). I will discuss lobsters and silicon 
circuits soon.
106 Yet another interesting question is chemical altering of the brain (e.g. with drugs or antidepressants) and 
whether that would belong to the group of prosthetic incorporation or not. However, that question will 
remain unanswered here.
107 ‘Prosthetic incorporation’ is my term, though. None of the writers referred to here use that term.
129
alone, if you accept it, establishes the key principle of 
[EM]. (Clark 2009b.)108
Farkas (2012) – quite justifiably – writes that if one accepts this much, there is no reason 
to leave conscious experience out. (I agree with her about this, but I don’t accept Clark’s 
original claim.) In order to show that Clark’s method is not restricted to the cognitive 
sphere, but that it encompasses consciousness as well, Farkas modifies Clark’s example 
slightly.
[C]onsider the example of Hera, who suffers minor 
brain damage and loses the ability to process auditory 
signals using only her neural resources. Therefore she 
does not have auditory experiences anymore. An 
external silicon circuit is added that restores the 
previous functionality. Hera’s experience of hearing 
is completely restored: but now a genuinely conscious 
event (an auditory experience) is supported by a 
hybrid biotechnological system. (Farkas 2012, 443–
444). 
Farkas’s main reason for using the silicon chip argument is to show Clark’s inconsistency, 
and not to argue directly for ECM with it. Vold’s (2015) position, on the other hand, is 
more difficult to excuse, because she is using the silicon chip argument as an explicit 
argument for ECM. She asks us to imagine a situation where a patient’s brain functions 
are deteriorating and doctors start replacing her biological neurons with artificial ones 
that are programmed to behave identically with the original ones.
Now imagine that instead of entering your skull to 
replace your deteriorated neurons where they are, 
doctors consider it preferable and less intrusive to the 
biological shell to do as much as they can externally. 
So doctors tell you it will be safer to attach your 
remaining well-functioning neurons through tiny 
electrical nodes to an implant that threads a wire out 
your ear. They then attach this wire to an external 
device that contains your programmed silicon chips 
and which attaches to your person. We can imagine 
that after the operation you come to with a small wire 
now reaching out of one of your earholes. Attached to 
                                                
108 In Clark’s defence, he wrote this passage as an answer to Fodor’s critique to his book Supersizing the 
Mind, and the example of Diva is tailored for that purpose. Clark has argued for EM in better ways countless 
times elsewhere.
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this wire is a small device that hugs your ear, much 
like a hearing aid. Doctors call it an iCog. (Vold 2015, 
27.)
By placing the silicon chips outside the body, Vold probably wanted to stress the 
externalist side – which is after all the ultimate goal behind all of these examples. 
However, the thought experiment doesn’t get any more convincing by relocating the 
vehicle outside the skin and skull. It is irrelevant where the artificial neurons are located
or what they are made of, as should be clear for anyone who has read their 4E literature. 
Instead the important question is can we actively interact with them – use them, do things 
with them – and as a result take them into our system as genuine parts. Externalism is not 
established by stipulating a logical possibility of replacing neurons with silicon chips and 
placing them outside the head. I claim that these thought experiments do not promote 
externalism at all because they have misunderstood the most crucial features of EM and 
ECM.
Thus, the silicon chip argument is inadequate and misguided for two reasons. First, 
because it is a highly speculative thought experiment that belongs to science-fiction rather 
than to science.109 The Otto thought experiment was at least based on existing, everyday 
“technology”. However, an even more serious problem is the second one: the silicon chip 
argument belongs to the group of prosthetic incorporation. I will explain in the following 
why prosthetic incorporation is incapable of backing up EM or ECM.
David Chalmers (2017)110 ends up reaching a similar conclusion, even though I find his 
path of argumentation wanting, because he doesn’t differentiate between prosthetic and 
functional incorporation (actually he doesn’t talk about any ‘incorporation’, but instead 
only about ‘extension’ without contrastive subtleties). Nevertheless, he also concludes 
that the silicon chip argument is weak. As a clear indication of the weakness, he mentions 
that even the best-known opponents of the externalist views accept the silicon chip 
                                                
109 Even though, something like this has been done in science. A group of scientists has successfully 
managed to replace one neuron of a California spiny lobster with an artificial, electronic one that functioned 
well with the biological ones, and they aim to replace gradually more neurons. (See Szucs et al. 2000, and 
discussion in Clark 2008.)
110 Chalmers has stayed out of the extended mind debates since his original article with Clark, apart from
on two occasions: his foreword to Clark’s book Supersizing the Mind (2008), and the short article referred 
to here, which was published in a collection of essays titled Andy Clark and His Critics (2017). On both 
occasions, he tries to deny ECM. In my view, especially in this latest paper, he fails thoroughly – he simply
repeats the central features of sensorimotor enactivism that entail ECM.
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argument: Adams & Aizawa (2008) and Rupert (2009) have all declared that they can 
agree with science-fiction -type thought experiments that include imaginary future 
technology, such as silicon chips replacing brain functions. I agree with Chalmers that 
already this alone shows that there is something wrong with the silicon chip arguments 
and the like. Somewhat surprisingly, he finds a solution that follows a well-trodden path 
– or to put it bluntly, he reinvents the wheel. Chalmers’s solution to the inadequacy of the 
silicon chip arguments is virtually sensorimotor enactivism, although he doesn’t make a 
reference to sensorimotor enactivism. He states that what is distinctive for EM, is 
“interacting via perception and action”, and that is what makes Otto and his notebook as 
well as rotation in Tetris count as EM, whereas the silicon chip examples are ruled out. 
He gives an updated definition of EM:
A subject’s cognitive processes and mental states can 
be partly constituted by entities that are external to the 
subject, in virtue of the subject’s sensorimotor 
interaction with these entities (Chalmers 2007).
It is easy to agree with Chalmers’s statement (even though he presents it in a short and 
sketchy fashion) – it is the core assertion that I have made throughout this thesis: 
extension is based on an interaction relationship via perception and action between the 
subject and the external element. Without that relationship, there is no extension in the 
sense that it is understood in EM or ECM.
Let us recapitulate why prosthetic incorporation is insufficient for ECM. To start with, 
the prosthetically incorporated objects are not ‘tools’, as I have described a ‘tool’ based 
on De Preester’s (2011) and De Vignemont’s (2018) definitions. They are not “unattached 
external objects that one actively manipulates” to extend our “motor, sensory or spatial 
capacities”. Further, there is no sensorimotor control over the prosthetically incorporated 
objects – the subject is not in charge – and hence a sense of agency will not develop. From 
these reasons it follows that the subject cannot manipulate her surroundings with the 
device, it is beyond her control.
Unlike the previously presented ways of extensions (and functional incorporation, which 
will be presented next), prosthetic incorporation is not on the same scale: a cardiac 
pacemaker either works or doesn’t work, whereas the level of coupling between a violinist 
and her violin is always a matter of degree. The three other ways of extension require 
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training: a process in which the tool is taken as one’s “own”. A successful coupling and 
extension only happens as a result of this effort. Prosthetic incorporation is different in 
this sense, its functioning is quite out of reach of the subject’s training.
Thus, prosthetic incorporation is not only “not enough” as an argument for ECM, but it 
is an altogether wrong way to proceed. I do not think prosthetic incorporation provides 
any support at all for ECM. All the defining features of ECM are missing. Even if we 
could replace all of the neurons and brain functions with silicon chips (or some other non-
biological material) that would not yet tell us anything about ECM being true or not. Let 
us now turn to the positive story – what features are required then if not prosthetic 
incorporation?
4.2.4. Functional incorporation
Finally, consider Edward Scissorhands. For him, scissors are part of his body, and he 
experiences the world through them in a way that is not possible for even the most 
competent of Fleet Street barbers. Is there a difference in kinds of extensions between the 
cases where the tool is used fluently (Sweeney Todd) and when the tool is part of the 
body (Edward Scissorhands)?111 Of course, the latter case is science fiction (and the 
former is fiction, but that is not relevant). Even though scissors as body parts exist only 
in science fiction, this comparison still reveals a crucial question: how firmly and in what 
sense does a tool need to be attached to the body for it to be considered functionally
incorporated?112
                                                
111 The idea for contrasting Sweeney Todd with Edward Scissorhands is borrowed from Thompson and 
Stapleton (2009) (although they don’t develop the example further, it is just briefly mentioned to stress the 
importance of intimate coupling and bodily regulation for incorporation relations).
112 The Australian performance artist Stelarc could almost be called a real life example of Edward 
Scissorhands. He is famous for enhancing his body by technical means, e.g. he has transplanted an ear in 
133
From everything we have learned so far, it has become clear that the tool doesn’t have to 
be biological. Nor does it have to be attached permanently (or not even firmly in a 
physical sense) to the body, as Edward’s scissor-hands are, or as an artificial cardiac 
pacemaker is. To understand what is meant by this fourth group of extension, we need to 
look at both terms – functional and incorporated. In the following, I will discuss these 
two concepts – separately and together – and aim to show how functional incorporation 
differs from the other three types of extensions.113
Let us first look at the term incorporated. Here, it is understood differently than in the 
prosthetic version of incorporation – it doesn’t need to involve taking the external tool 
literally inside the boundaries of the body (as in the previous incorporation). Rather, the 
external part needs to be taken into the bodily point of view – so that the subject doesn’t 
experience the external part as an object, but the world through it. The notion of body 
schema is a central feature when defining functional incorporation. It is differentiated 
from body image, and this conceptual pair is used in both philosophical (starting from 
Merleau-Ponty 1945) and scientific (starting from Head & Holmes 1911) discourses.
Body image refers to the intentional and reflective stance we have towards our bodies –
the body experienced as an object. It is “composed of a system of experiences, attitudes, 
and beliefs where the object of such intentional states is one’s own body” (Gallagher & 
Zahavi 2008, 164). Body schema, on the other hand, refers to the body as a pre-reflective 
subject of experiences – the body from a first-person perspective. It is a “system of 
sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual 
monitoring” (Gallagher 2005, 24). Body schema is our point of view to the world that is 
below conscious monitoring. We can grasp an apple without considering consciously the 
posture of our hands, jump over a small brook without considering the movements of our 
legs, and bend down to enter a car without considering how to adjust our posture. The 
objects that matter are the apple, the brook and the car – not the body. If we hit our head 
while climbing into a car, we might lose the transparent stance and start seeing the body 
as an object again.
                                                
his hand (that is “partly surgically constructed, partly cell-grown”) and a robotic third arm (See Atzori & 
Woolford 1995; Dayal 2012).
113 In functional incorporation, extension is obtained by means of perception, instead of in interaction with 
objects of perception. The difference was briefly discussed in second chapter (2.2.2.) when comparing 
differences between dispositional and occurrent EM.
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Even though these concepts are sometimes treated inconsistently in the literature,114 it is 
undeniable that this distinction is legitimate, and it also has empirical support, namely in 
cases of double dissociation. There is neuroscientific evidence of cases where the body 
image is injured but the body schema is intact, and the other way around, where the body 
schema is injured but the body image is intact. The best-known phenomenon is probably 
phantom limb pain – a patient who has lost a limb can still feel pain in “it” after 
amputation.
Gallagher (2005, 25) gives examples of both kinds. An example of the former (intact body 
schema, injured body image) is unilateral neglect, a condition following brain damage, 
where the patient fails to recognise items that are located on one side of a space (left or 
right). According to a research set-up by Denny-Brown, a person suffering from a brain 
lesion (in the hemisphere opposite of the neglected side) fails to be aware of the left side 
of her body. She doesn’t dress the left side of her body or comb the left side of her hair. 
However, she is still able to use her left side quite normally for motor tasks that require 
both sides of the body, such as using her left hand to button up clothes on the right side 
of her body. (Denny-Brown, Meyer & Horenstein 1952, reported in Gallagher 2015, 25, 
40.)
An example of the latter (injured body schema, intact body image) is found in some rare 
cases of deafferentation. The symptoms are caused by a nerve fibre neuropathy that 
causes a loss of tactile sensations from the neck down. The patients can control their 
movements only by “cognitive intervention”, e.g. they use a visual perception of their 
body in order to compensate for the lack of proprioceptive and tactile feeling in their 
body. (Gallagher 2015, 25; Cole 1995.) Gallagher & Cole (1995) suggest that in some of 
these cases, the patient has lost the body schema, even though the body image stays intact.
An interesting aspect of body schema is that it is not tied to physiological body 
boundaries; instead it is plastic and open to adaptation. By functional incorporation, I 
refer to situations where the body schema takes external elements into it, namely, the 
body schema extends outside the biological body boundaries. To find out whether there 
is functional incorporation, we need to ask whether an external element can become 
                                                
114 Perhaps the most unfortunate confusion is that Merlau-Ponty’s term schéma corporel was translated 
body image in the first English translation in 1962. Besides terminological confusions, there are also 
conceptual open questions – the case is far from settled, but after all, the distinction is more useful than
confusing.
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incorporated into the organization of the system, rather than merely extending an 
individual experiential state every now and then. When properly functionally 
incorporated, the previously external element becomes part of the organisation of an 
experiential system. Apart from enactivism,115 it is related to the embodiment thesis and 
to the Merleau-Pontian divide between the objective, material body and the 
phenomenological, lived body. Coupling happens with the latter kind of understanding of 
the body. It has an impact on the structure of experience, and the world is experienced 
through the incorporated external part transparently. Functional incorporation creates a 
sense of ownership over the incorporated part, which can be tested by removing the part: 
removing a prosthetic limb or a blind man’s cane are closer to removing a body part than 
removing a fork or a notebook.
Let us then look at the term functional. Its purpose in my taxonomy is to differentiate 
functional from prosthetic incorporation. Colombetti (2016) draws from Merleau-Pontian 
differentiation, and talks about ‘phenomenological incorporation’. The reason why I don’t 
follow her terminology, but instead talk about functional incorporation, is that firstly, 
according to my view, the phenomenological side is already present in the first two types 
(i.e. in short-term extension and integration), and secondly, I want to emphasise the 
importance of functionality as a purposeful, goal-driven property as opposed to the 
phenomenological side that would instead sound as if something was more passively 
received. (Of course, functional incorporation is phenomenological.) The external 
element needs to be under the “functional” control of the subject – controlled 
sensorimotorically by the active agent. Being a physical part (coupled within the 
biological body) is not sufficient.
Merleau-Ponty’s (1945, 165–166) classic examples of incorporation116 are famous and 
often cited in the literature. The best known is of course the blind person’s cane: the cane 
is not (primarily) an object, but functions as if it were a sense organ through which the 
blind person experiences her surroundings. Merleau-Ponty’s other examples include a 
driver and her car, and a woman and her feather hat. The driver and the hatted woman 
have extended their bodily frontiers to include the size of a car and the feather, and they 
                                                
115 Enactivism starts from the phenomenal side, whereas ECM starts from the material basis – but this 
feature doesn’t make them incompatible.
116 Regarding the distinction presented earlier in this chapter between habit incorporation and object 
incorporation (see Colombetti 2016), in these examples, the notion of incorporation used by Merleau-Ponty 
(1945) goes of course under object incorporation.
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know (i.e. feel) without calculating whether they can pass through a narrow opening –
just as we don’t have to calculate our body size to find out whether we can pass through 
a door or not. “To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into them, or
conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 
166).
From Merleu-Ponty’s examples, the blind person’s cane fits well with my definition of 
functional incorporation. The cane clearly fulfils a sensorimotor function, is transparent 
(or quasi-transparent) and extends the body schema. The hat and the car examples 
undoubtedly extend the body schema as well – but it is less clear whether they have a 
sensorimotor function or purpose of the right kind. A sensorimotor stance is certainly 
included, but it occurs as a side effect. Especially having a feather in one’s hat would 
rather belong better to my definition of prosthetic incorporation. The function of the 
feather is not to extend its carrier’s sensorimotor area or the scope of sensitivity (the 
feather is not comparable to a cat’s whiskers for example). Even though something of this 
sort can happen when wearing a hat (we could call it a weak imitation of a cat’s whiskers), 
feather hats are not usually used for sensorimotor probing.
The car example comes closer to functional incorporation, at least by changing the focus 
of interest a little. Here, too, the right sort of incorporation is of course technically also a 
side effect or by-product, since the main function of the car is – obviously – to enable 
passengers to move (faster than by foot) in space. But consider somebody driving on an 
oily or icy surface, or driving over small obstacles like stones, etc. The feeling is probably 
even stronger with a sport car, since there is less material between the driver and the road. 
The focal point of sensorimotor sensitivity is transformed from the borders of the body to 
the borders of the car. In all of Merleau-Ponty’s examples, pieces of the environment 
become incorporated into the body schema, but not into the body image. (Although 
perhaps incorporation into the body image is also possible after long-term use.)
An external piece is properly functionally incorporated when it functions transparently
as part of the system. Thompson & Stapleton (2009) call this requirement a transparency 
constraint, according to which: “For anything external to the body’s boundary to count 
as a part of the cognitive system it must function transparently in the body’s sense-making 
interactions with the environment”. The transparency constraint is a phenomenological 
criterion for incorporation. It emphasises phenomenological considerations – the first-
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person experience of the subject – as a criterion for incorporation. When some element is 
incorporated into the body, it is no longer felt as an object, but the world is experienced 
through it. It is reminiscent of the transparent status of the biological body in normal 
experience, and it modifies the way in which world is experienced. Moreover, it doesn’t 
stay in the phenomenological realm alone. I agree with Thompson and Stapleton (2009) 
when they hypothesise that “tools and aids that conform to transparency are incorporated 
into the neurophysiological body schema”. This idea is not only based on philosophical 
hypothesising but also has empirical support (e.g. Maravita & Iriki 2004). 
However, I think we should adjust the transparency constraint a little. The tool doesn’t 
have to be absolutely transparent because, strictly speaking, it might be that no tool is 
completely transparent – otherwise it would no longer be a tool. A sufficient level of 
transparency is needed, so that the focus of the attention and significance is not in the 
tool, but in the target of the coupled system formed by the subject and her tool. Although 
not a physical tool, speaking a foreign language that one has learned as an adult is an 
example of this kind of partial transparency. At least when the speaker is not fluent in the 
language, there is always a certain barrier that prevents total transparency (as opposed to 
one’s native language). Colombetti (2016, 240) describes this kind of partially transparent 
tool as “quasi-transparent, i.e., as ‘withdrawn’ from experience (not attended, not taken 
as an intentional object) but still present”.117 She continues that the tool is presented to its 
user as “that through which” the world is experienced. This “that through which” nature 
of the tool is necessary for functional incorporation.
When asking which tools can become functionally incorporated, one should not look at 
the tool itself, but rather at its use. Whether a tool can be incorporated depends on the 
subject’s interactive relation with it – rather than on the tool’s design, internal structure, 
effective functioning, portability, etc. Instead, it is crucial that the tool can be manipulated 
and controlled by the subject.
It is as if the tool withdraws into the sensorium of the 
body, or rather, as if the tool extends not only the 
motor body, but also the sensorium of the body. This 
results into a feeling of quasi-transparency in which 
the tool co-enables our experience but is itself not in 
the focus of our experience. The quasi-transparency 
of the tool is related to a feeling of non-mediation, 
caused by the altered correlation between 
                                                
117 For quasi-transparency or semi-transparency, see also Ihde (1990) and De Preester (2011). 
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somatosensory and visual information. (De Preester 
2011, 123.)
Sometimes it is difficult to see whether a tool is a mediating or non-mediating tool, and 
placing it into one single group is complicated. For example, an artificial limb is an 
ambiguous case.118 Consider a person using an artificial leg, for instance. Is it functionally 
or prosthetically incorporated? The answer depends on what dimension we are looking 
at, and how profoundly the device has been taken into the system. It goes without saying 
that the actual users of artificial limbs would prefer them to become as incorporated as 
possible. However, this doesn’t always happen, for the artificial limb may remain an 
external tool that is not felt as part of the body. De Preester & Tsakiris (2009, 310) suggest 
that it should become a “knowing body-part, in other words, something that shares in the 
knowledge of the body”. Experiments with artificial limb users have shown that they may 
become “knowing body-parts”, but only in a limited sense (De Preester & Tsakiris 2009; 
see also Murray 2004).
Of course, there are exemplars of successful artificial limb incorporation, as for example 
the famous South-African sprinter Oscar Pistorius proves. Both of his legs were 
amputated in his infancy, and he wears running blades that enabled him to not only 
succeed in the Paralympics, but also in the Olympics. The blades turned out to outperform 
biological legs in certain aspects that affected the running speed. The way Pistorius ran 
with his blades is an interesting case for science in many ways, and importantly for our 
purposes, it looks like a possible case of functional incorporation.119 Hence, an artificial 
limb may or may not belong to the group of functional incorporation, depending on the 
case.
The benefits of restricting ECM to cases of functional incorporation are that it gives a 
demarcation criteria for ECM, it ties ‘embodied’ (incorporated), ‘enacted’ (active, 
functional sensorimotor stance) and ‘extended’ (non-biological object/tool is included) 
together. The disadvantage is that it excludes cases that belong to ‘short-term extension’ 
and ‘integrated’ sections. Even though they clearly have an experiential side to them, the 
                                                
118 Artificial limbs are of course called prostheses, but I use the word ‘prosthesis’ referring to prosthetic
incorporation only, and artificial limb may or may not belong to that group regardless of this terminological 
matter.
119 Although he doesn’t run anymore, because he was convicted of killing his girlfriend in 2014 (Lindstrom 
2019).
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reason for leaving them out is that the coupling is not strong and stable enough – they 
only extend individual experiential states, but don’t become part of the organisation of 
the experiential system or subject. They don’t contain a sense of ownership in the same 
way as functional incorporation does. However, this doesn’t mean that extension based 
on short-term extension and integration would be non-experiential. As I have stated 
earlier, we don’t transform into Chalmers’s zombies in real life cases of sensorimotor 
tasks and cognitive reasoning. However, these cases are exempted from my narrow 
definition of ECM.120 They can be taken rather as support for a general tendency for 
experiential extension.
This section aimed at differentiating functional incorporation from weaker sorts of 
extensions. However, as for example the example of an artificial limb showed, whether 
something counts as functional incorporation needs to be analysed case by case. In the 
following sections, I will investigate functional incorporation from slightly different 
angles. First, I will set the criteria for it even more explicitly in the form of glue and trust
conditions for ECM, and in the final part of this chapter, I will discuss one concrete 
example of functional incorporation, namely sensory substitution technology.
                                                
120 Even though ‘integrated’ tools are not included in ECM, the experiential, “non-zombieness” feature in 
the integrated-extension of course supports my general view, and especially the argument for ECM from 
parity of cognition and consciousness. 
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4.2.5. Summing up the four degrees of extension
Functional or not? Incorporated or not?
Short-term extension no no
Integrated extension yes no
Prosthetic incorporation no yes
Functional incorporation yes yes
This illustration sums up the crucial differences within the taxonomy I have outlined. Let 
us review briefly how the different levels of extensions are separated from each other. 
The difference between short-term extension and integrated extension is that the former 
is more fleeting – a tool that one uses as an external prop for a motor or cognitive, etc. 
task, but it is not taken into the system as a genuine part. Many of the tools we use every 
day belong to this group, such as knives, forks, pens and toothbrushes. However, 
becoming part of the system is required for something to count as integrated extension. I 
suggested that Clark and Chalmers’s original Otto example belongs to this group. Also, 
someone who has played, say, the violin long enough, has probably integrated the 
instrument in a more stable way into her system. The first two groups of extensions, 
hence, are on the same scale, the latter being a stronger and more permanent relation. 
The third group of extension, prosthetic incorporation, is neither an instance of EM nor 
ECM. It is not on the same scale of extensions with the other three groups, but is included 
in the taxonomy in order that its difference from functional incorporation becomes 
evident. Prosthetic incorporation differs from functional incorporation in that the former 
doesn’t involve sensorimotor control over the incorporated part – and the other exemplary 
features of functional incorporation remain absent as well. An example of a prosthetically 
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incorporated part could be a cardiac pacemaker or an electronic neuron, whereas the best 
examples of functional incorporation are devices that have an active role in forming 
sensorimotor, perceptual experiences, such as a blind person’s cane or a sensory 
substitution device.
Further, short-term and integrated extensions differ from functional incorporation in that 
the former pair do not involve a bodily sense of ownership that shapes the body schema, 
whereas functional incorporation does. When one loses a part that has been functionally
incorporated (such as a blind person’s cane), the loss is different compared to losing a 
tool that might have had an important status, but which hasn’t been part of the bodily self. 
Even in a short-term extended or integrated tool use (such as using a pair of scissors or a 
paintbrush), the tool can be under the motor control of the user, and hence a feeling of 
control over the tool can develop. However, the relationship to the tool is still not as if it 
was part of the body or bodily functions. Removing the external part is a way to reveal 
whether a sense of bodily ownership was involved. Removing a cane or a TVSS-device 
from a blind person is comparable to losing a body part, whereas taking away a paintbrush 
from an artist is not – even though the paintbrush might be of great importance to the 
artist. After having demarcated these degrees of extensions, let us now turn to the criteria 
that are needed specifically for ECM.
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4.3. “Glue & Trust” conditions 
Glue and trust conditions refer to criteria that need to be fulfilled for there to be genuine 
extension. They are the guiding instructions when some external element is “glued” to 
the system tightly enough that it can be trusted as part of that system – so that a new 
coupled system is formed. The criteria might vary from case to case, and hence it is 
impossible to give all-encompassing rules that would fit all situations. The criteria 
nevertheless help us to demarcate genuine extension (or integration, in the case of EM, 
and functional incorporation, in the case of ECM). Setting the criteria is an effective way 
to resist the slippery slope of the cognitive bloat argument (which has already been 
discussed in chapter 3). Let us start with how the limits of EM have been set in the 
literature, and then compare how these criteria fit with ECM. Finally, we can then set the 
glue and trust conditions for ECM.
4.3.1. Glue & Trust conditions for EM
Clark and Chalmers (1998) and Clark (2010) have phrased quite clearly their conditions 
for the extension of cognition. They stress, however, that these are not categorical 
conditions for extension, but rather guidelines for what kind of features should be 
included at least in cases that resemble the Otto case. Clark and Chalmers’s glue and trust
conditions include:
1. That the resource be reliably available and typically 
invoked. […]
2. That any information thus retrieved be more or less 
automatically endorsed. It should not usually be 
subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of 
other people, for example). […]
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3. That information contained in the resource should 
be easily accessible as and when required.
(Clark 2010, 46.)121
The tool needs to be “glued” to the system: it needs to be a constant, reliable resource. 
When properly glued, it will be trusted: it is automatically accepted, and not 
questioned.122 The result is a coupled system in a two-way interaction – from the external 
resource to cognition and from the cognitive function to the resource. It is clear that these 
conditions are written with Otto and his notebook in mind. As said, they are set up using 
a case-by-case method, which makes them a posteriori rather than a priori. For example, 
it is clear that the conditions cannot be the same for situations where one is using a 
notebook compared to, say, a situation where one is using a prosthetic limb or a walking 
stick. According to Hurley (2010, 126), we should “consider externalist explanations on
their empirical merits, case by case”. For example, in the case of Otto and his notebook, 
an externalist explanation is clearly better than an internalist one, as the original text aptly 
shows. I consider the case-by-case method to be the best way to embrace glue and trust 
conditions (whatever they may be), because we cannot set a priori rules to match all 
situations, and that was never the aim of Clark and Chalmers’s criteria.
As a more general condition, Clark and Chalmers originally offered the parity principle,
according to which extended cognitive processes must play the same functional roles as 
brain-bound cognitive processes. The parity principle would serve as a convenient general 
rule (as opposed to a case-by-case rule), only if it wasn’t so problematic when taken 
literally, and not taken as an intuition pump (for criticism of the parity principle, see 
chapters 1 and 2). A better way to explain extension is the complementarity argument,
according to which environmental functions can play different, complementary roles 
from the internal, biological ones. However, it doesn’t provide such an explicit toolkit we 
are after in here. 
                                                
121 Clark and Chalmers (1998, 17) added a tentative fourth requirement, prior endorsement: the information 
in the notebook must have been consciously endorsed at some point in the past. However, they themselves 
admitted that the fourth condition is dubious, because not even all biological memories are consciously 
endorsed (consider e.g. memory tampering).
122 Clark and Chalmers never specified a literal meaning with the term ‘glue & trust’ (and in fact it is often 
referred to as ‘trust & glue’).
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Kim Sterelny (2010) is along the same lines with Hurley.123 Instead of an all-embracing 
requirement for a trusted, reliable relationship between one agent and an external resource 
(such as Otto’s relationship with his notebook), he stresses variability between different 
cases. However, he names three dimensions where we should go looking for clues: 1) the 
level of trust when a person uses an external resource, 2) the level of how much the 
external resource is entrenched and individualised, 3) the level of how it can be shared
with other agents.124 Thus, Sterelny’s way of demarcation is rather setting a scale than 
positing either–or responses. This way resembles the scale or spectrum of extensions I 
framed in the beginning of this chapter.
Further, Mark Rowlands (2009) suggests ownership as a demarcation criterion (for 
cognitive states in general, whether extended or not). “EM has an obligation to 
demonstrate the sense in which the extended processes it invokes – manipulation, 
transformation, and exploitation of relevant environmental structures – can be owned, or 
in an appropriate way belong to, a cognitive subject” (Rowlands 2009, 15). Thus, a 
demarcation criterion is not any material barrier, but the belonging relationship. Gallagher 
(2013) trusts in ownership as well: the enactive engagements determine the ownership of 
a process. A similar requirement has been proposed by Mason Cash (2013, 65). 
According to his responsibility condition, the solution is “in our shared, evolving, 
normative and social practices of holding people responsible for their actions”. Instead of 
asking “what makes a process cognitive”, we should ask “what makes any thought or 
action mine”. Likewise, Tom Roberts (2012) stresses responsibility: “Extended resources 
can house an individual’s beliefs, I propose, only if she has taken responsibility for their 
sources in a suitable way”. I think both ownership and the closely related responsibility
are important aspects. Otto’s notebook, for example, has to be under his control, “owned” 
by him, and hence he is responsible for the contents in it, and for his actions based on the 
contents (as opposed to contents e.g. in Wikipedia). I will soon evaluate how these 
conditions fit with the preconditions for ECM.125
                                                
123 Sterelny represents an interesting position. He criticises Clark’s EM for the reason that it is restricting 
the phenomenon of cognitive extension to a too narrow area, to specific cases such as the use of a notebook. 
Instead, he supports a broader view he calls scaffolded mind, where distinction between causal and 
constitutive relations with the environmental resources is not made.
124 First two of his conditions are similar with Clark and Chalmers’s conditions (just in slightly different 
terms), but the third condition about intersubjective dimension is new, and missing from most of the criteria 
presented in the literature.
125 I consider it promising that many writers have ended up with quite similar criteria (even though slightly 
different terms are used).
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Yet another proposal to set the limits is the mutual manipulation criterion that was 
discussed in length in the previous chapter. Apart from the original formulation by Craver 
(2007) and the ensuing literature in the new mechanist approach, a similar account has 
been suggested by the supporters of EM, namely the continuous reciprocal causation 
criteria (Clark 2008; Palermos 2014). Its strengths and weaknesses were presented in the 
previous chapter. In what follows, I will evaluate whether these criteria help us to set the 
glue and trust criteria for ECM.
4.3.2. Criteria compared with ECM
Let us now turn to ECM, and reflect the above listed suggestions for demarcating EM: 
could they be used as demarcation criteria also for ECM? First, let us compare Clark and 
Chalmers’s original glue & trust conditions with ECM. Should the externalisations of 
experiential states be reliable, available, automatically endorsed and easily accessible?
Let’s say a blind person’s cane is a part of the material basis for his tactile experience. Is 
it necessary that the cane is constantly and reliably available for him? Wouldn’t just one 
successful case of extension be enough to show that ECM is true? Of course, the same 
question can also be asked in the case of extended cognition. If Otto uses his notebook 
only occasionally (but successfully in those cases), or if the notebook is not easily 
accessible for him, and he needs a little effort to reach it, why should these mitigations 
affect EM? Does his notebook still count as reliable if he showers without it? On the other 
hand, Inga’s memory is not always reliable either – when she sleeps or is intoxicated, for 
example. This shows how setting limits is always somewhat arbitrary. It is impossible to 
set absolute criteria for easy accessibility or reliability – they are always a matter of 
degree.
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The answer to these questions lies in the scale of extensions I presented earlier. Even 
though one successful use of a blind person’s cane or a notebook contains some kind of 
experiential extension (in the case of the blind person’s cane) and some kind of cognitive 
extension (in the case of the notebook), they would belong to the lower groups of 
extension, such as short-term extension. In order for Otto’s use of a notebook to belong 
to the group of integrated extension, and in order for a blind person’s use of a cane to 
belong to a group of functional incorporation, Clark and Chalmers’s original conditions 
are required. Thus, it seems Clark and Chalmers were on the right track with their criteria 
– they clearly capture some essential features of what differentiates EM from the more 
short-term fleeting extension of individual cognitive states or processes. 
I suggest the same applies to ECM – especially as a means to differentiate short-term
extension from functional incorporation. One successful use of a blind person’s cane or 
using a stick to reach for something on the highest shelf only extends an individual
experiential state. However, for an experiential system to be extended, a more profound 
and stable relation is needed. Therefore, availability, reliability and accessibility should 
also be counted in ECM’s demarcation criteria. Further, with the blind person’s cane, 
automatic endorsement comes along if the reliability and availability conditions are 
satisfied. When a person successfully uses a device, it becomes transparent in a way that 
we could say it is “automatically endorsed”. Thus, this requirement should also be 
counted in the glue and trusts of ECM. However, I don’t use these exact same terms for 
my criteria of ECM, because my emphasis is different, and Clark and Chalmers’s criteria 
fit into some wider concepts I use, such as transparency and ownership.
What about the demarcation suggestions set forth by others? I think most of the above-
mentioned criteria of EM (especially ownership, responsibility, trust, entrenchment and 
individualisation) apply more or less to ECM as well – the emphasis just varies slightly. 
It is clear that the parity argument is not a good criterion for ECM, but, as I have made 
clear, it is not a good criterion for EM either. Neither the requirements based on mutual 
manipulability nor continuous reciprocal causation are unproblematic – but again, the 
problems are not specific to ECM, but apply to EM as well. 
Consequently, are there no differences in the glue and trust criteria between EM and 
ECM? Even though all of the criteria for EM also count as criteria for ECM (at least with 
a slightly modified emphasis), the same doesn’t apply the other way around – hence the 
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criteria are not the same. Some of ECM’s criteria apply to perceptual experience only, 
namely those conditions that deal with sensorimotor control and bodily stance. Thus, 
ECM requires more than EM. 
4.3.3. Glue & Trust conditions for ECM
In this section, I will outline the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to have an 
instance of ECM. As we saw, Clark and Chalmers’s original criteria with the 
supplementing conditions presented by others serve as a starting point for criteria for 
ECM. However, apart from these conditions, the core of my glue & trust conditions for 
ECM is the fourth type of extension presented in the taxonomy above, namely functional 
incorporation. With that notion, I refer to quite a wide-ranging phenomenon, as already
stated earlier. The relevant features embedded in that notion are the following:
1) It needs to be part of the quasi-transparent bodily point of view
2) It needs to be under sensorimotor control of the subject
3) Ownership (entrenched, individualisation and fluency) (and hence 
responsibility?)
4) Sense of agency
5) Sense-making attitude (a purpose, goal-drivenness)
These are the glue & trust conditions for ECM. They are not isolated from each other but 
are linked in several ways. In order to gain (quasi-)transparency, the external part needs 
to be taken under one’s control – to make it one’s own by individualising and entrenching 
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it.126 A feeling of ownership emerges gradually with constant practice and use. This 
creates fluency, which increases transparency: the tool becomes transparent for a fluent 
tool user. Because ECM deals with perceptual experience, the component needs to be 
under the bodily, sensorimotor control of the subject. When it is taken under the user’s 
voluntary control, a sense of agency will be gained. All this requires a sense-making
attitude – a programmed robot just following rules would not count as having conscious 
experiences.
Further, my suggestions for conditions are not in contradiction with Clark and Chalmers’s 
criteria, but as said earlier, their original glue and trusts fit mine. I also consider that 
Sterelny’s (2010) way of talking about dimensions and levels of extensions is an 
advantageous way to proceed. In a similar vein as with the scale of extensions I presented 
at the beginning of this chapter, the glue and trust criteria for ECM should not be taken 
as categorical, but rather as a matter of degree. They provide a guideline of what should 
be taken into account – but still each case has to be examined separately, and the emphasis 
of the criteria might vary depending on the case. I do not think the lack of a clear-cut 
assemblage of all-embracing criteria should be seen as a problem for externalist theories, 
because a need for categorical criteria stems from the idea that there is a distinct mark of 
the cognitive or mark of the consciousness at play. However, as I have argued earlier, the 
request for the mark of the mental is a misguided way of proceeding in demarcating 
cognition and consciousness.
To summarise, according to ECM, the constitutive material components (i.e. the material 
basis) of some experiential states can include external elements on the condition that they 
are functionally incorporated into the system. Functional incorporation involves quasi-
transparency, sensorimotor control, ownership, a sense of agency and a sense-making 
attitude. In the following section, I will discuss an example where the criteria are fulfilled.
                                                
126 The ownership doesn’t have to be restricted to the subject but can be shared between other individuals. 
Collaborative processes, shared tools or environments that are ‘owned’ by a group of people, can also 
contain ownership in the right sense (see Sterelny 2010; Cash 2013).
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4.5. An example of functional incorporation: Sensory Substitution
Sensory substitution (SS for short) provides an illustrative and paradigmatic example of 
functional incorporation, that is, an example where all the glue & trust conditions of ECM 
are met. An increasing number of philosophers of perception, cognitive sciences and 
neurosciences have been interested in this phenomenon – which is not surprising because 
it offers intriguing empirical ways to investigate some of the key questions in these 
research fields (see e.g. a recent collection edited by Fiona Macpherson 2018). However, 
the relationship between sensory substitution and 4E-views has not been analysed 
thoroughly in the literature. There are some exceptions. In particular, Andy Clark has 
argued that SS provides empirical evidence for EM (e.g. Clark 2003; 2008; Kiverstein, 
Farina & Clark 2015) and Alva Noë that it gives empirical evidence for ECM (e.g. Hurley 
& Noë 2003; Noë 2004; 2009; see also Kiverstein & Farina 2012). In this section, I will 
outline the main features of sensory substitution, introduce some examples of SS-
technology, and argue that the previously set glue & trust conditions are fulfilled in a 
proper use of SS-devices (after sufficient training).
The term sensory substitution refers to cases where one sensory modality is replaced with 
another sensory modality (for example vision with touch), or within the same sensory 
modality (for example touch in the fingers with touch in the forehead). Sensory 
substitution systems are used to restore or compensate for lost senses (e.g. for blind or 
deaf subjects), or to enhance or create completely new senses (e.g. a feeling of magnetic 
North)127 by exploiting other senses. The latter is sometimes more specifically referred to 
as sensory augmentation. Users of SS-technology gradually learn for example to do 
localisation tasks, motor tasks such as batting a ball, and recognising the shapes of objects 
(Macpherson 2018; Bach-y-Rita 2002; Auvray & Myin 2009; Kiverstein, Farina & Clark 
2015).
Sensory substitution and augmentation are both forms of intervening sensory paths using 
an auxiliary system. It is possible because of brain plasticity: the devices exploit the cross-
                                                
127 The feelSpace project at the University of Osnabrück is conducting research on a sensory augmentation 
device: naviBelt, a vibrotactile magnetic compass belt that subjects wear around their waist. After training, 
the subjects learn to recognise magnetic North instead of just feeling a vibration at their waist. (See König 
et al. 2016; and for the project, https://www.feelspace.de/?lang=en).
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modal plasticity of the sensory cortex.128 Instead of a biological sense organ, an artificial 
receptor is delivering the environmental information to the brain via a human-machine 
interface. Importantly, the device needs to be under the motor control of the user, e.g. a 
hand-held camera that the agent can move. Especially the pioneering work of an 
American neuroscientist Paul Bach-y-Rita and his work in neuroplasticity and earliest 
forms of sensory substitution devices has opened up this field of research (and industry). 
(See e.g. Bach-y-Rita 1972; 2002; Bach-y-Rita & Kercel 2003; Auvray & Myin 2009; 
Macpherson 2011; Farina 2013.)
On a general note, sensory substitution is a reminder that the way we perceive the world 
is not the only possible way – it is only our take on it. The world appears very different 
to a hound dog, who mostly relies on olfactory sense, or to a bat, who uses echolocation 
to navigate in the dark. Besides helping to restore and compensate for lost senses, sensory 
substitution technology can also be used as way of accessing perceptual experiences that 
have previously been inaccessible for humans. Broadly understood, the phenomenon is 
not restricted to modern technology, but has been used long before the rise of recent 
technological developments. Braille language as used by blind people is sometimes 
labelled as the most successful sensory substitution system. In Braille, visual sensing 
(reading) is substituted by tactile sensing in the fingertips. In a similar vein, sign language 
used by deaf people is a way to replace auditory senses with visual senses. Yet another 
obvious example is a blind person using a cane, where visual information is replaced by 
tactile information. Bach-y-Rita & Kercel (2003, 541) even suggest that reading could be 
considered the first SS-system – because reading doesn’t occur naturally but is a way of 
substituting auditory modality (the spoken word) with visual modality. These examples 
reveal the very elementary function of sensory substitution. However, in what follows, I 
refer specifically to the technological devices that have been developed during the last 50 
years or so (starting from Bach-y-Rita’s pioneering work in the late 1960s), instead of the 
more general capability of replacing senses with other senses.
                                                
128 However, Kevin O’Regan (2018) has argued that the reason why sensory substitution is possible is 
actually not cortical plasticity as such, but rather the sensorimotor changes in the modes of environmental 
interaction that the user undergoes while using the device. I am sympathetic to his claim because, as he 
says, stressing the role of cortical plasticity may lead to an assumption that the cortical areas are the only 
material realisers of experience. However, I do not think that cortical plasticity and changes in sensorimotor 
interactions as explanations necessarily exclude each other, and thus this is not a problem when tying SS 
and ECM together.
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The most common SS-devices belong to two kinds of systems: visual-to-tactile systems, 
which convert visual pictures to tactile patterns, and visual-to-auditory systems, which 
convert visual pictures to patterns of sounds (Farina 2013, 640; Auvray, Hanneton & 
O’Regan 2007, 416). Perhaps the best-known example of the former is tactile visual 
sensory substitution system (TVSS) and its application Tongue Display Unit (TDU) (see 
Bach-y-Rita & Kercel 2003), and of the latter, The vOICe (see Meijer, 1992).
TVSS was first invented by Bach-y-Rita and colleagues in the 60s and 70s, and several 
versions have been developed since then, e.g. the Brain Port and the AuxDeco Forehead 
Sensory Recognition System, (FSRS) (see Nau et al. 2015). TVSS has been described as 
a way for the blind “to see by touch”. TVSS subjects have a receptor in their skin that 
takes input from a head-mounted or hand-held video camera (there are different versions 
of electrotactile and vibrotactile receptors, which can be located e.g. in the abdomen, the 
back, the fingertip – and the tongue has proved to be a particularly suitable place). In 
response to the camera input, the unit in the skin activates and gives tactile stimulation, 
which is first felt as it is – tactile, cutaneous stimulation – but after the subject has used 
the device for some time, the feeling starts to be transformed from tactile to something 
that resembles visual experience. Whether visual or not, subjects can act as if they had 
visual experiences. They report experiencing images in space, rather than on the skin. 
They can make judgement based on visual information, such as depth estimations, 
perspective and hand-eye coordination tasks. (Bach-y-Rita & Kercel 2003.)
The best-known visual-to-auditory SS-device is The vOICe, first developed by Meijer 
(1992).129 It is a way to translate visual inputs into audible patterns – from video to audio. 
Objects that are high in the visual field produce high-pitched sounds, and lower objects 
produce lower-pitched sounds. Lateral location is related to the balance of the stereo 
sound, and brightness with loudness, etc. The human-machine -interface is simpler in 
visual-to-auditory devices than in TVSS. The vOICe consists of three components: a 
video camera embedded in sunglasses, a smartphone running the algorithm, and stereo 
earbuds (Farina 2013, 640). Technology needed for The vOICe and other kinds of visual-
to-auditory devices is very common nowadays, which is an asset compared to visual-to-
tactile technology. As with TVSS, subjects who use The vOICe for a sufficient period of 
                                                
129 Another example of a visual-to-auditory device is the software program EyeMusic that translates visual 
stimuli into sounds (Nau et. al 2015).
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time, will be able to perform tasks that usually require visual modality, such as 
recognising objects.130 (See Clark 2008, 173; Auvray, Hanneton & O’Regan 2007.)
Apart from visual-to-tactile and visual-to-auditory, there is also for example tactile-to-
tactile and tactile-to-vestibular sensory substitution systems. An interesting application 
of tactile-to-tactile sensory substitution technology is the so-called leprosy glove (Bach-
y-Rita & Kercel 2003). Subjects who have lost peripheral sensation (e.g. due to leprosy), 
can start feeling again with their fingertips – or rather, with the fingertips of the gloves. 
The glove has artificial contact sensors coupled to a forehead-mounted tactile disc-array. 
After training, the subjects reported experiencing “the data generated in the glove as if 
they were originating in the fingertips, ignoring the sensations in the forehead” (Bach-y-
Rita & Kercel 2003, 541).
There are a number of other applications of SS-technology as well, but these examples 
suffice for understanding the relevant features for discussion about functional 
incorporation and ECM. But before analysing how these applications of sensory 
substitution fit into my glue and trusts, one clarification should be made. Many writers 
have addressed the question of what kind of experience the substituted experience is. The 
options are roughly: 1) It stays in the substituting modality (e.g. tactile in the case of 
TVSS). 2) After sufficient training, it switches to the new modality (e.g. visual in the case 
of TVSS). 3) It is neither of these, but a genuinely new kind of perception, or as Auvray 
and Myin (2009) phrase it, a “novel form of perceptual interaction with the environment”. 
(See Farina 2013 for an overview.) 
However, this question, even though otherwise highly intriguing, is not essential for my 
purposes. For it doesn’t matter to which modality the experience belongs, as long as there 
is a transformation in sensory experience with the device – and that much is evident. After 
all, it is good to notice that all (at least present-day) sensory substitution technology is 
incomplete – no one has ever really seen the whole rich scenery with all the finest details 
with tongue or with sounds (for an overview of the limitations, see Deroy & Auvray 
2012). However, this doesn’t undermine my argument: it suffices that the subjects using 
the devices are going through sensory experiences that enable them to perform tasks that 
they wouldn’t be able to perform otherwise.
                                                
130 The vOICe has been reported to function for both early-blind and blindfolded-sighted subjects (Auvray, 
Hanneton & O’Regan 2007).
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Let us now turn to the question how the use of sensory substitution devices counts as an 
instance of functional incorporation. The central feature in order for sensory substitution 
technology to work is “goal-driven motor engagement” (Clark 2007b, 269). The subject 
needs training in order to get gradually used to the device, to gain a sense of ownership
over it. In order to work, it is important that the “new agent-world circuits be trained and 
calibrated in the context of a whole agent engaged in world-directed (goal-driven) 
activity” (Clark 2007b, 270). For example in TVSS and The vOICe, one needs to be in 
motor control of the camera; uncontrolled, passively received visual information coming 
through the camera will not produce an effective result. The training period can be seen 
as an individualisation process: the user makes the device her own, it becomes rooted and 
entrenched in the system. Hence, the requirements of sensorimotor control and sense of
ownership are fulfilled. These features also ensure that a sense of agency is gained. The 
user of the SS-device is in charge – she actively brings about the changes in her perceptual 
sphere.
Furthermore, there is an interesting similarity between sensory substitution and the 
enactivist notion of sense-making. According to enactivism, there is no pregiven world, 
as agents create their environments (or their Umwelts, to use Uexküll’s term) with the 
perceptual machinery they have. The same environment appears different for a bat and 
for a bee, and for a blind and for a sighted person. Sensory substitution technology opens 
a door for experiencing other kinds of previously unfamiliar Umwelts – ways of making 
sense of the environment in new ways. For example, a blind person who gets access to 
what usually belongs to visual modality, or a person with normal human sensory 
modalities who gets access to a completely new modality – such as a feeling of magnetic 
North – gains access to an environment that is felt differently due to the coupling with the 
SS-device. The teleological aspects embedded in the notion of sense-making are also 
present in using SS-devices. Using SS-devices is always goal-driven: the successful use 
requires “goal-driven motor engagement”, as mentioned earlier. Thus, we can say that in 
the successful use of sensory substitution technology, there is a goal-driven, Umwelt-
creating sense-making attitude at work.
Finally, the (quasi-)transparent bodily point of view develops with the successful use of 
SS-technology. For example, with TVSS, the subject stops feeling the tingling sensation
on the skin, and starts sensing the external cause (such as a ball being thrown towards 
her). The subject doesn’t feel the device anymore, but the world outside her, i.e. the 
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coupled user-device system. In the same way as a blind person doesn’t feel the cane in 
her hand, but the world at the tip of her cane, a TVSS-user doesn’t feel the device but the 
world around her. The device fades from view – in other words, it becomes transparent. 
Thus, the (quasi-) transparency constraint is also fulfilled. This new coupled system, or 
the “new agent-world circuit”, emerges gradually when transformation from a mere tool 
to a (quasi)-transparent incorporated part of the perceptual machinery happens. The SS-
device becomes part of the constitutive base for the cognitive and experiential system, 
letting the user of the device have experiences that would not otherwise be possible.
Thus, all of the glue and trust requirements are satisfied in the successful use of sensory 
substitution devices: the device becomes part of the quasi-transparent bodily point of 
view; it is under the sensorimotor control of the subject; a sense of ownership develops; 
a sense of agency develops; and a sense-making attitude is involved. Thus, a sensory 
substitution device (when properly used, and after sufficient training) becomes 
functionally incorporated into a subject’s perceptual and experiential system. The result 
is a new integrated system, or a new systemic whole that consists of the subject and the 
device – and the constitutive basis of those new perceptual, sensory experiences is 
extended to include also the device.
Perhaps an opponent of ECM would admit some sort of extension in sensory capabilities, 
but still be doubtful whether there is in fact conscious experience involved in substituted
sensing.131 Bach-y-Rita (2002) explicitly asks whether there is qualia involved (his 
answer is that there most likely is, when the SS-system has been in use from early 
childhood).132 Needless to say, I think Bach-y-Rita’s question is misleading. Insofar as 
conscious experience is understood in the enactivist way, the question of whether there is 
some extra quality of experientiality or phenomenality involved (whether we call it qualia 
or something-it-is-like-ness or something else along these lines) simply doesn’t arise. 
Successful use of a SS-system clearly involves conscious experience, when conscious 
experience is understood as an active embodied sense-making interaction with one’s 
environment – and this is exactly what using SS-devices is all about. This much should 
                                                
131 For example, Wheeler (2015a; 2015b) has criticised the use of SS-devices as an argument for ECM. His 
aim is not to deny that SS counts as incorporation (or functional incorporation, in my terms), but he 
questions the inference from incorporation to the SS-device becoming part of the material realiser of the 
substituted experience. According to him, the jury is still out on the latter step.
132 Bach-y-Rita (2002, 510) remarks that SS-systems for blind babies indicate that when used from infancy, 
the device becomes a part of the child’s personality, and a phenomenal feel comparable to the phenomenal 
feel of the sighted can develop.
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also be evident for someone who denies ECM. Further, I think the sceptic should also 
acknowledge that SS is a case of functional incorporation as I have described it – whether 
or not she agrees that functional incorporation is a sign of ECM. However, if functional 
incorporation is accepted as a demarcation criterion for ECM, then we need to accept that 
sensory substitution is a case of ECM.
4.6. Conclusions
In this chapter, I differentiated between four degrees of extension. Even though also the 
first two of them (short-term and integrated extension) can involve experiential states, 
they are not stable enough to provide a relation that is needed for ECM. I argued that only 
the last one, functional incorporation, is suitable for ECM. For clarificatory purposes, I 
introduced a group (prosthetic incorporation) that doesn’t qualify as any kind of 
extension as extension is understood in EM and ECM.
I then set up the criteria needed for ECM, namely the glue and trust conditions. The 
external part needs to be: 1) part of the (quasi)-transparent bodily point of view, 2) under 
the sensorimotor control of the subject, 3) entrenched and individualised as the subject’s 
own; and there needs to be 4) a sense of agency involved, and 5) a goal-driven, sense-
making attitude.
Finally, I analysed an example that fulfils these conditions. I showed that the use of 
sensory substitution devices, such as TVSS or The vOICe, fits well with my description 
of functional incorporation and the features included in it, namely the glue & trust criteria 
for ECM.
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5. Possible Objections to ECM
5. 1. Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss four objections or counter-arguments that have been presented 
against ECM. They are 1) the argument from high-bandwidth, 2) predictive processing, 
3) the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, and 4) dreaming and hallucinations. The reason 
I have chosen exactly these counter-arguments is that I think they are either the most 
challenging (1 & 2), or the most common (3), or the most interesting (4). I will answer 
them, and conclude that none of them refutes ECM.
The first two counter-arguments (as they are used by Clark) are meant to block the 
inference from EM to ECM, that is, my first argument in the second chapter. The last two 
criticisms especially challenge my second argument for ECM (the inference from 
sensorimotor enactivism to ECM), but also my third argument (the inference from 
embodiment to ECM). However, I will argue that they are not successful in cutting off 
the inference relations of these arguments.
The last two objections touch upon the same concern: if we can have (or conceive, in the 
case of the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment) instances of phenomenal experience 
without access to the environmental interactions, how can we claim that the interaction 
has a constitutive role for (other, e.g. veridical, non-envatted fully embodied waking life) 
phenomenal experiences. The concern indeed is real, of which the existence of dreams is 
perhaps the clearest expression. Another real-life example is receiving electric impulses 
in one’s brain, and in this way creating phenomenal experiences. Moreover, there are a 
number of different brain injury -based pathologies, such as the locked-in syndrome, that 
are manifestations of the same phenomenon. The reason why I took the highly speculative 
brain-in-a-vat thought experiment alongside these empirical cases, is that it puts into 
words the centuries-old scepticism about the constitutive role of the outside world for our 
perception and mind.
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5.1.1. Clark’s criticisms of ECM
Because one person (Andy Clark) has come up with so many counter-arguments for 
ECM, I will start this chapter by briefly summing up his line of thought. The contradiction 
between Clark being on the one hand the first and most famous supporter of EM, and on 
the other hand the most ardent opponent of ECM, is a thrilling one. Of course, the 
discrepancy is not only thrilling, but also inconsistent, as I have already presented in the 
first argument of the second chapter (where I argued that if we accept EM, we need to 
accept ECM as well), and as I will show in this chapter as well.
As was briefly mentioned in the third chapter, Clark (2009) argues against ECM along 
the same lines as Adams and Aizawa did against Clark’s own EM: he claims that the 
relation between the external tool and conscious experience is causal, but not constitutive. 
Accordingly, Clark continues, ECM commits a causal–constitution (C–C) fallacy. 
However, Clark’s approach or underlying method is different from Adams and Aizawa’s. 
Whereas the latter’s argument was drawn from metaphysical considerations, Clark’s 
argument is supposed to be based on empirical grounds. Clark (2008, 138) himself admits 
that the metaphysical C–C debate is “unproductive”. We could call Clark’s version an 
empirical C–C -fallacy. Whereas Adams & Aizawa appealed to the metaphysical 
assumption about the lack of the “mark of the cognitive”, Clark appeals to empirical 
reasons, such as the superior processing power of the biological brain. Even though a fact 
like the processing power of the brain is undoubtedly a more empirically 
verifiable/falsifiable than Adams and Aizawa’s non-derived content, I claim that it 
nevertheless falls into the same kind of a priori claim about the “mark of the conscious”. 
It leans on a presupposed border between conscious experience and the rest. (I will return 
to this issue in the answers for the high-bandwidth argument.)
Of the four counter-arguments presented in this chapter, two are used by Clark, namely 
the arguments from high-bandwidth and predictive processing. The former states that
high-speed processing power is crucial in the construction of conscious experiences, and 
only neural processes are able to achieve it (Clark 2009). The latter states that the 
neuroscientific theory of predictive processing is able to explain all the positive features 
of ECM, while securing internalism (Clark 2012). Note, however, that Clark does not 
think that predictive processing is in conflict with externalism in general. On the contrary, 
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he declares that they have much in common, and that predictive processing is a “perfect 
neuro-computational partner for work on the embodied mind” (Clark 2016). He simply 
considers that conscious experience is out of the scope.
However, Clark explicitly admits that two of the counter-arguments that I will present do 
not refute ECM, namely the brain-in-a-vat argument and the argument from dreams and 
hallucinations. Clark (2009, 981) recapitulates neatly why the envatted brain argument is 
mistaken:
If the vat does not fill in everything the world 
provides, the experiment is unfair. If it does, it cannot 
prove anything, as the filled in contributions might 
[…] still be essential for that very experience. The 
brain-in-a-vat considerations are thus unable to 
advance the argument.
Furthermore, according to Clark (2009, 981), the existence of states such as dreams and 
hallucinations can only show that there are some experiences that are not realised by 
means of external interaction. This doesn’t yet tell anything about the rest of the 
experiences. He also acknowledges that the cases where the body and the world are in the 
loop outnumber the non-loop cases. 
These rejections are reasonable of course, since these counter-examples would threaten 
Clark’s own EM as well. The brain-in-a-vat thought experiment (had it any argumentative 
power) would upset EM directly for obvious reasons. It seems that Clark realises that if 
used against ECM, it would also rebut EM. The rejection of the dream counter-argument, 
however, is a slightly more perplexing case. Dream experiences are experiential states, 
and hence in the range of ECM and not EM – and for that reason one would think Clark 
would want to employ it. Nevertheless, in his 2009 paper, Clark is hesitant to use it against 
ECM because he acknowledges that ECM follows the same pattern as his own EM: for 
EM or ECM to be a legitimate theory, it is not required that all cognitive (in the case of 
EM) or all experiential (in the case of ECM) states be extended. This argumentation is 
the most straightforward reason to reject the counter-argument based on dreams and 
hallucinations. 
However, as we will see in section 5.5., the dream argument leads to some complexities, 
and requires a more thorough treatment with finer details. Moreover, even though Clark 
rejected it in 2009, he re-adopted it in his 2012 paper, where he states that dreams and 
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hallucinations are problematic for ECM. He has a solution: unlike ECM and enactivism, 
which are unable to explain these phenomena, a framework from cognitive science, i.e. 
predictive processing, is capable of offering a coherent explanation for them. In what 
follows, I will show why Clark should also drop his arguments based on high-bandwidth 
and predictive processing – if he wishes to uphold EM.
5.2. The argument from high-bandwidth
Clark (2009) bases his first counter-argument against ECM on a short passage about 
timing and bandwidth from a foreword to his own (2008) book written by Chalmers.133
Chalmers’s suggestion offers Clark a concrete explanation how ECM falls into the above-
mentioned empirical causal–constitution fallacy. Clark draws a picture according to 
which ECM fails because the material basis of consciousness requires access to 
information on a very high bandwidth, and our relation to the environment is on too low 
a bandwidth. Clark develops Chalmers’s idea, and thus appeals to the biological brain as 
“the only adequate vehicle” for consciousness.
                                                
133 Chalmers (2008) only throws this idea in the air, he does not develop it further. However, in his more 
recent (also short) treatment considering EM and ECM (Chalmers 2017), he admits that the high-bandwidth 
argument might have been wrong, because some perceptual processes, such as vision, are extremely high 
in bandwidth. He alters the argument slightly: “I think the right explanation is not that consciousness 
requires high-bandwidth access to information, but that it requires relatively direct access” (Chalmers 2017,
italics original). This way of reasoning is not very far from the original high-bandwidth claim, and 
especially because Chalmers doesn’t specify what he means by “direct” (and if it is needed, why is it not 
needed in the case of occurrent cognitive states?). It is difficult to see how “direct” is actually different 
from temporally high (i.e. quick) bandwidth. However, this new counter-argument is in a sense more 
metaphysical, since Chalmers’s argumentation relies on considerations very similar to arguments based on 
the differentiation between derived vs. non-derived content (see Adams & Aizawa 2001). Moreover, 
Chalmers suddenly appeals to action–perception loops or sensorimotor interaction as a requirement for 
truly extended cognition – a requirement that has been promoted by sensorimotor enactivists and supporters 
of ECM all the time, and which in no way would refute ECM, but quite the contrary would promote it.
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Thus, speed matters. Clark suggests that there are time-scales that are only reachable for 
neural processes. According to him, consciousness “requires cortical operations that 
involve extremely precise temporal resolutions” (Clark 2009, 985). He combines this with 
Eliasmith’s (2008) suggestion that neural and extra-neural dynamics are different in speed 
of information flow (bandwidth), and that the extra-neural body functions as a “low-pass 
filter”. A low-pass filter is a physical barrier that allows low frequency signals through, 
and blocks high frequency signals. For example, the walls of a room function as a low-
pass filter for a sound: the lower frequencies (such as the base) are heard better than the 
higher frequencies outside the room (Clark 2009, 985). 
[T]he extra-neural body, implicated in all cases of 
active vision and motor loops, acts as a kind of low 
pass filter for signals coming from the environment. 
What this means in practice is that for phenomena that 
depend on, for example, the very fast temporal 
binding or processing of signals, the only locus in 
which such operations can (as a matter of fact) occur 
lies within the brain/CNS. (Clark 2009, 985.)
Hence, conscious experiences cannot be extended, because everything that involves 
bodily, sensorimotor actions (e.g. eye saccades) will be “screened off” by the bodily low-
pass filter. Clark ends up noting that the bodily, environmental aspects do have a role in 
constructing conscious experiences, but the role is merely causal.
5.2.1. Answers to the high-bandwidth argument
This counter-argument is problematic in many ways. First, it presumes a priori
predominance of the neural that is very much in conflict with Clark’s larger views about 
the human mind. It draws a principled barrier between the brain and the rest of the body 
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(and the world). As I wrote earlier, Clark’s reasoning resembles Adams and Aizawa’s 
original critique towards his own EM. High-bandwidth is used as the mark of the
conscious in a similar manner as non-derived content was used as the mark of the 
cognitive. Even though the argument is based on two empirical claims (information flow 
on a high-bandwidth and body as a low-pass filter), the way they are used builds up a
principled gap between the neural and non-neural, and consciousness and the rest, 
respectively. Moreover, it also seems the latter of these claims is false on empirical 
grounds, as we will soon see.
Second, the argument is based on dubious assumptions about the body as a low-pass filter 
that do not have empirical support. Empirical research doesn’t back up the claim that our 
bodies function as low-pass filters.134 Vold (2015) has criticised Clark’s high-bandwidth 
argument based on research on visual perception. Visual modality is a non-neural system, 
and as such should be low in bandwidth if the high-bandwidth argument were true. 
However, visual perception is actually higher in speed than the neural processes dealing 
with vision.
Information about the surfaces of objects is 
transferred when light hits the eye, which is 
subsequently transmitted to the brain. But the brain, 
which cannot transfer or receive information at the 
speed of light, slows this information processing 
down. So non-neural processes must be constantly 
reporting information back to the brain, through the 
low-pass filter Clark describes, at least as quickly as 
neural processes can operate. (Vold 2015, 21.)
Therefore, it seems that the claim that the body is a low-pass filter is simply mistaken. 
This alone suffices to refute the high-bandwidth counter-argument because even if the 
high-speed processing were still necessary, there is no reason why it should be delimited 
in neural processing any more. All in all, as an empirical claim, the high-bandwidth 
argument is very ambiguous since Clark does not specify which neural activity he refers 
to.
                                                
134 See e.g. Holcombe 2009; Elliott & Giersch 2016; Sweet 1953. One problem in differentiating high and 
low bandwidth is that it is dependent on the feature we want to describe, and cannot be defined 
independently.
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Third, the fact that conscious experiences require fast neural processing, even if true, only 
shows that neural processing is necessary (as a matter of contingent, empirical fact about 
humans, as Clark also reminds us) for consciousness. No one would deny this, and it is 
fully compatible with ECM. Neural processing is a necessary criterion for conscious 
experiencing, and it is undoubtedly high in bandwidth. However, the high-bandwidth 
argument gives no reasons why the neural sphere would be a sufficient condition for 
realising conscious experiences. The fact that the brain is necessary does not entail that 
the brain is sufficient for constructing experiences.
Fourth, even if it were true, it would also debunk occurrent EM (which is certainly an 
unwanted result for Clark). According to Vold, there is no evidence that high-bandwidth 
would not be necessary for cognition. For example, motor skills in expert behaviour, such 
as the skills used in driving a car, require processes that “are unconscious but still work 
fast enough to control our real-time behaviours” Vold (2015, 25). Bodily factors certainly 
matter in occurrent cognitive states just as they matter in experiential states – if the body 
really acted as a low-pass filter, these cognitive processes would turn out to be internal in 
the same way as experiential processes. At least, for the reason that Clark is raising such 
a strong distinction between neural and non-neural processing, he should provide 
convincing reasons why cognition is different from consciousness – otherwise he is 
creating an objection against himself. Of course, this is not a knockdown to the high-
bandwidth argument as such, but is surely a reason why Clark should not want to use it. 
However, as I showed above, there are plenty of reasons why the argument based on high-
bandwidth is not a convincing way to debunk ECM in the first place.
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5.3. Predictive processing
Clark’s second attempt at criticising ECM was published in his 2012 paper, where he 
answered Ward’s (2012) answer to his 2009 paper, and came up with a new line of 
criticism towards ECM. This time, he appeals to predictive processing as a positive story 
how phenomenal consciousness is realised in the brain (alone). Clark claims that 
predictive processing is not only able to explain veridical, wakeful experiences, but also 
explanatorily problematic experiences in dreams, hallucinations and imagination. Clark 
himself, among other things, is famous for developing the theory of predictive processing: 
the branch he promotes is referred to as action-oriented predictive processing or radical 
predictive processing, and in general it is compatible with (at least some of) the 4E and 
situated views (see e.g. Clark 2012; 2013; 2015; 2016).135
Predictive processing is a theory used in cognitive sciences, computational psychiatry, 
and other related sciences of the mind, concerning the generative power of the brain (see 
e.g. Friston 2003; 2010; Wiese & Metzinger 2017). Brains, to put it bluntly, are prediction 
machines whose task is to correct and minimise errors. The brain is generating and 
constantly updating a model of the environment based on the sensory information it 
receives. Prediction-driven processing is meant to reduce prediction errors, namely the 
difference between actual and predicted sensory signals. The world does not “come 
inside” the brain, so the brain predicts how the world is likely to be (Clark 2012, 759).
To successfully represent the world in perception, if 
these models are correct, depends crucially upon 
cancelling out sensory prediction error. Perception 
thus involves “explaining away” the driving 
(incoming) sensory signal by matching it with a 
cascade of predictions pitched at a variety of spatial 
and temporal scales. These predictions reflect what 
the system already knows about the world (including 
the body) and the uncertainties associated with its 
own processing. […] What we perceive depends 
heavily upon the set of priors (including any relevant 
hyper-priors) that the brain brings to bear in its best 
                                                
135 The branch that Clark supports is contrasted with a moderate or conservative account of predictive 
processing that is committed to the view that generative power comes from full-blown (internal) 
representations (for overviews, see Clark 2015; Dolega 2017). However, as my interest here is not in the 
theories of predictive processing as such, but rather in the counter-arguments against ECM, I will focus on 
the branch promoted by Clark, i.e. action-oriented predictive processing.
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attempt to predict the current sensory signal. (Clark 
2013, 187).
Clark’s account is compatible with the externalist views. He himself states: “Embodiment 
and action fit very naturally within such a framework” (Clark 2012, 760). Embodied 
agents can actively control their sensory input stream, and that enables better and faster 
predictions. For example, turning one’s head or walking towards an object are ways of 
controlling the sensory input, and hence the prediction process. Clark calls this “self-
structuring of information flows” (a term borrowed from Pfeifer et al. 2007). The self-
produced action creates a “known transform”: I can move my head such-and-such ways 
to transform the incoming sensory data (Clark 2012, 760). 
As we can see, Clark aims to come up with a view that would explain the positive results 
of sensorimotor enactivism and ECM (the features of sensorimotor enactivism that were 
presented in the second chapter, such as virtual presence/presence in absence and variable 
neural correlates) – while preserving an internalist account of conscious experiences. 
However, the most important asset for Clark (2012) is that he claims that the predictive 
processing framework can explain how perception-like states, such as dreams and 
hallucinations, resemble “normal” veridical perceiving phenomenologically, yet they 
don’t have a direct link to the outside world. Clark claims that his account can explain the 
similarities and differences – in a way that supports the internalist explanation of the 
realisers of conscious experiences. Clark’s idea is that in “normal” veridical perception, 
the generative models of predictive processing enable us to engage (at least to some extent 
directly) with the outside world. These same generative models are at play in the absence 
of the sensory information from the outside world, that is, in dreams and hallucinations. 
Accordingly, according to Clark, perception and perception-like states have the same 
(internal) neural basis.
Hence, (this time) Clark rejects ECM because of the “super-tight link” between the 
mechanisms of perception and the mechanisms of phenomenally close states, such as 
dreams, hallucinations and imaginings, and we should “consider these latter cases as co-
arising within the general setting of mechanisms for veridical perception and effective 
action” (Clark 2012, 767). According to Clark, the predictive processing framework 
shows how we can have a genuine “not-indirect” access to the outside world – yet seal 
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the mechanisms for perceptual experience in the head, because the mechanism is the same 
as in (internal) dreams.
5.3.1. Answering the counter-argument from predictive processing
My aim is not to criticise the action-oriented predictive processing framework itself. I 
think it provides a convincing story about how the brain anticipates its states, and how 
this enables perception to reach a world that appears coherent. However, I disagree with 
Clark in that it would refute ECM. I claim that the predictive processing framework is 
fully compatible with external material realisers of perceptual experience.
Pepper (2014, 101) takes a step further, and states that the predictive processing 
framework is “conducive to ECM and the enactive approach generally, as it puts the 
anticipatory structure of perception on a firm neurocomputational footing hitherto absent 
from the discussion”. Kiverstein & Kirchhoff (2019) are on the same track and not only 
argue that the predictive processing framework does not refute ECM, but also argue that 
it provides further support for ECM. Hence, this is the altogether opposite of Clark –
instead of using the theory to criticise ECM, they use it to reinforce it – but their reasons 
are based on the same empirical evidence. My aim here is more moderate: I do not aim 
to argue for predictive processing as such, nor argue that it leads to ECM, but merely to 
show that it is not incompatible with ECM, and therefore we can disregard the counter-
argument based on it.
First, it is important to notice that Clark doesn’t commit himself to an indirect view of 
perception – which would at least seem to be a quite straightforward way to deny ECM 
and set up internalism. If the world out there was just a model in our brains, the denial of 
the environmental interaction would be much easier to establish. However, Clark’s 
intention is that we don’t perceive the generative models in our brains, but we perceive 
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the world. “Equipped with brains like ours we become porous to the world. Its structure 
and statistical regularities flow through us in as real a way as do food and water through 
the digestive tract” (2012, 767).
The directness of perception is related to the reason why Clark cannot consistently 
maintain his view. Pepper (2014) emphasises that if perception really is direct, then the 
phenomenological differences between veridical perception and dreams and other non-
veridical processing are explained by the external elements in the world. He refers to 
O’Regan’s notion of the world as an external working memory: “the stability of the 
waking perception is explained not in terms of sameness of representational content, but 
in terms of the stability and continual availability of information in the world itself” 
(Pepper 2014, 105). The external parts that are available in veridical perception, but 
absent in dreams, make a difference. I will discuss the dream question in more detail in 
section 5.5.
The main reason why the predictive processing framework doesn’t work as an objection 
to ECM is embedded in Clark’s own philosophy. If we accept the action-oriented side of 
the theory that Clark himself promotes, ECM fits very well into the picture. As mentioned 
earlier, Clark (2012, 760) talks about “the self-structuring of information flows”, namely 
bodily actions that are taken in order to obtain better and faster predictions. Accordingly, 
Pepper (2014, 102) draws the following conclusion:
It is an unnoticed consequence of Clark’s position 
that the EM theorist who endorses the [action-
oriented predictive processing] framework cannot 
deny extended perceptual cognition on pain of 
inconsistency. This is because the centrality of 
informational self-structuring to [action-oriented 
predictive processing], when considered in light of 
some key commitments of EM expressed by Clark 
elsewhere, unwittingly commits the EM theorist to an 
extended physical basis of perceptual cognition.
Throughout his other writings, Clark (see especially 2008) has emphasised that 
informational self-structuring is one of the exemplar cases of (occurrent) EM. How we 
position our bodies, turn our heads, make use of eye saccades, perform gestures and so 
on, should be seen as part of the cognitive processing itself – and not something that just 
affects, enables or shapes it. There is a great deal of empirical evidence for this, for 
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example Goldin-Meadow’s (2001; 2003) studies on the role of gestures as part of the 
thinking process (for details, see sections 2.4.1. and 3.3.1.1.). Clark is famous for arguing 
for this kind of off-loading of the cognitive burden into the environment. 
Pepper (2014, 102) points out that according to Clark’s own characterization of 
informational self-structuring (as sketched above), bodily actions have a constitutive role 
for the mechanisms of perception. Therefore, if one wants to hold on to EM (as Clark 
defines it) and also embrace the action-oriented predictive processing framework (as 
Clark defines it), one cannot just rule out the external elements – because otherwise EM 
would be cut out too. Therefore, Clark’s criticism, as he presents it in his 2012 paper, 
does not work. 
However, one might try a less direct form of criticism. As we saw, the direct rejecting of 
the role of the external elements in perception did not work out. But perhaps Clark would 
declare that he is only talking about the cognitive aspects of the mechanisms of 
perception, but not the experiential aspects. For this claim, he would need an additional 
argument, because the theory of the active-oriented predictive processing did not provide 
one. The high-bandwidth argument (i.e. consciousness requires faster processing power 
than cognition) would be an option, but as I showed earlier, it does not work. As I have 
argued elsewhere in this thesis (see especially chapter 2, argument 1), the cognitive and 
conscious aspects cannot be separated as Clark has claimed. Clark’s (2012) other 
alternative is the existence of dreams and hallucinations, and the “super-tight link” 
between them and veridical perceptions. I will discuss in more detail in section 5.5 why 
this route doesn’t provide the result that Clark wants.
To recap, the (active-oriented) predictive processing framework does not provide 
independent reasons to reject ECM. It needs further reasons for the now very familiar 
problem: how is one to uphold EM while denying ECM? As has now become clear, the 
task is very difficult, if not impossible, and in the best case the surviving EM would be a 
reduced version that would cover only dispositional states and leave out the main aspects
that characterise Clark’s theory of EM.
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5.4. The brain-in-a-vat thought experiment
What if we removed some poor chap’s brain from his head, placed it in a vat with 
nutrients, and simulated the inputs usually coming from the rest of the body and 
environment by wires to a supercomputer? Would this envatted brain have the same 
experiences (or at least some experiences) as a person with a normal brain situation? If 
that would be the case, it would prove quite efficiently that the brain is a necessary and 
sufficient material realiser for experiences.
The brain-in-a-vat is an archetypal example of a thought experiment in (analytical) 
philosophy. Its origin can be traced back as far as Cartesian scepticism, and it has certainly 
provided food for thought for generations of philosophers.136 However, a thought 
experiment as a method is problematic when applied to empirically oriented philosophy 
of mind. The reason for this is that whether a brain-in-a-vat scenario is conceivable, i.e. 
metaphysically or conceptually possible in principle, doesn’t yet have any impact on EM 
or ECM, or questions generally related to cognitive and neurosciences. Hurley (2010, 
109) calls these kinds of arguments supervenience thought experiments, which “assume 
that internal and external factors do not vary together in relevant possible worlds – that 
internal factors can be unplugged from one array of external factors and plugged into 
another”. However, if the internal factors turn out to be unpluggable, then the 
supervenience thought experiment is not possible in the first place (see Thompson & 
Cosmelli 2011, 173).
However, Thompson and Cosmelli (2011) (and see also Cosmelli & Thompson 2010) 
have approached the matter from an interesting point of view. It is interesting for two 
reasons. First, it very effectively nips in the bud the brain-in-a-vat counter-argument, and 
second, this refutation (i.e. the practical impossibility of envatting the brain) demonstrates 
that the body and environmental stimulation are necessary for the mind and 
consciousness. Therefore, they end up using the thought experiment for exactly the 
opposite purpose, namely for supporting the embodied, extended mind.
                                                
136 For some early versions of the argument, see Dennett (1978); Putnam (1981); Smith (1984). Locked-in
syndrome could be considered a “real-life case” of the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. There are some 
enactivist answers about how to deal with the challenge the locked-in syndrome poses to 4E-views (see e.g. 
Kyselo & Di Paolo 2013).
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Thompson and Cosmelli make it clear that in order to have any argumentative power, the 
question must be addressed from a technical, bioengineering perspective. They follow 
Dennett’s (1991) idea presented in a prelude to his book Consciousness Explained, where 
he asks what it would take to envat a brain so that it would function like a normal, 
embodied brain. Dennett’s treatment shows that sometimes “impossibility in fact is
theoretically more interesting than a possibility in principle” (Dennett 1991, 4; quoted in 
Thompson & Cosmelli 2011, 168). First, the brain needs to be kept alive and protected 
by something that replaces the skull.
[T]his system must involve at least the capacity to 
keep up with the energetic, ionic, osmotic, and 
recycling needs of the brain. It will therefore include 
some kind of circulatory system, plus the necessary 
pumps, oxygenating devices, and additional 
subsystems for ensuring the maintenance of 
physiological levels in the circulating fluid. […] 
[W]hat the brain requires at any given instant depends 
on its own ongoing, moment-to-moment activity. 
Therefore, the life-sustaining system must not only be 
supportive of this activity, but also locally and 
systemically receptive and responsive to it at any 
given instant, independent of any external evaluation 
of the brain’s needs. Consequently, to keep the brain 
alive and functioning, this responsive system will 
most likely need to be energetically open, and self-
maintaining in a highly selective manner. (Cosmelli 
& Thompson 2010, 368–369.)
Thus, this system needs to be robust and self-regulating – as organisms are. As Thompson 
and Cosmelli (2011, 170) note, this system begins to resemble more a body than a vat. 
And this is not enough. The thought-experimenter must also fix the following issues: 
brain’s self-generated activity must be tightly coupled with the “body”, and the 
stimulation that the nervous system usually receives from the body and environment must 
somehow be replaced. These are highly problematic requirements. First, it is not enough 
to try to mimic the normal inputs, since identical inputs don’t lead to identical states.
It’s not the case that an embodied brain and its 
envatted duplicate will remain qualitatively identical 
simply because they receive identical inputs 
throughout their lives. The brain isn’t a reflex 
machine whose activity is externally controllable 
through input instructions. Rather, it’s a highly 
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nonlinear and self-organizing dynamical system 
whose activity exhibits an extreme sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions. Inputs perturb such 
complex systems, but don’t specify particular 
outcomes. Furthermore, most inputs arise as a 
consequence of the system’s own intrinsic activity. 
Hence to get the body-type inputs to match the normal 
inputs precisely would require getting them to match 
the bodily inputs to the brain that arise from the 
brain’s nonlinear and unpredictable intrinsic activity. 
(Thompson & Cosmelli 2011, 171.)
The thought-experimenting engineer should find out how to produce phenomenal 
experiences that would match those of the normal experiencers. As we learnt from the 
previous passage, this is not a simple task. Rather, it is very probably an impossible task. 
Some kind of stimulating device would be needed that would be “in perfect synchrony 
with the brain’s exploratory motor efference signals as its sensory systems scan through 
the virtual image, and updating its activity so as to match precisely the sensory 
reafference” (Thompson & Cosmelli 2011, 172). Further, the stimulating device should 
not disturb the life-sustaining system: every stimulation creates a disturbance in the 
homeostasis that needs to be compensated by the system. (Thompson & Cosmelli 2011, 
172; Dennett 1991, 5.)
Studies in computational neuroscience137 indicate that adaptive behaviour rises from the 
dynamical coupling and feedback between the nervous system and the peripheral 
sensorimotor systems – it is not a one-directional process programmed by the brain. 
Hence, the “vat” should have the required flexibility and capability to ensure this 
dynamical coupling relation. As Thompson and Cosmelli (2011, 172) point out, “the best 
and probably only way to establish this coupling is to give our brain real sensorimotor 
systems it can control”. Hence, the brain in its vat looks very much like an embodied 
agent in the world.
Therefore, envatting the brain actually requires embodying the brain. It doesn’t have to 
be identical with our body, but it needs to fulfil certain functional requirements,138 that is, 
                                                
137 Thompson & Cosmelli refer for example to a study made by Chiel and Beer (1997), where it is shown 
that feedback loops between the nervous system, body and world are essential for behaviour. See also e.g. 
Ferri et al. (2012) and Chiel et al. (2009). 
138 This leaves the door open for the possibility of an artificial mind (e.g. a robot). Thompson & Cosmelli, 
however, do not address the questions of developmental robotics and artificial intelligence.
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it has to be a surrogate body. This makes the thought experiment impossible, because –
if we recall Hurley’s notion of supervenience thought experiment – the factors (brain vs. 
body) were meant to be separable for the purposes of the thought experiment. 
Nevertheless, they are not. The brain is not a brain (as we know it) without its body and 
environment. The brain is explanatorily and physically unpluggable from the body.
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Clark (2009, 981) explicitly rejects the 
brain-in-a-vat argument: if the vat doesn’t imitate everything the real world provides, the 
thought experiment is not fair, and if it does, it is unable to prove anything, since it is 
impossible to separate what is the role of the substituting external interactions. Clark’s 
reasoning is close to what I have been arguing so far, and what I think is the main reason 
why the brain-in-a-vat is not a good argument: if the “vat” doesn’t mimic everything, the 
experiment isn’t fair – and if it does, the result is a surrogate body situated in a surrogate 
environment.
Moreover, the idea of a disembodied brain creating experiences by itself is in general very 
far from the enactivist and 4E framework. Dave Ward illustrates this with two 
comparisons. A man performing movements identical to tangoing on his own doesn’t 
qualify as dancing a tango, since the relation with a partner and music are necessary for 
something to count as dancing a tango. Similarly, “driving” an overturned car is just 
spinning its wheels and not driving, since the act of driving requires a relationship 
between the car and the road (or other surface). The same goes for brain activity and 
experiencing. “A disembodied brain going through a sequence of physical states in limbo 
is not experiencing, for it is in no meaningful relationship with its environment” (Ward 
2012, 746–747). Disembodied legs are not walking, and a disembodied brain is not 
experiencing because the necessary parts of the picture are missing.
Finally, even if the brain-in-a-vat scenario were possible, it would only speak for that 
specific brain in that specific vat, and it might still be that with real embodied people, the 
experiences were constructed in the interactions with their bodies and environment. To 
recap, this counter-argument is unsuccessful all the way down the line, and is of no threat 
to the externalist views. Somewhat surprisingly, despite all this, I think the brain-in-a-vat 
argument still manages to reveal something. Its impossibility illustrates that “the brain 
and body are so deeply entangled, structurally and dynamically, that they are 
explanatorily inseparable” (Thompson & Cosmelli 2011, 168). In order to maintain a 
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mind, the brain simply cannot be unplugged from the body. Body states, brain states and 
environmental interactions are inseparable, and belong to the constitutive basis of 
experiences.
5.5. Dreams and hallucinations
The counter-argument based on the existence of dreams and hallucinations is perhaps the 
most straightforward (and most natural, in a sense) that has been presented against ECM. 
The central idea is similar to the brain-in-a-vat argument, but with one striking difference. 
Whereas the brain-in-a-vat scenario leaned on a thought experiment, this argument is 
based on a common everyday phenomenon, of which there is an abundance of empirical 
research available. I think that of all the counter-arguments presented in this chapter (also 
including the causal–constitution fallacy presented in chapter three) the dream argument 
is the most convincing – even though I do think the ECM supporter can answer it. 
However, it is striking how little literature there is about this topic, namely the 
relationship between 4E-theories and dreams. Antti Revonsuo (2015) has contributed a 
direct objection to ECM and sensorimotor enactivism based on the “dream argument”. 
Enactivists have not given a proper reply. This section aims to fill that gap – or at least 
raise the central issues we need to take into consideration in order to respond to the 
challenge.
The dream argument is the following. If conscious experiences are (partly) realised by 
external elements as ECM claims, how are states such as dreams and hallucinations 
possible, as it seems that they are realised exclusively in the head? If dreams and 
hallucinations do not need any interaction with the environment, possibly other 
experiences do not either. And if the interaction with the environment is not a necessary 
feature for these certain experiences, how can it be part of the constitutive basis for 
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experiences in general?139 We need to accept the situation described in the following 
passage that appears to be challenging the very core principle of the externalist view of 
consciousness. “The dreamer is highly conscious (she has vivid experiences), is 
disconnected from the environment (she is asleep), but somehow her brain is creating a 
story, filling it with actors and scenarios, and generating hallucinatory images” (Nir & 
Tononi 2010). This is the challenge that dreams and dream-like states posit for ECM and 
externalist views in general.140
There is one crucial methodological matter we need to take into account. Philosophers 
who are addressing the dream question very often tend to ignore all the empirical research 
there is about dreaming. Matthew Ratcliffe (2017) has made a sharp observation. He 
points out that philosophers are using their very own conception of hallucinations (he 
calls it philosophers’ hallucinations) that has been in a dominant position through the 
history of philosophical thought experiments, as Descartes’ evil demon and various more 
recent counterparts show. This kind of concept of hallucination, however, has barely any
connection to another concept of hallucination, that is, real hallucinations, that are 
studied in psychiatry. This is a very important remark: we need to be aware in which 
sense the concept is used, because the meaning is very different. Ratcliffe’s sharpness 
notwithstanding, he has a similar kind of blindspot himself when it comes to dreams.
There is a similar discrepancy between philosophers’ dreams that are used in thought 
experiments and real dreams that empirical dream research is investigating. Philosophers 
often use a notion of dreams that has no connection to empirical research.
Revonsuo (2015) has strongly criticised the way the results of empirical studies are often 
absent from philosophers’ theories. I agree with him that when philosophers of mind and 
cognitive science define dreams, it is crucial that they take into account the empirical 
results from neurosciences and dream research. However, I disagree with him that these 
                                                
139 I will focus on dreams, since there is more literature about them, and because dreaming is a very familiar 
phenomenon, of which (almost) all of us have first-hand experience. Hallucinations, on the other hand, are 
considered to be something that is not so common (this might be a false belief, but still, it is fair to say that 
dreaming is a more mundane and commonplace phenomenon than hallucinating). However, the existence 
of hallucinations (whether due to schizophrenia, brain injury, psychedelic drugs, alcohol, sleep deprivation,
etc.) would be an equally good example. I sometimes use the term dream-like states, by which I refer to 
dreams, hallucinations, illusions, imaginings and other non-veridical experiencing.
140 At least externalist views that argue for the extension of experiential states. ECM is not the only one of 
this kind, for also e.g. sensorimotor enactivism (and perhaps enactivism in general) and the hypothesis of 
extended affectivity (see e.g. Colombetti 2014) are in the target. However, I think dispositional EM is in 
the clear when it comes to the dream challenge (though some might oppose this based on the fact that we 
do have beliefs in dreams).
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empirical results would necessarily entail an internalist account of the mind or of 
phenomenal experience.
Another problem is that the writers who have addressed the dream challenge regarding 
ECM have a strong dissonance even about the very starting point, namely what the 
relation between dream experiences and veridical experiences is. The opinions vary from 
one end of the spectrum to the other. According to Revonsuo (2015), dreams are 
phenomenologically similar or even identical with veridical experiences – they simulate 
waking life. According to Pepper (2013), dreams are somewhat different 
phenomenologically – they are an impoverished version of veridical experiences and 
waking life. According to Noë (2009), dreams are completely different – they belong to 
a different kind than veridical experiences. This reveals that the question is complicated 
because this is only the starting point that does not even address externalism or 
internalism yet.
It is good to remember that of these three writers, only Revonsuo is a dream researcher. 
Considering this, it is surprising how strongly he appeals to the similarity or identity 
between veridical and dream experiences, when after all, besides the similarities, there is 
also plenty of empirical evidence of dream bizarreness, such as discontinuities, holding 
contradictory beliefs, sudden transformations and impossible scenes or activities, like 
pink elephants or flying (Nir & Tononi 2010; Hobson, Stickgold & Pace-Schott 1998). 
Moreover, as I will argue in section 5.5.2.4., Revonsuo’s interpretation or understanding 
of phenomenal experience is different from the notion that sensorimotor enactivism and 
ECM deals with.
Even though this dissonance has complicated the discussion, I claim that the nature of 
dream experiences and their level of similarity with veridical experiences is not actually 
of the essence concerning the question we want to address here. For the dream argument 
to work, it is enough that some dreams are similar enough. Kristjan Loorits (2017, 123) 
calls this “sufficient similarity”: a dream is sufficiently similar to veridical experience 
when the dream experience contains the phenomenological features that are explanatorily 
relevant for veridical experiences. And there is a consensus amongst the dream 
researchers that there are dreams that belong to this group (see e.g. Revonsuo & 
Salmivalli 1995; Domhoff 2007). 
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Further, even though for the sake of the (opponent’s) argument I will treat dream 
experiences as fully internally constituted processes, this in fact is not necessarily true. 
The material realisation of dream experiences is perhaps not restricted to neural processes 
only, for it might also depend on bodily functions. As Metzinger (2013) states, the 
functional disembodiment hypothesis, according to which dream states are disconnected 
from the sleeping body (see Windt 2014), has been refuted by empirical studies. Instead, 
there is evidence that some minimal forms of embodiment are preserved during REM-
sleep dreams. Inputs from the real sleeping body can enter dreams, and vice versa, dream 
movements may be enacted by the sleeping body. According to Metzinger, the most 
evident case is the “reliable directional correspondence between dream-eye movements 
and real-eye movements”. Moreover, studies in lucid dreaming indicate that dream 
movements are in accordance with muscle twitches in the same limbs as in the dream, 
and also correspond with heart and respiration rates. External, real-body stimuli, such as 
spraying water on the skin, electric stimulation, etc., has also been shown to be mirrored 
in our dream bodies. (Metzinger 2013.)
These results show quite unquestionably that dreams are not completely disembodied. 
However, the embodiment question would require a more thorough investigation, which 
I am not going to pursue here. I settle for the modest claim that it is not necessary that 
dream experiences are entirely disembodied. Moreover, even though the evidence speaks 
for some amount of embodiment, it doesn’t indicate extension outside the body. The 
potential minimal embodied nature notwithstanding, I will treat dream experiences as 
purely brain-bound events. A proponent of ECM can answer the dream challenge either 
way.
In what follows, my aim is to show that empirical dream research doesn’t contain 
anything that would necessarily lead to an internalist account of the mind. First, I will 
introduce the most straightforward dream argument against ECM that has been presented 
in the literature, and discuss some of its merits and deficiencies. I will then discuss four 
different options how a proponent of ECM can defend herself from the dream challenge 
in general.
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5.5.1. Revonsuo’s dream argument
Revonsuo (2006; 2015) has set up the most elaborate version of the dream argument 
against ECM and sensorimotor enactivism.141 According to him, if the following two 
statements are true, internalism of consciousness follows, and he claims that “all the 
available evidence from empirical dream research” supports them. First, experiences are 
phenomenally highly similar and in most cases identical to the veridical waking life 
experiences – they have equally rich and complex experiential contents, and this is 
manifested especially during REM sleep. Second, if the first clause is true, and dream 
experiences are as rich and complex as the waking experiences, it follows that the only 
minimal necessary constitutive conditions for experiential states are the ones that are 
active in the brain during dreaming in REM sleep.142 (Revonsuo 2015, 57–58.)
I am hesitant to accept even the first premise. It is undeniably true that waking and 
dreaming experiences are phenomenally similar to a great extent, but empirical dream 
research doesn’t back up the claim that they would have equally rich and complex 
experiential contents (Hobson, Stickgold & Pace-Schott 1998). Further, I disagree with 
the second premise and the conclusion (the brain-boundedness of dream experiences 
leads to the general brain-boundedness of all experiences, and therefore an internalist 
theory of consciousness follows). The jump from dream experiences to all experiences 
cannot be taken in as straightforward a manner as Revonsuo assumes. I will discuss the 
reasons for this below, and my suggestions for answers to the dream argument (presented 
in following sections) deal with this very same question.
Even though I disagree with Revonsuo’s conclusion, and find his argumentation wanting 
in various ways, I do agree that he addresses an important matter – a challenge that is 
pressing for ECM, and deserves an answer. It is valuable as such to open the discussion, 
and by so doing demand an answer from the enactivists. The core of the challenge is 
perhaps best captured in Revonsuo’s (2015, 58) elaboration. Compare a sleeping person 
in dreamless sleep at T1 with a person at T2 in REM sleep and vivid dreaming. In the first 
                                                
141 Revonsuo’s paper targets sensorimotor enactivism in particular. However, the same argument can be 
used against ECM. There are some differences how a proponent of sensorimotor enactivism and a 
proponent of ECM can answer the challenge, though. I will elaborate these differences in the following 
sections.
142 As a technical matter, we might ask how empirical dream research could offer even in principle any 
support or resistance for the second statement, which aims to be a deductive inference, and not something 
that could be verified or falsified by empirical means.
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case the explanandum is completely absent, whereas in the second case it is present –
while everything in the dreamer’s environmental relations (or the lack of them) stays 
constant. Therefore, Revonsuo continues, as the only material differences are the neural 
differences between T1 and T2, they have to be constitutively responsible for the 
explanandum.
This shows why a prima facie obvious answer that is sometimes heard from 4E-minded 
people (see e.g. Noë 2009, 180) is problematic. It would seem natural to suggest that 
dreaming might as well happen completely in the head, but it wouldn’t be possible 
without all the previous environmental interactions we have had during our lives and over 
hundreds of thousands of years of evolution. Even though this “obvious” answer is not a 
straightforward solution, it is in line with the “explanatory strategies”, such as weak 
enactivism, which I will present later as one possible solution to the dream argument. 
However, this answer does not address the issue Revonsuo is posing with the dream 
argument. Internalists (such as Revonsuo) would probably accept the etiological role of 
external relations in (causal) explanation of dreams. As I will show soon, there are also 
ways to answer the argument that are based on constitutive strategy.143
Revonsuo’s aim is to criticise sensorimotor enactivism in general, but he only refers to 
one writer’s one book (i.e. Noë 2009).144 Moreover, the section where Noë discusses 
dreams is a short one. I mainly agree with Revonsuo’s critique regarding Noë’s view (I 
will discuss Noë’s view in section 5.5.2.1.) However, a few pages from one book (which 
also happens to qualify more as popular science than cognitive science) from one author 
is not a comprehensive sample of sensorimotor enactivism. Loorits (2017) has elaborated 
Revonsuo’s arguments, and stressed that sensorimotor enactivism contains different 
positions and facets regarding dreams, such as Hurley’s (2010) explanatory strategy, 
according to which dreams require a brain-bound explanation, even though with veridical 
experiences, a sensorimotor explanation is more apt. Another example is a skill-based 
view, supported e.g. by Myin (2016), that stresses the counterfactual element – skills, 
capabilities and dispositions to act, rather than online action – in the constitution of 
                                                
143 This said, my aim is not to undermine the causal, etiological relation that past waking life experiences 
and actions have on dreams, or their evolutive role.
144 Revonsuo himself criticises Noë for referring vaguely to only one dream researcher (Stephen LaBerge), 
and not even to his published research. I agree wholeheartedly with Revonsuo’s criticism.
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perceptual experiences.145 Hence, Revonsuo’s refutation of Noë’s view is not enough to 
prove the whole of sensorimotor enactivism wrong.
Loorits (2017) agrees with the conclusion Revonsuo draws: the existence of internally 
constituted dream experiences offers us reasons to believe that veridical experiences are 
also constituted internally. However, he also criticises Revonsuo’s straightforward 
argumentation in the two statements presented above. Revonsuo claims in his second 
premise that the brain-bound nature of dream experiences leads to the brain-bound nature 
of all experiences, including veridical waking-life perceptual experiences. This is too 
hasty a conclusion, and dream research does not offer any support for it. As Loorits (2017, 
111) notes, the empirical evidence Revonsuo refers to only shows that dream experiences 
and veridical experiences are phenomenologically similar. The conclusion Revonsuo 
draws is not the only possible consequence from this empirical fact. For example, one 
could equally well say that dream experiences and waking experiences are realised in a 
different manner. 
Even though the straightforward critique Revonsuo is using is not possible, it is true that 
dreaming shows that sensorimotor enactivism cannot pass the general theory of 
consciousness (Loorits 2017, 107), that is, a theory that comprises all areas of 
consciousness. Revonsuo’s argumentation rests on passing the general theory. According 
to him, if a theory “cannot explain dreaming in particular, then it cannot explain 
consciousness in general” (2015, 53). He seems to be under the impression that any kind 
of experience without the environmental relation will refute the externalist theory. 
However, this is not a necessity, and there is no principled reason why a theory of 
consciousness should be applicable to all cases of consciousness. To sum up, I agree with 
Revonsuo that dream experiences are brain-bound states that are phenomenologically 
sufficiently similar to veridical experiences. However, I disagree that this would lead to 
an internalist account of veridical (perceptual) experiences. In the next sections, I discuss 
different options to argue for this view.
                                                
145 I will call this view weak enactivism, and discuss whether it is of any help with the dream challenge in 
section 5.5.2.3. See also the discussion about weak vs. strong enactivism in chapter 2.
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5.5.2. Answering the dream challenge 
A proponent of ECM can try to answer the dream challenge in at least four ways. First,
it is possible to deny the connection between dream experiences and veridical experiences 
altogether. If dream experiences are not real experiences (or don’t belong to the same kind
with veridical experiences), obviously their existence doesn’t pose any threat to 
externalist theories. Second, we can look at the definition of experience itself. If it is 
understood in an enactivist way rather than as static what-it-is-likeness, the question 
changes. Third, we can appeal to a narrower interpretation of sensorimotor enactivism 
that stresses mastery of skills, and knowledge or understanding of sensorimotor 
contingencies rather than actual interactions between the subject and her environment. 
The skills may stay intact during dream experiences, and the core of enactivism prevail. 
Fourth, we can accept that experiences don’t have to extend in all cases. In the spirit of 
multiple realizability, it is possible to hold a view that certain veridical waking-life 
perceptual experiences have an extended base, whereas some other instances of 
experiences, such as in dreams, hallucinations and imaginations, are brain-based.146
In the following sections, I elaborate on the benefits and deficits of these different options. 
I will argue that the first option is problematic, mainly because it contradicts current 
dream research. Further, I admit that the second option might not make an opponent of 
externalism satisfied, because it presumes a conception of experience that is already 
extended. Perhaps this option should be read more as a descriptive statement than as an 
argument against the dream challenge. However, I think it still deserves its place because 
it reveals the significance of the conceptual background, as well as fundamental 
differences between the externalists and internalists. However, the third and fourth 
options are the best ways to surmount the challenge.
                                                
146 Of course, another obvious (but highly implausible) attempt to answer would be to claim that dream 
states are also extended. For example, perhaps the above-mentioned not total disembodiment would lead to 
extension, too. However, this line of argumentation is certainly not my strategy here. I have only seen one 
argument of this kind in the literature, namely by Riccardo Manzotti.
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5.5.2.1. Noë’s disjunctive enactivism
One option is to deny that veridical and dream experiences share the same 
phenomenological status. If dreams are not real experiences (because their phenomenality 
is different or lacking), the way they are constituted (internally or externally) is irrelevant 
for ECM. Alva Noë (2009)147 supports this kind of disjunctivist148 view in order to 
promote his sensorimotor approach. He admits that unlike veridical experiences, the
seemingly similar states we have during dreaming are not extended. This is not, however, 
a problem, since he holds that dream experiences are not real experiences to start with. 
Dreams and dream-like states only seem to be similar with veridical perceptual
experiences, but in fact they belong to different kinds. Going through what appears as “an 
experience of red” during a dream is phenomenologically different from a veridical 
waking-life experience of red, and only the latter is a real instance of an experience of 
red. Dreaming is less rich in details, “dream seeing” is not “real seeing”, and all dream 
experiences are based on earlier veridical experiences.
I call Noë’s view disjunctivist enactivism. His view is disjunctivist because what we call 
‘experiences’ are either 1) real, veridical perceptual experiences or 2) quasi-perceptual 
experiences that belong to a different kind. His view is enactivist because real experiences 
are based on an agent’s online actions in the real environment.149 Thus, Noë can hold a 
view according to which all (real) experiences are extended without needing to pursue 
the somewhat wild claim that experiences would be extended during dreams.
Noë’s view is problematic for many reasons. Part of the problem might be Noë’s vague 
language and argumentation rather than a general problem of sensorimotor enactivism. 
For example, he talks about perception when he refers to veridical perception, and also 
when he refers to dreams (that dreams are not perception). However, it makes no sense 
to declare that dream experiences are not perceptual experiences – it is a trivial fact.
                                                
147 Noë’s 2009 book is meant for a more general audience, and hence the argumentation is not always 
particularly meticulous. He has also discussed the dream question briefly elsewhere (see e.g. 2004; 2005; 
2008).
148 Disjunctivism rejects the view that experiences have a common nature: veridical, dream, hallucination,
etc. experiences belong to different kinds. They might appear similar, but the similarity is only ostensible. 
For disjunctivism in epistemology of perception, see e.g. Martin 2002; Fish 2008.
149 Disjunctivist enactivism is my term, neither Noë nor Revonsuo call it a disjunctivist view.
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The main problem is the core claim that dream experiences are not real experiences. This 
claim is not only unintuitive but also contradicts dream research – especially experiments 
with lucid dreamers indicate that dreams really are conscious experiences (see e.g. 
LaBerge et al. 1981; Windt 2015; Revonsuo 2015; Domhoff 2007). Even though dream 
experiences are not identical in every sense, they clearly fulfil the definition of
experiential states. They are sufficiently similar, as was stated in earlier sections. Noë also 
claims that dreams merely consist of experiences we have experienced previously (in 
waking-life). This claim is not supported by empirical studies (Revonsuo 2015), and even 
if was true, it wouldn’t back up the externalist account, since the causal background 
conditions are not what the dream argument is referring to anyway. Hence, the 
concessions we would need to take with Noë’s view are too serious to accept, and we can 
conclude that disjunctive enactivism cannot answer the dream challenge in a satisfying 
way.150
5.5.2.2. Experience as sense-making
Even though I found Noë’s view wanting, I think this underlying statement is valid: 
dreams are not experiences if we understand and define experiences as enactivists do. Let 
us observe what kind of concept of experience the dream challenge is dealing with. It 
seems that when Revonsuo speaks about experiences, he refers to static states of what-it-
is-likeness (reminiscent of qualia). However, if we understand experiencing as process-
like sense-making that is partly constituted by the very interactions the experiencer has 
with her environment, the setting changes. The enactivist notion of experience contains 
                                                
150 Apart from Noë’s account, there have been earlier attempts to claim that dreams are not experiences
(Malcolm 1959; Dennett 1976). Their argument was that all we know about dream experiences derives 
from the moment of waking up, so perhaps we never had the experiences but instead only false later 
memories of them. However, this view has been proved wrong by empirical dream research (see e.g. 
Revonsuo 2006).
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extension to start with: the organism–environment system that brings about conscious 
experience is decomposable. When experience is defined in this way, dreaming is 
obviously ruled out. Dream experiences don’t fulfil the definition of experience that 
enactivism is endorsing, and hence the challenge is solved.151
This kind of enactivist line drawing is of course a rather controversial way to answer the 
dream challenge, because it depends on our previous definition of the explanandum. 
Thus, it is a question-begging claim – when the question is whether dream experiences 
are experiences. Thus, an opponent of ECM probably would not be convinced with this 
option to answer the challenge. Of course, we can take this option as a descriptive rather 
than an argumentative point.
After all, as I have shown in other parts of this thesis, we have other, independent reasons 
to support the enactivist account of (some) experiences. As I have argued, experience is 
(partly) constituted by the skilful active relation with the environment. Especially 
sensorimotor enactivism that was presented in the second chapter stresses these features. 
Qualitative differences are explained by sensorimotor contingencies – the understanding 
of how our movements and actions affect our surroundings and objects in lawful ways. 
Our sensorimotor understanding of the world and the sense-making relationship created 
in that interaction constitutes the perceptual experience – it simply is the experience. 
When that relationship is absent – as in dreaming – experiences are absent. Admittedly, 
when dreaming, we certainly undergo processes that resemble sensorimotor experiences, 
but because the necessary constitutive element is missing, dreams cannot belong to the 
phenomenon that sensorimotor enactivism is describing. They are experiential states, but 
not those dynamic processes we have with our environment. Noë (2009, 179–180) writes:
[D]ream seeing is not really seeing at all. […] [W]e 
ought to think of perceiving as an activity of 
exploring the environment. It is not a process 
whereby a picture of the world is built up in your 
brain; rather, it is the activity whereby you achieve 
access to what is around you by making use of various 
different skills (of movement, of understanding, etc.). 
[…] The content of our experience – what we 
experience – is the world; in the world’s absence, we 
are deprived of content. For this reason, whatever we 
                                                
151 Perhaps this was what Noë had in mind in his 2009 book, but he doesn’t explicitly state this, so I don’t 
claim that this is Noë’s view.
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think and feel and say, when we dream, we are not 
seeing.
Revonsuo (2015, 61) criticises Noë for question-begging in his argumentation. It is true 
that Noë presupposes an externalist account of experiences, and does not truly face the 
challenge the dream argument poses. His opponent is no better when it comes to 
presuppositions. Revonsuo (2015, 56) writes: “I am here assuming an internalist theory 
of consciousness: consciousness is located inside the brain, and thus if there is any 
constitutive mechanism for consciousness, it must also reside in the brain”. How could a 
dialogue be possible between two completely opposite views that are based on strong 
presuppositions? It seems that neither of these writers can step out of their own 
background assumptions, where dream experiences are concerned. The following two 
options for answers (viz. weak enactivism and multiple realizability of experiences) are 
not based on presuppositions about conscious experience. In the next section, I will argue 
that enactivists can also answer the dream challenge without begging the question.
5.5.2.3. Weak enactivism
As it has now become clear, the dream argument shows that the online active explorative 
relationship with the environment is not necessary for there to be (some kind of) 
conscious experience. Environmental interactions are simply absent during dreams – we 
don’t probe, explore, touch, reach or move with our sleeping bodies152 – and hence a 
sensorimotor theory that depends on these relations cannot be applied to dreams. What 
does this mean for sensorimotor enactivists? Do we have to either commit to sensorimotor 
                                                
152 Of course sleepwalking, talking and various other activities (somnanbulism) sometimes occur, but they 
are connected with low conscious, non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep stages. However, usually during 
dreaming, the body is in a sort of paralysed state called REM muscle atonia. (Szelenberger et al. 2005.)
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enactivism and deny that dreams belong to its scope, or embrace internalism and deny 
sensorimotor enactivism? Fortunately, there is a third option. Sensorimotor enactivism 
can also be understood in a way that doesn’t require that the online relation is active in 
order to explain experiences. I am talking about weak enactivism, which was already 
briefly discussed in the second chapter (see section 2.3.3. and Aizawa 2010).153
According to weak enactivism, our knowledge of how we can access the world and how 
our actions affect it (namely knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies) is all that is 
needed for constituting experiences. As opposed to strong enactivism, the weak version 
abandons the requirement for an actual online bodily movement – the disposition to act 
is enough. In order to perceive a coffee cup as three-dimensional, we don’t have to walk 
around it, because we possess a knowledge (which of course originates from earlier online 
interactions) what it would very probably look like from the other sides, and how its 
appearance would change were we to observe it from different positions. For weak 
enactivism, possessing this knowledge is sufficient.
Of course, these skills and understanding of sensorimotor contingencies are already 
embedded in the actual interactions – the features described by weak enactivism are 
embedded in strong enactivism, but the feature specific to strong enactivism (i.e. online 
action) is not necessary. Strong enactivism explains not only (waking life) actions, such 
as reaching for a coffee cup, but also perceptual experience without action, such as 
looking at a coffee cup. Nevertheless, even in the latter case (looking at a coffee cup in a 
wakeful state), there is undoubtedly an online relation and access to the world – the cup 
is really there, there is real visual information coming from it to the retina, and perceivers 
know how their potential actions would affect the cup. With veridical perceptual 
experiences, I think strong enactivism is the best explanation, and there is no need to 
apply the weaker version, not even with apparently more “passive” experiences, such as 
having a perceptual experience of a blue coffee cup (i.e. colour perception). 
However, the situation might be different with dream experiences. Looking at a coffee 
cup in a dream is different. It cannot be explained by our actions, as was the case in 
reaching for the coffee cup in waking life. Neither can it be explained by an online access 
to the coffee cup, because there is no coffee cup. Hence, strong enactivism clearly cannot 
                                                
153 Loorits (2017) describes a somewhat similar account (which he then attempts to refute). He refers to 
Myin (2016) and Beaton (2013) as advocates of this kind of view.
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explain dream experiences. In the absence of actions and online access to the world, what 
is left? Even during dreaming, some of our capacities and skills remain intact. The 
understanding of sensorimotor contingencies that we have gained through our lives in the 
actual interactions with our environment doesn’t disappear altogether. We can reach for 
a dream coffee cup (and manage to get it in our dream hand or not) or walk around a 
dream house. We use the same skills in the dream environment as we use in waking life. 
The actions might have different and unexpected results, but our mastery of certain basic 
sensorimotor contingencies remains to a certain extent similar. Moreover, we don’t even 
have to move the dream cup (in the dream situation) because the possibility or disposition 
to move it is enough to count as mastering a skill. Thus, I suggest that weak enactivism 
could offer a way to explain dream experiences.
This should be taken as an explanatory strategy, rather than as an ontological or 
constitutive statement. The skilful understanding of sensorimotor contingencies plays an 
explanatory role in dream experiences. On the one hand, it explains the similarities with 
veridical experiences by appealing to the same skills we use in online perception. On the 
other hand, it explains the differences from veridical experiences by appealing to the lack 
of actions and online access to the world. I think this is the closest we can get to an 
enactivist explanation of dreams. In the next section, I will discuss an even more 
straightforward explanation that is not dependent on enactivism.
5.5.2.4. Multiple realizability of experiences
All the options so far were dependent on committing ourselves to stronger or weaker 
versions of enactivism. We have yet another option that is independent of the previous 
views, and independent of enactivism. This answer is to simply admit that experiences
are not extended during dreams, but that this is not a problem for ECM, since for ECM 
to be a sound theory, it is not necessary that all experiences are always extended. As 
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opposed to Noë’s view, this option is not to claim that dream experiences belong to a 
different kind than veridical experiences. Rather, it appeals to the possibility of the 
multiple realizability of experiences. Hence, internally constructed dreams don’t 
necessarily entail internally constructed veridical experiences, because veridical
perceptual experiences can be constituted in one way and dream experiences in another. 
They can be very similar, maybe they can even be phenomenally indistinguishable from 
each other but still have a different material basis.
For example, Hurley appoints dream-like states in the brain-bound sphere, and veridical 
perceptual experiences in the sphere of environmental interaction loops. (She calls the 
phenomenon variable neural correlates rather that multiple realizability, but the idea is 
the same.) According to her “neural correlates can vary despite sameness of quality”, and 
this happens across veridical experiences as well as between veridical and non-veridical 
experiences (Hurley 2010, 119). 
For this option, it is irrelevant whether the dream experiences and veridical experiences 
are phenomenally identical, somewhat similar or entirely different from each other. The 
crux is that their material realisation can differ either way – even if they are 
phenomenologically identical – if we accept the possibility of multiple realizability. This 
is obviously at least a logical possibility, but would it be possible to solve empirically? 
Can we show empirically that somewhat similar experiences can have a different material 
realisation? There is plenty of evidence that veridical experiences can be constituted in 
different ways. One example is neural plasticity. It provides an empirical example of how 
different brain areas can produce similar phenomenological states. The use of inverted 
goggles is also an example where different material realisations produce the same 
phenomenal experience before and after adaptation to the distortive lenses (Hurley 2010, 
119–120). Psychiatric disorders could be another example. For example, according to 
some philosophers of psychiatry, depression can be constituted in various different ways 
(see e.g. Borsboom, Cramer & Kalis 2019). 
Unfortunately, dream research doesn’t provide unambiguous results because the studies 
have found both similarities and differences at phenomenological and neurophysiological 
levels of explanation when comparing dreams and veridical experiences (for an overview, 
see Nir & Tononi 2010). It is uncontroversial that waking-life cognition enables and 
delimits dreams. On the other hand, some phenomenological differences (the ways in 
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which dreaming experiences differ from waking-life experiences) are accompanied by 
neurophysiological differences. Subjects’ cognitive and neural organisations are in 
accordance to an important degree in waking-life and dreaming. For example, children’s 
dreams develop consistently with their (waking-life) cognitive capacities: small 
children’s dreams are mostly simple and static. Patients with brain lesions have similar 
deficiencies in their dream experiences as in their waking-life experiences, e.g. patients 
with impaired face recognition do not dream of faces. (Nir & Tononi 2010; Domhoff 
2003; Foulkes 1999.)
All in all, empirical questions regarding dreams are far from settled. Nir and Tononi 
(2010) note that not even all dreams are constructed in the same way 
neurophysiologically, and thus researchers should treat “different kinds of dreams and 
their neural correlates separately”. However, it seems that empirical neuroscience cannot 
use multiple realizability as a general methodological tool – otherwise it would be 
impossible to make generalisations across species (see e.g. Bechtel & Mundale 1999). 
The multiple realizability argument is far from unproblematic, and my aim is not to claim 
that we need to commit to a strong metaphysical version of it in order to save ECM from 
the dream challenge.
Rather than committing to strong metaphysical claims, my intention with multiple 
realizability and the empirical cases supporting it has simply been to show that 
experiences don’t have to be realised in the same way, but instead their material 
constitutive basis can vary significantly. Dream research provides evidence for this. “In 
REM, the brain […] becomes activated but processes its internally generated data in a 
manner quite different from that of waking” (Hobson, Stickgold & Pace-Schott 1998, 1). 
During waking, brain activity is modulated by aminergic systems, while in REM sleep it 
is modulated by cholinergic systems (Hobson, Stickgold & Pace-Schott 1998; Pace-
Schott & Hobson 2002). Thus, it seems that the constitutive material basis differs (or at 
least it is not identical) between waking experiences and dream experiences.
A visual experience of a red apple can be constituted (partly) externally, and a dream 
experience of a dreamed red apple can be constituted entirely internally – and this is not 
a problem for my position. Most of the proponents of externalist views tend to agree that 
an all-encompassing extension is not necessary. Chemero and Silberstein (2008, 130) 
have phrased it clearly.
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Extended cognitive scientists need not claim 
that all of cognition is extended, just that some 
of it is. There is no a priori reason why some 
phenomenon might be given wholly brain 
internal explanations (e.g., dreams, certain 
kinds of pain), some given embodied accounts, 
while others will require explanations that span 
brain-body-environment systems (e.g., motor 
control, long division). Indeed, we all ought to 
embrace causal and explanatory pluralism 
about cognition. 
5.5.2.5. Conclusions from the dream argument
I claim that the reason why the dream challenge cannot refute ECM is a combination of 
the last three options I described above. The most important reason is simply the 
following: for ECM to be a sound theory, it is not necessary that all kinds of experiences 
are extended. A supporter of ECM doesn’t need to deny that dreams are real experiences 
(as Noë does), for empirical dream research has shown quite undeniably that they are 
genuine experiences. However, this is not a problem for ECM, as I have shown.
It is clear that a strong version of sensorimotor enactivism cannot explain dream 
experiences. A proponent of that view can justify this in two ways. On the one hand, it is 
possible to say that dream “experiences” are not experiences at all (as Noë does), or state 
that the enactivist concept of experience doesn’t include dream experiences by definition. 
On the other hand, if we are ready to accept the weaker version of enactivism, dream 
experiences can also be explained within the theory.
The dream argument would certainly work against a theory that claims that all 
experiences are always extended. However, I don’t think many people would commit 
themselves to this even amongst the strongest of enactivists. Even if they did, the same 
would not apply to ECM, because ECM is not a theory about all experiences, but about a 
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limited group of perceptual experiences. Ward has put into words the principal answer to 
the dream challenge and criticisms of similar kind (even though he is not talking about 
dreams). “What is required to rule out ECM is a reason to believe that neural states alone 
are always sufficient for the subpersonal basis of experience” (Ward 2012, 743).
Of course, yet one more straightforward (or simplifying) answer would be to say that 
because ECM is a theory about perceptual experience, and dreams are not perceptual 
experiences, their existence has nothing to do with ECM. However, this answer would 
bypass the challenge altogether, because its gist is to bring up that there are experiences 
that are very similar to the experiences that externalist theories are trying to explain, but 
which are constituted entirely internally. I think the proponents of ECM and other 
externalist views should rather welcome this kind of testing and trying out of their theory 
– for it offers a fine opportunity to improve and elaborate some questions that might 
otherwise have gone unnoticed. 
5.6. Summarising the counter-arguments
This chapter presented the most important arguments against extended experience, and 
offered suggestions how the challenges can be responded to. First, I showed that Clark’s 
two arguments against ECM (based on high-bandwidth and predictive processing) are 
unable to refute ECM. Interestingly, they share the same problem: were they true, they 
would not only refute ECM, but also Clark’s own theory of EM. This observation 
supports one of my main claims in this thesis: it is very difficult to argue for EM and deny 
ECM at the same time.
The last two counter-arguments (brain-in-a-vat and dreams and hallucinations) rest on the 
same idea: if we can show that there are some cases of internally constituted experiences, 
it follows that ECM is wrong. I showed especially with the dream argument that this 
190
argumentation is not sound. The same reasons can be applied to the brain-in-a-vat 
objection, too. However, I stressed different aspects in my answers. With the brain-in-a-
vat argument, I focused on the general implausibility of the whole scenario, whereas with 
the dream argument I did not challenge the internal nature of dream experiences, but 
rather the internalist conclusion that the opponent of ECM can draw from it.
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6. Concluding Remarks
In this study I have argued that one cannot consistently hold an externalist view about the 
material basis of cognition while denying it regarding consciousness. If one endorses EM, 
one has to endorse ECM as well. However, many philosophers have tended to overlook 
this. I presented several reasons why phenomenal experience cannot be omitted. In the 
beginning, I introduced the current externalist framework in philosophy of mind and 
cognitive sciences, and placed my own position at the top of third-wave externalism. I 
also outlined the central concepts, accounts and differentiations that were used and 
developed in the later chapters. 
In the second chapter, I argued that if we accept the general 4E-framework, we have to 
accept ECM as well. The arguments included bridges from the hypothesis of extended 
cognition (i.e. Clark & Chalmers’s EM) to ECM, from sensorimotor enactivism to ECM, 
and finally from the embodiment thesis to ECM. There is a way to understand the first 
(EM) and third (embodiment) premise theories without endorsing ECM. However, if this 
is done, it requires that the premise theories be significantly restricted. I argued that 
sensorimotor enactivism differs in this sense: it cannot be accepted without endorsing 
ECM as well.
In the third chapter, I tackled a subject matter that has gained a lot of attention in recent 
research in both philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, namely the causal–
constitution debate. I labelled “the constitution-turn” the immense interest in the ontology 
of constitution as a determining question whether EM and other externalist views are true. 
The abundance of literature started from Adams and Aizawa’s early critique of Clark and 
Chalmers’s EM, and later it spread to and got mingled with accounts in philosophy of 
science. Whilst using the new mechanist approach as a starting point, I argued that rather 
than in mechanist terms, the causal–constitution separation should be interpreted in 
diachronic–dynamical terms when we are dealing with mental phenomena. When 
understood in this way, the extension relation in ECM counts as constitutive. The 
discussion in this chapter was also a way of responding to two central critiques against 
ECM, namely the objections based on the causal–constitution fallacy, and the cognitive 
bloat argument.
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In the fourth chapter, I set the preconditions and limits for my position of ECM. I started 
by distinguishing between four degrees of extension: short-term extension, integration,
prosthetic incorporation and functional incorporation. The last one is required for ECM: 
the external tool has to be part of the transparent bodily point of view and under the 
sensorimotor control of the subject. Based on the notion of functional incorporation, I 
formulated the glue & trust criteria for ECM. They include: quasi-transparency,
sensorimotor control, ownership, sense of agency and sense-making attitude. Finally, I 
discussed a phenomenon that fulfils my glue & trust conditions, and of which there is a 
great deal of empirical research available, namely sensory substitution technology.
Finally, in the fifth chapter, I discussed four counter-arguments that have been set forth 
against ECM: 1) the argument from high-bandwidth, 2) the argument from predictive 
processing, 3) the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, and 4) the dream challenge. The 
last two concern the same theme: if we can have phenomenal experiences without online 
interactions with the environment, does that show that internalism also prevails with 
perceptual experiences? With the former objection, I concentrated on showing how the 
brain-in-a-vat thought experiment is not on a firm ground to start with, because it is based 
on a highly dubious science-fiction scenario. With the latter objection, I presented 
different ways to answer the dream challenge, and concluded that a strong version of 
(sensorimotor) enactivism cannot explain dream experiences. My main solution to the 
dream argument was simply that it is not necessary that all kinds of experiences are 
always extended for ECM to be a valid theory about certain perceptual experiences. 
Internally constructed dreams do not lead to internalism in the case of veridical 
experiences. Veridical perceptual experiences can be constituted in one way and dream 
experiences in another.
This study is exceptional within the 4E framework because it combines the analytic view 
(of Clark and Chalmers) with the enactivist view. This kind of unifying contribution has 
been lacking from both analytic accounts of the extended mind, and from enactivist 
accounts of the mind. As I wrote in the first chapter, there has been an appeal for this kind 
of broader account, since a comprehensive analysis of ECM has not been written before. 
One of this study’s assets is that it combines the empirical sciences with philosophy of 
mind, which is not always done in philosophy. 
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However, the work is not over. This study raised several questions for future research, for 
example regarding the relationship of the predictive processing framework and ECM, the 
status of dream experiences, and the role of developmental robotics in testing the 
sensorimotor accounts of the mind. It also encourages asking more wide-ranging 
pragmatic and ethical questions, for example about psychiatric disorders: should we give 
a more significant role to environmental and social relations when deciding on the 
diagnosis and treatment? Or how should we interpret the legal status of a device that 
functions as part of the mental system: is harming a smartphone or laptop an assault on 
one’s property or on one’s person? Furthermore, this research might provide tools for 
related areas that were not directly addressed in it. Even though this study focused on 
extended perceptual experience, I think some of the results can be applied in questions 
regarding the potential extension of affectivity, self and social interactions. After all, they 
all share the experiential side, although the accounts otherwise differ.
Clark & Chalmers’s opening question was “where does the mind stop and the rest of the 
world begin?” However, as we have seen throughout this thesis, the where-question is not 
as straightforward as some might think. It should not be interpreted as a question about 
the fixed location of the mind. On the contrary, the focus on location is downplayed within 
the 4E-framework. Instead, the boundaries, and hence the location, are negotiable and 
changing. What counts as boundaries of the mind varies depending on what kind of 
environment we are in, and what kind of opportunities and affordances that environment 
offers. What matters is what we do and how we exploit the resources. Whether a blind 
person’s cane, a mass murderer’s smartphone, or a forgetful person’s diary are part of 
their minds depends on how the devices are used and whether they are integrated or 
incorporated into their users.
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